

JOURNAL OF SECURITY AND CRIMINAL SCIENCES

Banja Luka, 2024

JOURNAL OF SECURITY AND CRIMINAL SCIENCES

Publishers:

Faculty of Security Studies University of Banja Luka

Address: Bulevar vojvode Živojina Mišića 10 a
78000 Banja Luka, Republika Srpska
Phone: +387 51 333 603
<https://fbn.unibl.org/>

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Phone: +381 11 3161 444
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Journal's web address: <https://fbn.unibl.org/casopis/>

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Print:

Mako print, Banja Luka

Circulation: 100

ISSN 2637-3076

The journal is published twice a year

The Journal of Security and Criminal Sciences (is registered in the Register of Public Media of the Ministry of Education and Culture of the Republika Srpska under number 688)

EDITORIAL INTRODUCTION

As the sixth year of publication of the *Journal of Security and Criminal Sciences* draws to a close, culminating in an outstanding twelfth issue (outstanding due to the quality of its articles), the editorial board has reason to be pleased. Ranked in the top category of national scientific journals in Republika Srpska, the *Journal* certainly deserves to remain among the selected few. The topics covered by the authors are both intriguing and current, ranging from reflective management of social networks and special evidentiary actions, through crime prevention through environmental design, to the migrant crisis and the security implications it brings.

In his article “Reflective Management through Social Networks as a Security Challenge,” Stevo Jaćimovski argues that reflective management is a method for managing complex systems. In the introductory section, he addresses “reflective management and its impact on social structures through social networks.” The author has identified this task as a priority in research and a fundamental security challenge, “particularly pronounced in recent decades due to the development of new technologies.” In this context, he emphasizes that reflective management “is becoming increasingly significant in the field of state security systems.” Although it might be concluded that Jaćimovski will focus on regional aspects of this issue—that is, on the “former Yugoslav republics, the Western Balkans, and the post-Soviet space”—the problem extends far beyond these boundaries (both geographically and conceptually), thereby adding further value to his work. This is because we live in an era where countries that once championed democratic values and emphasized freedom of speech and the press are now imposing sanctions on the media group Russia Today. The FBI is raiding the homes of their correspondents in the U.S., with accusations and explanations stating that these actions are taken “due to their connections with destabilizing activities of the Russian Federation abroad.”

Jaćimovski precisely defines reflective management as “the influence of one party (manipulator, subject) on the decisions made by an opponent or partner (object) by imposing (forcing) initial premises on which the object acts in a manner desired by the manipulator,” or when “the management subject creates an informational field over the controlled object.” Discussing the mechanisms of reflective management, the author highlights the role of language as a fundamental tool of influence on individuals, emphasizing that “a person does not live solely in a world of objects and events, but also in a world of language, which forms the basis for them.” Regarding social networks, Jaćimovski points out the role of moderators, who possess broader rights than ordinary social media users. He notes that moderators “have the authority to delete and edit other users’ messages, remove user pages, and restrict users’ rights to edit and view the site.”

In the section titled “Techniques for Implementing Reflective Management,” Jaćimovski outlines characteristic directions of action, which include: computer technology or software-mathematical influence on social networks; influence on decision-makers; influence on individual users; and influence through agents of influence. Examples include the dismantling of power in Serbia (October 5), the color revolutions in the Middle East and Ukraine, and “creating the perception of the harmless effect of depleted uranium on human health in Serbia and Republika Srpska under the influence of ‘authorities’ from medical circles.” Finally, Jaćimovski addresses the very current concept of “hybrid warfare” and suggests that, in order to counteract the effects of such wars, attacked states “should establish, within their security structures, bodies composed of competent individuals trained to conduct hybrid warfare. These bodies would monitor and undertake measures to prevent malicious informational influence on all segments of society.” Overall, the topic and approach are interesting, with a strong reliance on Russian authors who have systematically addressed this issue over a longer period of time.

In their co-authored article “Special Evidentiary Measures – A Comparative Study of Serbia and Slovakia,” Zvonimir Ivanović and Adrian Vaško analyze the circumstances and situations in which security services apply special evidentiary actions, which may also be referred to differently (for example, in Bosnia and Herzegovina, they are known as special investigative actions). The application of these measures is always sensitive as they infringe upon citizens’ privacy. Therefore, it is necessary to adhere to the judicial procedures outlined in the Criminal Procedure Code. When intelligence services resort to these measures, they follow provisions of other laws and the orders of specific authorities (for instance, in Bosnia and Herzegovina, it is the Court of BiH, while for police actions, the Criminal Procedure Code is applicable, with approval given by the preliminary proceedings judge based on the prosecutor’s proposal). In Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Intelligence and Security Agency (OBA) is analogous to Serbia’s Security Information Agency (BIA), but Serbia also has a military service, the Military Security Agency (VBA), which can implement similar measures following the legally prescribed procedure. The second military service in Serbia is the Military Intelligence Agency (VOA), which is also explained in the article: “Special evidentiary actions (PDR) are generally authorized through a document in the form of an order issued by the judge for the preliminary proceedings, based on a reasoned proposal from the public prosecutor in charge, provided that the conditions stipulated by the Code are met—both general (Articles 161 and 162 of the CPC) and, for each measure, specific. This procedure is applied when the Ministry of the Interior of the Republic of Serbia participates in the execution and implementation of the PDR. However, special laws (such as the Law on the Security and Information Agency and the Law on the Military Security Agency and Military Intelligence Agency) govern the handling, approval, and oversight of other entities with procedural authority (activity).” When comparing the legal solutions in Serbia with those in Slovakia, the authors highlight significant differences. In this context, one of

the key distinctions is emphasized: “There is a difference between criminally-oriented activities—in cases of suspected criminal activity—and other situations; intelligence activities—with evidentiary capacities.”

The authors do not address the oversight of the measures they examine, but this could potentially be the topic of another paper, focusing on the control of police and intelligence services in the application of special evidentiary actions.

In their article “Crime Prevention through Environmental Design – The Path to Standardization,” Tanja Stupar and Davor Stupar explore the “crime prevention through environmental design (CPTED) model.” According to this model, as the authors point out, alongside measures implemented by criminologists, crime prevention can also be influenced by shaping and organizing public spaces, that is, through urban design. Appropriate design and effective use of space can lead to a reduction in both the fear of crime and the occurrence of criminal activities, while improving the quality of life for residents. As highlighted, “the goal of CPTED is to make every location unsuitable for criminal activities while ensuring it is safe for citizens.” However, for this model to be applied more seriously, the authors emphasize that “it is necessary to incorporate CPTED standards, strategies, and principles into the legislative and policy framework, as well as into national policy guidelines and city regulations for urban design and planning.”

One of the theorists who substantially contributed to the development of CPTED is Jane Jacobs, whom the authors frequently cite. The authors conclude that “the built environment should be designed to enhance the style and quality of life by meeting people’s physical, social, and economic needs, as well as providing a safe place to live.” As stated in the article, “this can be achieved through crime prevention through environmental design (CPTED).”

The article “Security Crises as a Factor of Migration to the European Union” by Martin Matijašević and Darko Todorović points out that security-driven migration has a long history and that crises have always been a generator of migration. However, “the issue of migrant integration is becoming increasingly urgent due to the large number of migrants who have entered Europe over the past two decades.” The authors analyze reports from international organizations to highlight the key security crises as a factor driving migration to the European Union.

Through a historical overview of migration, its causes, and the reasons behind migratory waves, the authors emphasize that “migration poses a security challenge for the European Union not only in terms of increasing the threat of terrorism but also due to the potential for regional conflicts.” By reviewing various criminal activities committed by migrants and the animosity they face from the local population, Matijašević and Todorović conclude that in several EU countries, there are “growing anti-migrant sentiments that view migrants as a threat to cultural identities and the welfare system.”

The new book *Exercises Supported by Computer Simulations in the Training of Protection and Rescue Forces* by Dragisha Jurišić and Goran Maksimović published by the Faculty of Security Studies, University of Banja Luka, is certainly a work deserving of attention. As noted by the reviewer, Dragan Mlađan, a distinguished professor at the University of Criminal Investigation and Police Studies in Belgrade, this is “the first book in this region that addresses the use of modern technologies in the training of protection and rescue forces.” The authors highlight the shortcomings in the current training systems for protection and rescue forces at all levels in Bosnia and Herzegovina, noting that this training does not ensure “an efficient and effective response by these forces in emergency situations.” The development of computers, software, and hardware has enabled unprecedented capabilities, especially in terms of using modern technology for training. The primary idea behind the book is “to present exercises supported by computer simulations and to provide the essential elements for their planning, organization, implementation, and evaluation.”

Overall, the *Journal of Security and Criminal Sciences* continues to expand its network of authors and readers.

Editor-In-Chief

Predrag Čeranić

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REFLECTIVE MANAGEMENT THROUGH SOCIAL NETWORKS AS A SECURITY CHALLENGE

Review Article

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| DOI: 10.5937/zurbezkrim2402011J | COBISS.RS-ID 141414145 | UDK 316.776:004.738.5 |
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Abstract: Reflective management is one of the methods used for managing complex systems. This paper examines various aspects of reflective management and its impact on social structures through social networks. Examples of reflective influence on the motivation of social network users are provided. An assessment of the consequences of reflective management on the corresponding societal structures in terms of security is also presented.

Keywords: Reflective management, social networks, motivation, users, security

INTRODUCTION

The concept of *society* often implies that its members share some common concerns or interests towards a common goal. As such, the term society is frequently used as a synonym for the people of a country who have common institutions responsible for civic welfare (Wikipedia, n.d.a). A social community represents a very complex system. The behavior of a complex system, which is aimed at achieving a goal, is realized through appropriate management. There are several types of management in complex systems, with the following three types being characteristic:

- Programmatic management, which leads the system to achieve the goal through appropriate commands that follow a specific program.
- Reflective management, which is realized in the system by introducing certain motives into the system that stimulate the achievement of the desired goal;
- Adaptive management,² which achieves the goal by having lower-level subsystems fragmentarily copy the behavior of higher-level subsystems. These higher-level subsystems must have appropriate receptors and effective means and capabilities to assess their impact on the environment.

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² It is particularly prevalent in living complex systems.

In the centuries-old philosophical tradition, reflection was understood as the ability to analyze one's own thoughts. In the 1960s, Vladimir Lefebvre (Владимир Лефевр) significantly expanded the understanding of reflection by introducing the concepts of reflective systems and reflective management, which fundamentally changed the way that complex social systems are studied (Лефевр, 2003).

This paper addresses reflective management through social networks as a security challenge, which has become particularly pronounced in recent decades due to the development of new technologies. This method of management is widely prevalent in the spheres of economy, education, culture, and politics. In light of current global events, the collapse of the unipolar system, the emergence of a multipolar system, the intensification of inter-state relations, and the development and application of new technologies, reflective management is becoming increasingly significant for study and understanding, particularly in the area of state security systems, especially in the regions of the former Yugoslav republics, the Western Balkans, and the post-Soviet space.

REFLECTIVE MANAGEMENT

At the core of reflective management lies a motivational mechanism. The interacting parties, or opponents, will be referred to as the subject and the object. The opponent (the object of management) is outmaneuvered by the subject through the imposition of false motivations for future actions. Reflective management involves influencing an opponent or partner to accept what is unfavorable for them but advantageous for the party engaging in reflective management (Лефевр, 2009).

Reflective management is the influence exerted by one party (the manipulator, the subject) on the decisions made by the opponent or partner (the object) by imposing initial premises that lead the object to act in the manner desired by the manipulator.

In our case, reflective management occurs when the subject creates an informational field around the controlled object. This field contains information about what the controlled object should do. Consequently, the object performs actions determined by the subject. The object believes that this decision was made voluntarily and that they had the freedom of choice (Цырельчук et al., 2008).

The foundation of reflective management consists of various psychological mechanisms that influence the formation of opinions and decision-making processes of individuals. Such mechanisms (like conformity, self-image "I", social

“I”, etc.) are well-studied and are used to impose specific goals when transmitting information by those who wish to manage a particular target group.

Conformity as a phenomenon represents the adaptation of an individual to society or social groups. To function adaptively within human society, everyone must, to some extent, be conformists, that is, adhere to the norms and requirements of the society in which they live. The other option is to live in isolation from others, as only then can one live according to one’s own discretion and rules. Psychological experiments have been conducted concerning the process of conformity. The most famous is the so-called Asch experiment, which was devised by Polish psychologist Solomon Asch in 1950 (Wikipedia, n.d.b). In this experiment, the respondent was placed in a group of 5 to 7 confederates, who were aware of the true purpose of the experiment but were presented to the respondents as genuine participants. The participants were shown a card with a single line, followed by another card with three lines labeled A, B, and C.




Figure 1. Asch experiment

The objective of the experiment was to determine whether respondents would conform, despite the correct answer being obvious, and respond incorrectly due to the pressure of confederates. The majority of the respondents agreed with the incorrect answer, even though they believed otherwise.

When Solomon Asch later asked the participants why they did not trust their own eyes, some responded that they thought they were not seeing correctly since everyone else answered differently. Others knew that the others were giving wrong answers but feared social rejection and thus answered in line with the majority.

This conformity experiment scientifically confirmed how difficult it is to resist group pressure. It also highlighted the immense influence of the group and how challenging it is for the average person to stand out and oppose the majority.

The self-image or “I” of a person is a stable set of their psychological attitudes, value orientations, sensory preferences, and views on various aspects of life. It is important that the concept of the “I” is a holistic construct, a special standard through which we perceive the world around us and our actions within it. It is clear that for continuous action and assessment of changes in the external world, a stable and unchanging standard is necessary. Therefore, a person has psychological defense mechanisms aimed at preserving the “I” unchanged.

Another important concept of a person is the “social I”—a system of moral values, moral guidelines, ideas about God, good and evil, heroes and enemies, the meaning of history, and other fundamental concepts. We can assume that the “social I” is our collective “I” (Андриенко, 2000).

In the process of reflective management, it is fundamentally important to spread such information through social networks that will undermine faith in the value system of the “I” and the “social I” (or bring them into conflict) within a particular social community. Under these conditions, individuals and the entire community accept the imposed value attitudes as their own (Лепский, 2003).

Language

The influence on an individual, on their “I” or “social I”, is exerted through various means, the primary one being language. Since childhood, people have been accustomed to viewing and judging the world through a system of structured words, phrases, and statements. From the moment of birth, a child experiences the world around them through their native language, in which all objects, phenomena, and feelings have their labels. Gradually, it becomes apparent that fundamental knowledge about the world is formulated in a linguistic, verbal form, creating a logosphere.

A person does not live only in a world of objects and events but also in a world of language, which is foundational for them.

The change in the vocabulary of a language can be natural, reflecting changes in living conditions. Additionally, the change can be artificial, designed to alter life by either reducing its understanding or enhancing it.

Language, as a system of concepts through which a person perceives the world and society, is the most important means of subjugation. The widespread use of new words that sound exotic in the media is a likely sign of a large informational campaign aimed at specific economic and political goals. Slogans directly “set the direction” of behavior because they already contain instructions for actions ready to be followed. We are witnessing the uncontrolled use of the English language and, in this way, the imposition of Anglo-Saxon concepts, value systems, etc. This phenomenon has become particularly pronounced with the development and use of new technologies developed in the USA.

For example, Hollywood and its productions are considered to have imposed their system of values on the rest of the world, similarly to the military and economic power of the USA.

SOCIAL NETWORKS

By the end of the twentieth century, humanity had entered the era of information technology. The IT industry deals with the production, processing, storage, and transmission of information. The introduction of modern information technologies has led to the widespread use of communication through social networks and the emergence of a new social phenomenon—the phenomenon of virtual social networks in the global Internet space. The Internet represents a virtual network that serves as a medium for providing services related to establishing connections between its users and the information resources corresponding to their interests, which are installed on websites of the global network.

Social networks provide a range of important social functions: communication among their members, the exchange of information between them, the formation of virtual interest groups, professional communities, and more. Unfortunately, these networks often replace live human communication. As a result, the perception of reality by network users is transformed and shifts into the virtual world. The involvement of millions of people in a virtual environment enables the shaping and manipulation of public opinion (Лепский, 2010a).

The role of social network moderators

Computer network technologies enhance the effectiveness of reflective management. Social networks create a specific virtual world that surrounds the user. This world is shaped by diverse information circulating through the network, through the natural reflection of reality during direct communication between participants of certain events and the dissemination of their information via social networks, as well as through the formation of informational situations by specially trained specialists.

At first glance, it may seem that a person has access to various sources, perspectives, and evaluations of reality. It appears that the user has access to a world of objective, independent information, which will enable them to form true beliefs and motivate their further actions in the right direction.

In reality, the flow of information is controlled by moderators who have broader rights than ordinary users on social network platforms. They have the authority to delete and edit others' messages, delete user accounts, restrict users' rights to edit and view the site. Each site has its specific list of moderator permissions and responsibilities (Лепский, 1999).

The purpose of moderation systems is ostensibly to maintain order on the site and control content rather than user behavior. However, moderators often overlook this distinction. To influence user motivation, they may engage in the strategic “insertion” of specially prepared information into the network, which induces specific user behaviors. This can involve spreading rumors, publishing

unverifiable information, refuting or confirming analytical reports, and disseminating information that convinces the public of the veracity of certain events.

Additionally, moderators determine the editing or deletion of messages on the network. Consequently, the meaning of information can be distorted, influencing the beliefs of network users. Individuals with unstable views, weak “I” or “social I”, easily succumb to the required norms of social behavior (Лепский, 2010b).

Example 1: When the United States was preparing to attack Yugoslavia, it managed to gain total control over almost all information flows in the Western Hemisphere (including internet channels). Western internet resources operated under command, and any deviation from U.S. guidelines was suppressed. As a result, the entire world believed that the Serbs were responsible for the killings of Albanians, while Kosovar fanatics were turned into innocent victims.

Example 2: The restriction on publishing information by then-U.S. President Donald Trump during the 2020 election campaign on the social network “Twitter.”

TECHNIQUES FOR IMPLEMENTING REFLECTIVE MANAGEMENT

The implementation of reflective management has a multi-vector character. Here are some characteristic directions of action:

- Computer technology or software-mathematical influence on social networks
- Exerting influence on decision makers
- Exerting influence on individual users
- Influence through agents of influence

Computer technology

This section addresses the influence of the subject of reflective management on technical means of collecting, processing, transmitting, and displaying information to impose their viewpoints on the opposing side.

On the one hand, computer technologies reduce the time required for gathering, processing, and transmitting information, while on the other hand, they significantly shorten the decision-making time. Under these conditions, technical means can distort information, ultimately leading to the formation of the necessary influence on users by virtual reality.

In this context, software-mathematical influence on social networks aims to distort, replace, or destroy information stored in social network databases or reduce the efficiency of their operation, or disable computers or networks.

The main methods of influence in the field of computer technologies can include embedded “logic bombs,”³ computer viruses, special programs, and other means for destroying, suppressing, and falsifying information, including tools for protection against these attacks.

Exerting influence on decision-makers

The next segment of reflective management is the influence on decision-makers. This influence can be exerted through user groups that hold authority for a particular individual and are united in a network by conducting a set of reflective control actions. In this way, it is possible to achieve the desired decision from leaders through intermediaries who have been subject to reflective influence.

Altering the assessments and views of people who are decision-makers can create conditions for controlling various processes. Having a tool such as social networks can elicit a desired reaction from users as a result of coercion or encouragement to take appropriate action (Лепский, 2010).

An appropriately formed informational situation can prompt public opinion towards protest actions, which in turn forces the military-political leadership of a country to take retaliatory measures. Simultaneously, by compelling individuals to make wrong decisions, it is possible to create an impression of incompetence among those responsible for these decisions in the top leadership or public. This can lead to the removal or restriction of the powers of certain leaders. Such provocations can result in a loss of initiative among leaders at various levels or the formation of public opinion and sentiment that creates difficulties for the functioning of government bodies. This leads to the creation of a state of controlled chaos and instability within social communities.

Example: The overthrow of the government in Serbia in 2000, color revolutions in the Middle East, Ukraine, and so on.

Influence on decision-makers can also be exerted through user groups that represent authority for a particular person and are united in a network by conducting a set of reflective control actions. In this way, it is possible to achieve the desired decision from leaders through intermediaries who have been subject to reflective influence.

Example: Creating the perception of the harmless impact of depleted uranium on human health in Serbia and Republika Srpska under the influence of “authorities” from medical circles (Jokić, 2008), reducing the number of victims in death camps in the NDH under the influence of leading in the field of historical sciences, and so on.

³ A logical bomb is a malicious program designed to cause damage at a specific point in time, but remains inactive until that moment.

Exerting influence on individual users

Reflective management can be organized separately for each network user through targeted informational influences, allowing for specific impacts on their decisions. The total potential actions of users will be formed from the set of expected actions of these individuals, and through coordinated management via social networks, it is possible to achieve more global results of their subcontrol activities.

Example: The collapse of the “Twin Towers” in New York City in 2001. Despite assertions from construction experts about the impossibility of their collapse due to airplane impacts, the incident influenced citizens to accept it as a terrorist act threatening every U.S. citizen. This activity is considered to have been directed against the American population itself, aiming to restrict their rights guaranteed by the U.S. Constitution.

Influence through agents of influence

Through social networks, it is possible to create a foundation for “agents of influence” to implement changes in existing behavioral stereotypes of people and alter their beliefs, thereby determining the activities of organizations, groups, and specific individuals. By creating the right conditions, the legalization of inserted agents can be facilitated. Consequently, this can influence the quality of enacted laws, obstruct or promote their consideration, encourage public support for a project, and motivate agents of influence to implement it.

REFLEXIVE CONTROL IN THE MILITARY DOMAIN

Recent events concerning leaked Pentagon documents have brought the practice of reflexive control into the spotlight, which many scholars recognize as one of the most effective methods of conducting modern, so-called hybrid wars (Лепский, 2016).

A striking example of the successful and comprehensive use of reflexive control techniques during World War II was Operation Mincemeat, conducted by the British Admiralty’s intelligence division (Воеводин, 2000). This operation implemented the technique of “making the false seem real, and the real false.” The Allied forces needed to capture Sicily. While Sicily remained in German hands, they controlled the entire Mediterranean; without capturing Sicily, it was impossible to launch military operations in Italy. How could the Allies ensure that the Germans believed that another target, rather than Sicily, would be the primary objective of the Allied forces? The decision was to misinform the enemy. To achieve this, it was planned that documents revealing the Allies’ plans would fall into enemy hands.

The scenario developed as follows: the body of a staff officer, along with a letter, was found in the sea. The officer had been flying from England to Africa when his plane was shot down. The officer fell into the sea wearing a life jacket and perished. The letter he carried indicated that the preparations for an attack on Sicily were a diversionary maneuver, and the real strike would be directed at Sardinia and the eastern Mediterranean, with troops landing in Greece.

The results of Operation Mincemeat were profound. The Germans concentrated their troops in Greece, undertook extensive coastal fortification work, laid minefields, and positioned coastal batteries. They even redeployed a tank division to Greece. Significant resources were transferred from Sicily to Sardinia and Corsica. By the time the German command realized that Sicily was the actual target, it was too late to rectify the mistake.

A similar operation occurred during the Allied landings in Normandy in World War II (Воеводин 2000). Throughout this period, German forces were misled by various techniques into believing that the landings would occur across the English Channel at Calais (a logical assumption given that Calais is the closest point to the British coast). When German forces were partially redeployed to strengthen defenses at Calais, the Allies landed in Normandy, significantly farther from Calais.

The key elements of reflexive control, from a security-military perspective, are as follows (Берега, 2023; Бухарин, 2007):

- Distraction: Creating real or imaginary threats to vital enemy positions (flanks, rear, etc.) during the preparatory phase of military operations, forcing the enemy to reconsider the rationale of their decisions;
- Overloading: Bombarding the enemy with large volumes of contradictory information to overwhelm their decision-making processes;
- Paralysis: Creating the perception of specific threats to the enemy's vital interests or weakest points, leading to indecision or inaction;
- Exhaustion: Forcing the enemy to undertake futile actions, thereby depleting their resources and weakening their armed forces;
- Deception: Provoking the enemy to redeploy their armed forces to a threatened region during the preparatory phases of military operations, based on false information;
- Division: Convincing the enemy to act against the interests of their coalition, causing internal strife and weakening their collective efforts;
- Assurance: Persuading the enemy that ongoing preparations are merely routine training exercises rather than offensive actions, thus lowering their vigilance;
- Intimidation: Creating a perception of overwhelming superiority to demoralize the enemy;
- Provocation: Forcing the enemy into actions that are beneficial to the other side;

- Suggestion: Spreading information that legally, morally, or ideologically influences the enemy's decisions and actions;
- Pressure: Disseminating information that discredits the enemy's leadership in the eyes of their population, undermining their authority and control.

CONCLUSION

Information influence through social networks can take the form of creating various situations, effects, and information stimuli. These stimuli motivate certain individuals or the public to accept decisions that benefit the influencing party, leading to actions based on these decisions. By subordinating the consciousness and behavior of the enemy's leadership, the influencing party creates conditions for superiority over them. Historically, this superiority has been held by Western countries.

However, with the rapid development of social networks on the Internet, independent networks have emerged, free from government and political influences. Additionally, the rise of influential information resources created in China, Russia, and Muslim countries within the global information space has disrupted the long-standing dominance of Western information resources. These new resources are being utilized in an information war aimed at creating a fairer world for future generations. This information war is a struggle against the emerging global order, which promotes LGBT culture and arts, Satanism in ideology, the cult of the digital world intending to usher us into the Matrix of a global government, the WHO acting as a medical Gestapo, among other threats (Губанов, 2010).

States should establish bodies within their security structures composed of competent individuals trained in hybrid warfare. These bodies would monitor and take measures to prevent malicious informational influence on all segments of society.

However, what measures can be proposed to protect individuals from information influence? Unfortunately, all state measures will be insufficient, as the information security of an individual primarily depends on the individual themselves. There is only one way to develop self-awareness and reflection: a state policy that prioritizes science, culture, and education.

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Paper received on: 22/2/2024

Paper accepted for publishing on: 2/9/2024

SPECIAL EVIDENTIARY MEASURES – A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF SERBIA AND SLOVAKIA

Review Article

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| DOI: 10.5937/zurbezkrim24020231 | COBISS.RS-ID 141414401 | UDK 343.14/.15:343.98 |
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Abstract: There is a trend across European countries to incorporate various successful measures into national legislation, and the two cases presented in this article are no exception. However, these implementations vary due to the legal cultures and attitudes of legislatures in each country. Naturally, the Republic of Serbia faces specific demands related to its obligations, which are strict, pertaining to accession to the EU, with the negotiation process imposing numerous conditions on legislative efforts and outcomes. This article examines special evidentiary (investigative) measures, their status within the legal systems of both countries, and the variations between them. The originality of this work stems from the relevance of the legal, practical, and evidentiary solutions provided by both legislatures, as well as the trials conducted by European Community courts and practices based on Slovak results within the legal system of the European Community.

Keywords: special evidentiary measures, proving, evidence, police, criminal procedure.

INTRODUCTION

When considering media and its influence on the masses, one cannot ignore the role of state surveillance, which shapes such influence. Countries are closely monitored by various actors, ranging from international bodies to NGOs. This also raises concerns about human rights violations and intrusions, which must be analyzed in this context. In this regard, numerous rules are established for enforcers, rather than offering opportunities to track these activities in the region. The many interested parties and their pursuit of results make it nearly impossible to assist them all in overcoming the standards and significant ob-

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stacles imposed by lawmakers and control mechanisms to ensure success. This is due to a democratic understanding of law enforcement and the prevailing failure to recognize the real intrusions by state agencies into citizens' rights, as potential shortcomings in the implementation of these measures often remain unaddressed. Ultimately, various questions arise regarding the enforcement of surveillance measures, and this article discusses two different yet similar approaches. The similarity stems from the legacy of previous communist regimes and legal systems, with one country already having joined the EU and the other in the accession process for over 15 years. In the context of Serbia's EU accession and negotiations, Chapters 23 and 24 of the Acquis are of utmost importance, as they outline key milestones and conditions for the accession process. Therefore, more attention should be given to judicial rules, measures under judicial oversight, and measures that involve the deprivation of fundamental freedoms and liberties, which this article seeks to explore. The overall aim is to identify the obstacles Slovakia overcame in its compliance with the European Acquis, so Serbia can avoid repeating these challenges or, at the very least, attempt to implement Slovakia's solutions.

DISCUSSION

In Serbia, various actions are defined by the Criminal Procedure Code – CPC² in a procedural sense. These include: search activities, evidentiary actions, and special evidentiary actions. Among search activities, the first is the search of vehicles, passengers, and luggage. This is a very common action and includes police powers as outlined in Article 286, Paragraph 2, Article 64, Paragraph 9, and partially in Article 98 of the CPC for:

- Stopping the vehicle
- Public or private and search
- People in it
- There are some differences depending on what kind of luggage
- Closed parts of the vehicle are tackled by Law on police art.97, but for water vessel art. 98.
- Report is mandatory

Specific search activities in Serbia include counter-diversion searches (Ivanović & Baić, 2020), which are prescribed by Article 96 of the Law on Police. Another key search type is the focused and directed search, as outlined in Article 47, Paragraph 10, and more comprehensively in Article 60 of the Law on Police. What distinguishes the focused and directed search is the following:

- The Director of Police initiates the focused and directed search, and in the case of a directed search, it must be acknowledged and authorized

² Службени гласник Републике Србије, бр.. 72/2011, 101/2011, 121/2012, 32/2013, 45/2013, 55/2014, 35/2019, 27/2021 – Одлука Уставног Суда 62/2021.

by the Supreme Cassation Court (oral approval is possible, but it must be certified in writing within 24 hours by the Supreme Cassation Court).

- It requires special criteria, such as the involvement of a criminal act.
- It mandates the special engagement of various police units.
- The operation is limited in duration.
- It involves coordinated activities among different units.
- There are specific aspects of court involvement, and evidence obtained during the procedure may be inadmissible in court.

RAIDS are also classified as search activities in Serbia and involve both uniformed and CID police. These operations include:

- Coordinated, focused actions targeting the proceeds of criminal activities
- Forced deprivation of freedom of movement
- A time limit of up to 8 hours (CPC Article 286, Paragraph 2, and Article 88 of the Law on Police), which may be extended under Article 89 of the Law on Police (in cases of security threats caused by natural disasters, epidemics, or other circumstances necessary to protect the security of individuals and their property while such threats persist)
- Activities aimed at identifying an undefined number of people in a specific location

The next search activity is the search and seizure of facilities belonging to state agencies. Some key characteristics include:

- A representative of the state agency must be present
- Colleagues or “work buddies” may assist, and sometimes show leniency toward the person being searched or whose belongings are being searched
- Unknown or undisclosed areas may become points of interest
- The involvement of specialists in these activities is quite common
- Results can vary significantly
- A report must be filed, along with any preceding documentation

Evidentiary actions

- The conditions prescribed by the Criminal Procedure Code (CPC) must be met.
- Specific agencies are responsible—only the procedural agency, as the subject of the procedure, and the procedural actor are authorized and capable of performing evidentiary actions (Žarković, Ivanović, & Žarković, 2016).

- The police are only authorized to perform these actions in exceptional cases; however, in practice, this has become the rule rather than the exception. All conditions for evidentiary actions, including actors and subjects, are:

- Strictly defined by the CPC, along with:

Special evidentiary measures are defined by the CPC of the Republic of Serbia and include:

- Secret surveillance of communications
- Secret following and recording
- Use of a covert investigative agent
- Covertly surveilled shipments
- Automated computer searches
- Simulated services

In the enforcement of the mentioned measures, it is important to highlight the following: Special evidentiary actions (PDR) are generally authorized through a document in the form of an order issued by the judge for the preliminary proceedings, based on a reasoned proposal from the public prosecutor in charge, provided that the conditions stipulated by the Code are met—both general (Articles 161 and 162 of the CPC) and, for each measure, specific. This procedure is applied when the Ministry of the Interior of the Republic of Serbia participates in the execution and implementation of the PDR. However, special laws (such as the Law on the Security and Information Agency and the Law on the Military Security Agency and Military Intelligence Agency) govern the handling, approval, and oversight of other entities with procedural authority (activity). The specifics of the application area and the authorities involved necessitate different procedures and circumstances for application (Čudan & Ivanović, 2019). The legislature's clear intent is to place the decision on the application of this procedural institute in the hands of a judicial body (the judge for the preliminary proceedings), particularly in standard cases where the police carry out the application and enforcement. This is because the court, in the functional role of a judge for the preliminary proceedings, is tasked with safeguarding human rights and freedoms, while the prosecuting authority, that is, the competent public prosecutor, holds the primary role in the pre-investigation procedure.

Articles 161, and 162. of the CPC provide general terms for Special evidentiary actions. Conditions for measure determination are provided by the article 161. of CPC. So, special evidentiary actions can be determined toward (against) the person for whom there are grounds to suspect that he or she has committed a criminal offense from Article 162 of this Code, and in additional condition that the evidence for criminal prosecution cannot be collected in any other way or, it would be much more difficult to collect it. Exceptionally, special evidentiary actions can also be determined against a person for whom there are grounds for suspicion that he is preparing one of the criminal offenses from paragraph

1 of article 162, and the circumstances of the case indicate that otherwise the criminal offense could not be detected, prevented or proven, or that could cause disproportionate hardship or great danger.

Articles 161 and 162 of the CPC provide general terms for special evidentiary actions. Conditions for determining these measures are outlined in Article 161 of the CPC. Special evidentiary actions can be authorized against a person for whom there are grounds to suspect that they have committed a criminal offense listed in Article 162 of this Code, provided that evidence for criminal prosecution cannot be collected in any other way or would be significantly more difficult to obtain. Exceptionally, special evidentiary actions can also be applied to a person suspected of preparing one of the criminal offenses listed in paragraph 1 of Article 162, if the circumstances indicate that otherwise, the criminal offense could not be detected, prevented, or proven, or if it would result in disproportionate hardship or significant danger. When deciding on the authorization and duration of special evidentiary actions, the procedural agency must assess whether the same result could be achieved with less infringement on citizens' rights. Criminal offenses for which special evidentiary actions are implemented are defined by Article 162 of the CPC. Under the conditions specified in Article 161 of the CPC, special evidentiary actions may be determined for the following criminal offenses:

1. Criminal offenses for which a special law designates that the public prosecutor's office of special jurisdiction acts—general jurisdiction;
 Additionally, criminal offenses specified by the Code of Criminal Procedure (Article 162, Paragraph 1, Point 2) include:
 - Aggravated murder (Article 114 of the Criminal Code),
 - Kidnapping (Article 134 of the Criminal Code),
 - Showing, obtaining and possessing pornographic material and exploiting a minor for pornography (Article 185, paragraphs 2 and 3 of the Criminal Code),
 - Robbery (Article 206, paragraphs 2 and 3 of the Criminal Code),
 - Extortion (Article 214, paragraph 4 of the Criminal Code),
 - Abuse of the position of a responsible person (Article 227 of the Criminal Code),
 - Abuse in connection with public procurement (Article 228 of the Criminal Code),
 - Receiving a bribe in the performance of economic activity (Article 230 of the Criminal Code),
 - Bribery in the performance of economic activity (Article 231 of the Criminal Code),
 - Forgery of money (Article 241, paragraphs 1 to 3 of the Criminal Code),
 - Money laundering (Article 245, paragraphs 1 to 4 of the Criminal Code),

- Unauthorized production and distribution of narcotic drugs (Article 246, paragraphs 1 to 4 of the Criminal Code),
- Endangering independence (Article 305 of the Criminal Code),
- Endangering the territorial integrity (Article 307 of the Criminal Code),
- Attack on the constitutional order (Article 308 of the Criminal Code),
- Calling for a violent change of the constitutional system (Article 309 of the Criminal Code),
- Diversion (Article 313 of the Criminal Code),
- sabotage (Article 314 of the Criminal Code),
- Espionage (Article 315 of the Criminal Code),
- Disclosure of state secrets (Article 316 of the Criminal Code),
- Causing national, racial and religious hatred and intolerance (Article 317 of the Criminal Code),
- Violation of territorial sovereignty (Article 318 of the Criminal Code),
- Association for unconstitutional activity (Article 319 of the Criminal Code),
- Preparing an act against the constitutional order and security of Serbia (Article 320 of the Criminal Code),
- Serious crimes against the constitutional order and security of Serbia (Article 321 of the Criminal Code),
- Illegal production, possession, carrying and trafficking of weapons and explosive substances (Article 348, paragraph 3 of the Criminal Code),
- Illegal crossing of the state border and people smuggling (Article 350, paragraphs 2 and 3 of the Criminal Code),
- Abuse of official position (Article 359 of the Criminal Code),
- Influence peddling (Article 366 of the Criminal Code),
- Receiving a bribe (Article 367 of the Criminal Code),
- Paying a bribe (Article 368 of the Criminal Code),
- Human trafficking (Article 388 of the Criminal Code),
- Endangering a person under international protection (Article 392 of the Criminal Code) i
- Criminal offense contained in Article 98, Paragraphs 2 to 5 of the Data Privacy Act,
- (Article 162, Paragraph 1, Point 3) preventing and obstructing evidence, (Article 336 of the Criminal Code) if it was committed in connection with one of the listed criminal offenses and criminal offenses for which the prosecutor's office has special jurisdiction.

There is a deviation concerning the special evidentiary action of an undercover investigator. According to this deviation, it can only be ordered for crim-

inal offenses for which the prosecution has special jurisdiction. Additionally, secret surveillance of communications can be authorized not only for the criminal offenses listed but also for the following offenses: Unauthorized use of a copyrighted work or subject of related rights (Article 199 of the Criminal Code), Damage to computer data and programs (Article 298, Paragraph 3 of the Criminal Code), Computer sabotage (Article 299 of the Criminal Code), Computer fraud (Article 301, Paragraph 3 of the Criminal Code), Unauthorized access to a protected computer, computer network, and electronic data processing (Article 302 of the Criminal Code)

Slovak solutions

Similar activities, ranging from search to special evidentiary measures, involve very similar conditions for implementing special evidentiary actions, particularly regarding the conditions that must be met and the special police units or agents involved in enforcing the measures. However, there are some differences in the solutions provided, and while this is not true for all measures, it is particularly relevant for some that are of great interest to Serbia. One of the significant differences is as follows:

- Difference between criminally oriented activities – in cases of suspected criminal activity and other situations
- Intelligence activities – with evidentiary capacities

This is legally and technically stipulated as follows: Special evidentiary actions can be carried out (enforced) without a court decision, provided that approval for their implementation is obtained within 24 hours from the start of the enforcement. This is similar to the directed focused search activity outlined in the Law on Police in Serbia, but it is limited in its operative reach, as all material gathered this way cannot be used as evidence in the procedure. This approach is more advantageous in Slovakia. Additionally, while the Supreme Cassation Court is involved in Serbia, the basic court jurisdiction handles these measures in Slovakia. For instance, the Criminal Procedure Code of the Republic of Slovakia (Zákon trestný poriadok 301 z 24. mája 2005) covers this under § 113, titled “Tracking of People and Things.” Interception and recording of telecommunications traffic are addressed in § 115 of the Slovak CPC. (1) Surveillance of a person and thing (hereinafter referred to as “surveillance”) involves obtaining information about the movement and activities of a person or the movement of an object in a secret manner. Monitoring can be carried out during criminal proceedings for an intentional crime if it can be reasonably assumed that it will reveal information important for the criminal proceedings (Vaško, 2022). The surveillance order is issued in writing by the chairman of the court council before the initiation of criminal proceedings or by the prosecutor during the preliminary proceedings. The monitoring (surveillance) is conducted by the competent authority of the Police Force. If, during surveillance, it is discovered that the accused is communicating with their lawyer, any informa-

tion obtained in this manner cannot be used for the purposes of criminal proceedings and must be destroyed promptly in the prescribed manner. This does not apply if the information relates to a matter in which the lawyer does not represent the accused as their defense attorney (Vaško, 2022). If it is absolutely necessary for surveillance to be conducted on premises or land that is not publicly accessible, or if information and technical means need to be used during the surveillance without involving entry into a dwelling, a surveillance order must be issued by the chairman of the council before the initiation of criminal prosecution, or by the judge for the preliminary proceedings upon the prosecutor's proposal during the preliminary phase. This applies when facts crucial for criminal proceedings cannot be obtained through surveillance conducted in any other way. The order must specify the premises or land not accessible to the public where surveillance will be conducted and the type of technical means to be used. If the situation is urgent and cannot be postponed, the pre-trial judge of the court in whose district the surveillance will take place may issue the order instead of the competent pre-trial judge. During entry into non-residential premises or non-publicly accessible lands, only actions necessary for carrying out the surveillance may be performed. This provision differs significantly from Serbian legislation, and it suggests the need to amend the measure regarding secret tracking and recording under Article 171 of the CPC to better align with operational capabilities and demands. A surveillance order under Paragraph 2 of §113 may only be issued based on a written request by a police officer or a competent authority of the Police Force, and during court proceedings, upon a written request by the prosecutor. The request must be justified by suspicion of a specific criminal activity and include any available information about the persons or objects to be monitored, if known. The order must specify the duration of the monitoring with a maximum initial period of six months. The person who issued the order may extend the monitoring in writing for another six months, and this extension can be granted repeatedly. If the monitoring continues beyond twelve months, the monitoring order must be issued by a pre-trial judge both before the initiation of criminal prosecution and during the preliminary proceedings. (Paragraph 6) A police officer or the relevant unit of the Police Force is required to continuously assess whether the reasons for issuing the surveillance order still exist. If those reasons have disappeared or changed, the surveillance must cease, even if the time specified in Paragraph 5 has not yet expired. This must be immediately reported in writing to the person who issued the order, as well as to the prosecutor during the preliminary proceedings. (Paragraph 7) If the situation is urgent and a written order cannot be obtained in advance, surveillance may be initiated without an order, provided it does not involve the cases mentioned in Paragraph 4. However, the police officer or relevant department of the Police Force must request an order as soon as possible thereafter. If the order is not issued within 24 hours, the monitoring must cease, and any information thus obtained cannot be used as evidence and must be destroyed promptly in the prescribed manner. (Paragraph 8) If the recording made during surveillance is intended to be used as evidence, the appropriate

procedure must be followed in accordance with § 113, Paragraph 6. (Paragraph 9) In a criminal matter other than the one for which the surveillance was originally conducted, the recording may be used as evidence only if it pertains to a criminal proceeding involving an intentional crime. If the surveillance does not uncover facts relevant to the criminal proceedings, the recorded material must be destroyed without delay in the prescribed manner. During the procedure described in Paragraph 1, if necessary, recording devices and technical monitoring means may be used to document the progress of the act.

Interception and recording of telecommunications traffic are governed by § 115 of the CPC. Paragraph 1 states that in criminal proceedings related to crimes such as corruption, acts of extremism, abuse of power by a public official, the offense of money laundering under Sections 233 and 234 of the Criminal Code, or any other intentional criminal offense requiring action under an international treaty, an order for wiretapping and recording telecommunications traffic may be issued if it is reasonably assumed that relevant facts for the criminal proceedings will be uncovered (Vaško, 2019). Such an order can be issued if the intended purpose cannot be achieved by other means or if achieving it by other means would be significantly more difficult (Vaško, 2022). If, during the interception and recording of telecommunications traffic, it is found that the accused is communicating with their lawyer, the information thus obtained cannot be used in criminal proceedings and must be destroyed immediately in the prescribed manner. This does not apply if the communication concerns a matter in which the lawyer does not represent the accused as a defense attorney. The president of the court council issues the order for wiretapping and recording telecommunications traffic, either before the initiation of criminal proceedings or during the preliminary proceedings, upon the prosecutor's proposal, by the judge for preliminary proceedings. If a situation arises where action cannot be delayed, and a judge's order for the preliminary proceedings cannot be obtained in advance, the prosecutor may issue the order before the initiation of criminal prosecution or during the preliminary proceedings, provided the interception and recording of telecommunications traffic do not involve entering a dwelling. However, this order must be confirmed by the pre-trial judge within 24 hours; otherwise, it becomes invalid, and any information obtained in this manner cannot be used for criminal proceedings and must be destroyed immediately in the prescribed way. The role of the prosecutor in issuing such orders during pre-trial proceedings is crucial to consider in Serbian legislative reforms (Žarković, Ivanović & Žarković, 2016). The order for wiretapping and recording telecommunications traffic must be issued in writing and supported by factual circumstances specific to each participating station or device. It must detail the station or device being monitored, the person (if known) whose communications are being intercepted, and the duration of the surveillance. The time period for interception and recording can last up to six months, with the possibility of extending it for an additional two months at the prosecutor's request during the pre-trial proceedings, even repeatedly. The wiretapping and recording of telecommunication traffic are carried out by the relevant de-

partment of the Police Force (Paragraph 3). A police officer or the relevant Police Force department is required to continuously monitor the validity of the reasons that justified issuing the wiretapping and recording of telecommunications traffic order. If the reasons for wiretapping and recording telecommunications traffic cease to exist, the activity must end, even before the period specified in Paragraph 3 expires. This must be reported in writing without delay to the authority that issued the order for wiretapping and recording of telecommunications traffic, as well as to the prosecutor in the preliminary proceedings. In criminal proceedings for an intentional crime other than that referred to in paragraph 1, the president of the court council may issue an order for wiretapping and recording of telecommunications traffic, before the initiation of criminal proceedings or in preliminary proceedings, by a judge for preliminary proceedings at the proposal of the prosecutor only with the consent of the user intercepted or recorded telecommunications equipment. If the recording of telecommunications traffic is to be used as evidence, it must be attached, if the prepared recording allows it, to a verbatim transcript of the recording made by the member of the Police Force carrying out the wiretapping, to the extent of the established facts significant for the criminal proceedings, with information on the location, the time, the authority that made the recording, and the legality of the wiretapping. The record of the telecommunications operation is kept in its entirety in a file on suitable electronic carriers, copies of which may be requested by the prosecutor and the accused or defence counsel. After the eavesdropping and the recording of the telecommunications traffic have ended, the accused or the defence attorney may, at their own expense, make a transcript of the recording of the telecommunications traffic to the extent they deem appropriate. In Serbia there is another law proscribing rules and procedure of the wiretapping, then CPC. The obligations mentioned in the first sentence apply to them accordingly. The court evaluates the reliability of the transcript. If the transcript of the record was made during the preliminary proceedings, the president of the senate can order its addition, which will be completed by a member of the Police Force mentioned in the first sentence. A verbatim transcription of a record in a foreign language and additions to a verbatim transcript of a record in a foreign language can be prepared by an interpreter. When hiring an interpreter, the appropriate procedure is followed according to § 28 of the CPC. A transcript of the recording of the telecommunications operation, which is not classified, signed by a member of the Police Force or the interpreter who made it, is included in the file; if the verbatim transcript of the record contains classified information, it is classified according to the regulations on the protection of classified information. The recording of telecommunications traffic can be used as evidence only after the wiretapping and recording of telecommunications traffic is over. In preliminary proceedings, if the circumstances of the case justify it, a record of telecommunication operations can be submitted to the court even without a transcript of this record, if the accompanying report shows data on the place, time, authority that made the record, and the legality of the wiretapping, as well as on the per-

sons whose record of telecommunications traffic is concerned, and the record of telecommunications traffic is comprehensible. This is very different than in Serbia. In a criminal matter other than the one in which the wiretapping and recording of telecommunication traffic was carried out, the recording may be used as evidence only if it is a criminal proceeding for the criminal offense referred to in paragraph 1. If no relevant facts for the criminal proceedings are obtained during wiretapping and recording of telecommunications traffic, the authorities or the relevant Police Force department must destroy the recordings immediately in a prescribed manner (Žarković, Lajić & Ivanović, 2010). The destruction is documented, and the minutes are filed. The person referred to in paragraph 3, if known, is informed about the destruction of the record by the police officer or the prosecutor whose decision legally ended the case, and in proceedings before the court by the president of the senate of the court of first instance after the legal end of the case. The information contains the designation of the court that issued or confirmed the wiretapping order and indication of telecommunications operation, duration of wiretapping and date of termination. A portion of information refers to instruction on the right to submit, within two months from its delivery, a motion to review the legality of the order for wiretapping and recording of telecommunications traffic to the Supreme Court. The information shall be submitted by the authority whose decision legally ended the case, and, in proceedings before the court, by the president of the chamber of the court of first instance within three years from the legal termination of the criminal prosecution in the given case (Ivanović & Zirojević, 2021). The chairman of the court council, a police officer or a prosecutor shall not provide information pursuant to paragraph 9, if it is a person who has the opportunity to view the file according to this Act, or in proceedings concerning a particularly serious crime or a crime committed by an organized group, criminal group or terrorist group, or if more than one person was involved in the crime and in relation to at least one of them, the criminal prosecution was not legally terminated, or if the purpose of the criminal proceedings could be defeated by providing such information. The provisions of paragraphs 1 to 10 also apply to data transmitted in real time through a computer system (Ivanović & Baić, 2020).

Article § 118 of the Slovak CPC titled: Comparing data in information systems (1) In criminal proceedings for an intentional crime for which the law provides for a prison sentence with a maximum penalty exceeding three years, corruption or for another intentional crime for which an international treaty obliges the proceedings, comparison of data in information systems can be carried out, which contain characteristic or exclusionary features regarding persons or things important for criminal proceedings, with data in other information systems, if necessary to clarify the crime. The order to compare data in information systems is issued in writing by the chairman of the council, before the initiation of criminal proceedings or by the prosecutor during preliminary proceedings, which presents the constant in Slovak CPC, and quickens procedure, providing to it much more operational capacity. The order according to

paragraph 1 must contain the designation of the operator of the information system who is obliged to provide the data, and the definition of the data and test characters necessary for comparison (Paragraph 3). The person referred to in paragraph 3 is obliged to provide the data necessary for comparison. Such an approach could benefit the Serbian legislature. If the requested data cannot be separated from other data, other data will also be provided. These other data cannot be used as evidence. If the data were provided on information carriers, they must be returned without delay after the comparison has been completed. Data that were transferred to other data carriers must be deleted without delay by the law enforcement agency, the court or the member of the Police Force who performed the comparison, if they are no longer needed for criminal proceedings. If the data comparison record is to be used as evidence, the appropriate procedure shall be followed in accordance with § 115, Paragraph 6. In a criminal matter other than the one in which the data was compared, the record may be used as evidence only if it is a criminal proceeding for the criminal offense referred to in paragraph 1. If, during the data comparison, no facts significant for the criminal proceedings were found, the law enforcement agency, the court or a member of the Police Force, who performed the comparison, must destroy the obtained records without delay in the prescribed manner.

Conclusions

Some of the solutions are very effective for practical enforcement and, as previously mentioned, provide greater operational capacity to procedural agencies—such as the police and public prosecutors. These solutions should be structured in a manner that is “bulletproof” against issues related to human rights violations and the protection of liberties, not only at the regional or global level but also nationally, including safeguards provided by the Serbian Constitution. There are potential techniques for navigating these obstacles while incorporating the safeguards outlined in the Constitution. Some of these techniques were discussed in the text, with a proposal to integrate Slovak solutions and address national legislative demands in a more efficient and elegant manner. As elaborated in the text, some proposals connected with legislative techniques and possible intelligence gathering offer enhanced operational capacities for procedural agencies. Especially if we elaborate on the pre-trial capacities of the prosecutor, in conjunction with the police, it is crucial to consider the evidentiary capacities of intelligence activities as provided by Slovak legislation and explore their implementation in Serbian laws. This would offer an extreme tool for combating organized crime and its perpetrators. Generally, this demonstrates that different perspectives are not only valuable but necessary when considering all measures and means for fighting organized crime. This system and approach provide multiple benefits, from strengthening the operational capacity of law enforcement to offering more efficient means of combat, while preserving human rights and freedoms at the European level. It incorporates

proven methods that have withstood the scrutiny of the Court of Justice of the European Union. This should ideally be a win-win situation; however, potential problems may arise, including possible incompatibilities with the Serbian justice system. These issues can be addressed through a thorough analysis of the measures and actions outlined. This article represents one step toward achieving this equilibrium in the future.

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Paper received on: 10/7/2024

Paper accepted for publishing on: 20/9/2024

SECURITY CRISES AS A FACTOR OF MIGRATION TO THE EUROPEAN UNION

Review Article

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| DOI: 10.5937/zurbezkrim2402037M | COBISS.RS-ID 141413377 | UDK 341.231.14:351.86(4-672EU) |
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Abstract: Security crises around the world as generators of migration are not a phenomenon of modern times, but the issue of migrant integration is becoming increasingly urgent due to the large number of migrants who have entered Europe over the past two decades. The recent surge has been driven by the growing number of regional conflicts, leading to migration of Palestinians, Syrians, Iraqis, Libyans, Afghans, and Eritreans who are fleeing war, ethnic conflict, or economic hardship, risking their lives in attempts to reach Europe. In recent times, transit countries like Hungary and Croatia have recorded a significant influx, while Germany has seen the largest absolute increase in first-time asylum applicants due to its favorable policies towards migration and asylum seekers, as well as its relatively stable economy and high standard of living. In 2023, the political debate in the European Union focused on the major challenges facing the EU and its member states, particularly the development of the security situation in Ukraine and the management of migration, promoting integration policies that could have social, economic, and political impacts on the European Union. This paper aims to analyze the reports of international organizations to highlight the key security crises as factors driving migration to the European Union.

Keywords: migration, societal security, risks, factors, crises.

INTRODUCTION

Internal and external migrations in the period following World War II significantly impacted the spatial distribution of the population in Europe. During the era of rapid modernization and economic development, the most

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intense migrations occurred from rural areas to cities, then from smaller to larger urban settlements, and finally, migrations toward major regional and industrial centers in Europe. Within the European Union, between 1991 and 1996, forced migrations and the influx of refugees from the former Yugoslavia and their integration into European society had a notable impact (Кокотовић & Филиповић, 2017).

These migration flows within the European Union led to population concentrations in relatively small areas (the aforementioned large urban centers), while rural parts of the European Union experienced depopulation. The consequences of long-term fertility decline in the most recent inter-census period have become evident across the entire European Union. Population emigration, driven by crises in home countries and socio-political circumstances, has resulted in a constant negative migration balance throughout the observed period (Војковић & Глигоријевић, 2016: 87).

In European security doctrines, illegal migrations are recognized as a significant security risk. The National Security Strategy highlights uncontrolled migrations in the context of demographic development issues in the Republic of Serbia. These are manifested through low birth rates, unsatisfactory health and mortality indicators, a low average lifespan, and quality of life, as well as uncontrolled migrations and the emigration of educated, scientific and cultural potential abroad. Worsening difficulties in economic development could further contribute to a decline in birth rates, an aging population, and ultimately, a threat to the very foundations of the biological survival of the population in the Republic of Serbia.²

The analysis of migration and societal security should include the work of Radomir and Srđan Milašinović as an analytical framework. These authors outline key attributes of social conflicts that can be correlated with internal migrations. According to their definition, social conflicts are states of social interactions characterized by open antagonisms, with confrontation and struggle as the primary orientations. These conflicts are a constitutive element of every social system and form the basis of its progressive and desirable dynamics. The core content and essence of such a defined social conflict consist of intra-group and inter-group struggles to achieve mutually opposing interests, values, and limited but significant resources. This struggle can be a “war without rules,” but it is almost always constrained, to varying degrees, by broader social, legal, moral, religious, technical, or other norms and rules (Милашиновић & Милашиновић, 2007: 45). This interaction falls within the domain of national security issues and represents asymmetric security threats (such as social instability, economic problems, and migration-related issues).

Factors that disrupt societal security include personal factors (illness, old age, diminished work capacity), technological factors (job losses, the obsolescence of certain professions), macroeconomic, social, and political factors (de-

² Стратегија националне безбедности Републике Србије [National Security Strategy of the Republic of Serbia], Службени гласник Републике Србије, 94/2019.

velopmental insecurity, changes in the social system), as well as microeconomic and social reasons (the condition of enterprises, income distribution). Due to their impact, social security emerges as both a goal and a result of overall social development (Пјанић, Стојановић, & Јакшић, 1994: 1443). Societal security is inextricably linked to the concept of human security. Human security means protecting fundamental freedoms—the freedoms that are the essence of life. It involves protecting people from critical (serious) and pervasive (widespread) threats and situations. This entails using processes rooted in human strength and aspirations. It means creating political, social, environmental, economic, military, and cultural systems that together provide the building blocks for survival, human sustenance, and a life of dignity (Суботички, 2015).

The dimensions of the concept of human security can be outlined as follows (Center for Research on Human Security, 2016): **Economic Security:** This includes the security of personal property, job insecurity, poor working conditions, and income inequality. It also involves ensuring access to hygiene and safe food. **Health Security:** Threats to health and life from infectious and parasitic diseases, HIV and other viruses, and inadequate access to healthcare services. **Personal Security:** Threats of physical violence from the state and criminal organizations. **Population Security:** Issues related to overpopulation, ethnic tensions, and violent conflicts. **Political Security:** Threats to use state repression and other threats that jeopardize human rights. Each of these sources of social insecurity can be rooted in discrimination deeply embedded in the social environment caused by migrations. Cultures of intolerance, antagonism, and apathy, increasing intolerance, and rising numbers of conflicts are seen as everyday threats. These are recognized as major drivers of hatred and violence based on ethnic, sexual, or political grounds, with migrations being a primary cause (Литавски, Костић-Дићић, & Ђорђевић, 2013).

There are numerous motivating factors that influence migration. Apart from life-threatening armed conflicts, common reasons include undemocratic living conditions where human rights are egregiously violated, economic poverty, and natural disasters. On the other hand, better living conditions in democratically organized, war-free, and economically richer countries attract migrants.

Population migration is one of the significant consequences. Unlike voluntary migrations, which are primarily labor migrations, there are also forced migrations. These often parallel labor migrations but stem from entirely different motives. Individuals seeking asylum, refugees, and internally displaced persons may migrate not only because of war in their immediate surroundings but also due to other pressing factors.

In his work *The Laws of Migration*, which was published in the late 19th century, Ravenstein proposed several laws that can be considered generalizations (Ravenstein, 1889):

- Most migrants move only a short distance: As the distance from a place increases, the number of immigrants moving from that place decreases.

- Migration from places near large cities occurs during periods of economic expansion, followed by migration from more distant areas. As a result of the expansion of the city, there is an increasing influence on the broader periphery.
- Each migration flow produces a compensating counter-flow.
- Natives of towns are less migratory than those from rural areas.
- Females are more migratory than males.

One specific form of migration is the movement from rural areas to cities in search of new opportunities (Gidens, 1998). Depending on whether the place of settlement (immigration) or departure (emigration) belongs to the observed country, migrations can be classified as internal or external. Migrations where both the origin and destination are within the same territory are called internal migrations. From a psychological perspective, two types of migration are identified: voluntary and involuntary. There is also a classification into permanent and semipermanent migrations (Bell & Ward, 2000). In terms of factors that contribute to migration, we can identify push factors—such as unsafe living conditions, war, political persecution, violence, discrimination, poverty, unemployment, and climate conditions—and pull factors, such as good living conditions, employment opportunities, education, and safety, which largely overlap with the general factors that stimulate migration (Марковић & Марковић, 2015). From the perspective of societal security, the study of illegal migration is particularly important. As anthropologist Nicholas De Genova noted, while the term “illegal” migrant provides a “broad legal or descriptive category,” it encompasses a vast heterogeneity: “illegality” must be understood as an epistemological, methodological, and political problem (De Genova, 2002). “Illegal” migrants leave their countries for the same reasons as all other migrants. The increase in illegal migration is largely due to intensified state control over mobility (Kyle & Koslowski, 2011).

CAUSES OF MIGRATION IN COUNTRIES OF ORIGIN

During the 1990s, liberal development theories were called into question, particularly regarding how privileged elites across much of the Arab world and Africa largely benefited from economic growth, while relative poverty persisted. The development schemes designed by the IMF, World Bank, or European Union often imposed strict market and trade liberalization measures, which frequently rendered local producers uncompetitive and led to the collapse of significant portions of domestic businesses and industries, only to be replaced by foreign investors.

With continuous demographic growth in countries such as Egypt, Sudan, Tunisia, Ethiopia, Syria, and other states along the Eastern Mediterranean and East African migration routes, the lack of new job opportunities for young peo-

ple entering the workforce, increasing disconnection from the political elites, and the ongoing rise in education levels and communication means have intensified internal pressure on repressive regimes. As Western governments continued to cooperate with authoritarian regimes for economic and strategic reasons, young Africans and Arabs found their economic and non-material aspirations stifled and suppressed. With limited prospects in rural areas, migration to urban centers increased. Some people headed north towards Europe, oil-rich Gulf countries, or economic boom zones in southern or western Africa.

Countries like South Africa, the Gulf states or the European Union symbolized values of economic wealth, freedom from persecution, or a clearer hope for a better life. Continuous political oppression, ethnic conflicts, racial discrimination, or the outbreak of wars forced further waves of migration towards the southern and southeastern borders of Europe. Conflicts and wars not only produced political, ethnic, religious, or social refugees but also rendered economic production unfeasible for years. While some migrants became internally displaced, others fled to border countries where there is relative peace (Easterly, 2003; Morrissey, 2004).

Although the cultural and social backgrounds and specific reasons for migration vary greatly depending on the country of origin, states plagued by prolonged civil war produce different types of migrants than those where political persecution forces activists, students, and minority groups to flee (Hofmeier & Mehler, 2004). These forced migrants constitute a significant portion of those “trapped” in countries like Jordan, Syria, Turkey, Egypt, or Libya, with little hope for permanent status solutions in their host countries. A particular security risk is posed by the fact that paramilitary, terrorist, and criminal organizations often infiltrate migrant groups with the aim of reaching the European continent.

Long-lasting civil wars (Sudan, Somalia, Iraq)

Long-lasting civil wars in Sudan since the 1980s, Somalia since the 1990s, and Iraq since the early 2000s have led to significant migrations in the region, and still continue with varying degrees of intensity. These civil wars triggered the first major waves of migration towards Europe. The U.S.-led invasion of Iraq and the subsequent war, along with terrorist attacks and targeted persecution of ethnic, religious, and minority groups, forced approximately 2 million Iraqis to flee the country. Most of these refugees sought asylum in neighboring countries such as Syria (1 million in 2010; 480,000 in 2013), Jordan (450,000 in 2013), and Egypt (150,000). Acknowledging its responsibility for the refugee crisis, the United States, through the Kennedy Law of 2007, provided direct resettlement opportunities for Iraqis who worked in U.S. institutions or U.S.-funded organizations. This, along with resettlement and regular asylum requests, resulted in about 82,000 Iraqis finding asylum in the U.S. (MPI DATA HUB, 2011). Sweden has been the European country that has received the most

Iraqi refugees, with an estimated total of 79,000, some of whom had already arrived in the 1990s (Workpermit, 2007). Other significant recipients of Iraqi refugees include Australia and Canada. Despite the relatively peaceful security situation in northern Iraq, ongoing civil unrest, political conflicts, and terrorist attacks, coupled with detailed country-of-origin information provided by immigration agencies in Europe and North America, suggest that large parts of Iraq are still unsuitable for the repatriation of Iraqi forced migrants living in the region (UK Border Agency, 2011). Nevertheless, some Iraqi refugees have returned from Syria and Egypt since 2011.

From May 2013 onwards, renewed fighting in Iraq resulted in the deaths of 45,000 people and forced thousands of Iraqis to flee across the Jordanian border. The reasons for fleeing included religious, political, and social persecution, along with generally high levels of insecurity in areas affected by repeated terrorist attacks and civil conflicts. The uprising in neighboring Syria, which quickly escalated into a civil war, reignited sectarian conflict among the Shiite, Sunni, and Kurdish populations in Iraq. Iraq's national unity remains fragile, and further violence is likely if the ongoing lack of a clear path forward persists, coupled with shifts in the regional balance of power.

The civil war in Somalia has been raging since the early 1990s, internally displacing approximately 1.5 million Somalis and causing over a million to flee to neighboring countries, across Africa, and around the world. Somalia is divided into numerous majority and minority clans, some of which have distinct social roles, such as pastoralists, livestock breeders, leather producers, spiritualists, or traders, while others form the political elite. The clan system extends beyond Somali national borders, with complex forms of loyalty and conflict resolution mechanisms, sharply contrasting with the military dictatorship of Siad Barre from 1961 to 1991, which attempted to impose a hierarchical, centralized form of governance.

Inter-clan conflicts since the early 2000s have been complicated by the Islamist insurgency of Al-Shabaab, which has ties to Al-Qaeda and recruits partly from youths orphaned by the civil war or captured by Al-Shabaab fighters. U.S., Ethiopian, and Kenyan interventions add another layer to the conflict. The largest regional recipients of Somali refugees, since 2011, include Kenya (495,000), Yemen (230,000), Ethiopia (240,000), Djibouti (18,000), and Egypt (8,000) (UNHCR Information Sharing Portal, 2013). Since 2005, there have also been 10,000 Somali refugees in the United Kingdom and 34,000 in the United States (United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, 2005). An indeterminate number of Somalis lived in Libya during Gaddafi's rule. Despite recent talks between the Kenyan and Somali governments about repatriating Somali refugees (AllAfrica, 2013), a lasting pacification of the Somali conflict seems distant (Economist, 2013). With a birth rate of seven children per woman, frequent droughts, and ongoing wars, Somalia is likely to remain a country from which people feel compelled to leave in the foreseeable future (IMI Policy Briefing, 2012). While most refugees will continue to reside in nearby countries,

allowing them to return home when relative calm is restored, those who are more mobile or at greater risk will seek a better and safer life further afield, in South Africa or the Global North.

Sudan has one of the longest and most diverse histories of forcing its citizens to emigrate. Following the conflicts over the Ottoman, Egyptian, and British legacies of colonial domination, the First Sudanese Civil War (1955-1972) and the Second Sudanese Civil War, fought between the predominantly Arab-Muslim north and the African-animist-Christian south, caused the death of around 2 million people and the exodus of 4 million by 2001 (U.S. Committee for Refugees, 2001). Between the second half of 2011 and mid-2013, reports indicate that 180,000 Northern Sudanese fled to South Sudan (Reuters, 2013). Since 2003, the western Sudanese region of Darfur has experienced another bloody war. Historically regarded as a region independent of Sudan's core, African tribes demanded more autonomous rights and less interference from the Arab-dominated central government, which culminated in the Sudanese Liberation Army (SLA) and the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM) entering into war against central government troops and Arab tribes in northern Darfur in 2003. The Sudanese government, under Omar al-Bashir, responded with open warfare against Darfuri people, arming the Janjaweed, Arab horseback tribes living in northern Darfur, to fight the rebels. Official figures indicate that between 2003 and 2008, approximately 300,000 people were killed, with 2 million Darfuri people displaced from the region to central and southern Sudan, Chad, Libya, Egypt, and beyond (Amnesty International, 2009).

The conflict in Darfur has a clear regional and international component, with the involvement of the Chadian and Libyan governments supporting various warring factions. An international campaign accusing the Sudanese government of genocide, along with the International Criminal Court's indictment of Sudanese President Omar al-Bashir in 2009, increased pressure on the central government. Qatar hosted several rounds of negotiations between the opposing parties, leading to the Doha Peace Agreement in Darfur in 2011 and a temporary lull in the conflict (UNAMID, 2011). Several European and Gulf countries, as well as China, are pursuing economic interests in resource-rich Sudan, with little visible benefit for the general population. Despite the peace agreement, fighting continues, and as of January 2013, 300,000 Darfuri people had been displaced, with an additional 50,000 fleeing to Chad since April 2013 (IRIN, 2012).

Repressive Regimes in Eritrea, Ethiopia, and Sudan

The persecution of political opponents and the discrimination against ethnic or religious groups by repressive regimes in Eritrea, Ethiopia, and Sudan have led to increased migration to the European Union. Sudanese activists outside Sudan challenge the narrative of ethnic and religious conflict, emphasizing the political aspects of the Sudanese crisis. This narrative suggests that vari-

ous factions are opposing Omar al-Bashir's regime and that the separation of the South was merely a phase in the broader opposition movement aimed at overthrowing the authoritarian regime, which has relied on its secret police to torture, intimidate, and systematically persecute political opponents, journalists, and students. The regime has also built alliances with predominantly Arab tribes. Alliances between the Government of South Sudan, previously the SPLM/A, SLA, and JEM, as well as with activists outside the country, were established with the goal of dismantling the Sudanese regime (Guardian, 2012). In addition to war refugees and ethnic persecution, many educated activists have been forced to flee Sudan due to their actual or implied political opposition to Omar al-Bashir's regime.

The number of Sudanese refugees in neighboring countries is a subject of dispute. In Egypt, the figures range from the UNHCR-recognized Sudanese refugee population of 25,000 (Daily News Egypt, 2012) to a more realistic estimate of long-term forced and economic migrants between 500,000 and 3 million, many of whom have not approached the UNHCR (Fahamu Refugee Legal Aid Newsletter, 2013). Libya has been a significant recipient of Sudanese migrants since the 1980s; however, due to the Jamahiriya's policy of being a country for all Africans, the lack of international observers, and the absence of Libyan migration documentation, accurate numbers are difficult to determine. Other countries that have received significant numbers of Sudanese migrants include Chad (100,000), Ethiopia (90,000), the United States (35,000), and Israel (7,000).

After the Eritrean War of Independence against Ethiopia ended in 1994, resulting in over 60,000 military and 40,000 civilian casualties, the regime of Isaias Afwerki gradually intensified repression and curtailed personal freedoms. Freedom of speech was severely restricted, and political opponents faced torture and abuse. The regime adopted a policy of mass military conscription in 2002, effectively utilizing conscripts as forced labor. Specifically, Christians of the Tigrinya ethnic group faced persecution, and the state severely undermined religious freedoms for all religious denominations. Approximately 20,000 Eritreans are held in detention based on their beliefs. Over the last decade, this has led to a mass exodus of Eritreans, despite the government's policy of shooting those who attempt to cross its borders. The UNHCR estimates that 100,000 Eritrean refugees reside in northern Sudan, with around 60,000 living in camps (IRIN, 2011). Many Eritreans who leave their country are relatively young and well-educated, viewing Sudan, with its limited integration opportunities, as a transit country on their way to Egypt, Israel, and Europe. Since emigration from Eritrea is illegal, repatriation to the country results in automatic detention and potential abuse, even preventing non-political migrants from re-entering. In addition to Sudan as a major host for Eritrean refugees, Egypt also hosts thousands of Eritreans, as does Libya, and recently Ethiopia (Connell, 2013). It is estimated that 35,000 Eritreans have made their way through Sinai to Israel (Jewish Daily Forward, 2013).

Ethiopia, one of the few African countries without a long colonial history (1935-1941), has been involved in numerous military conflicts throughout the 20th century and continues to grapple with its multi-ethnic and diverse religious composition, a legacy of its own imperial past. The largest population group, the Oromo, does not identify as Ethiopians. The central government led by Meles Zenawi with the support of the Tigray minority marginalized the Oromo, Amhara, and other southern minority groups. Specifically, the Oromo Liberation Front (OLF) has been engaged in both peaceful and armed opposition to the regime since the 1970s. Approximately 20,000 Oromo people have been detained on accusations of being OLF members, and there have been frequent arrests of journalists, students, and opposition activists (Aljazeera, 2013). Repeated droughts leading to mass famine and ongoing structural adjustments under the guidance of the IMF and World Bank have made the country aid-dependent, with aid often mismanaged and filling the pockets of those close to the ruling regime. The death of Meles Zenawi in August 2012 has not yet led to political changes, with fabricated charges against political opponents and social activists persisting. The construction of the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam, with significant financial support from China, could potentially improve agricultural productivity and generate the electricity needed for more sustainable industrial development (Berliner Afrikakreis, 2013). However, without fundamental political changes, which analysts do not foresee, the benefits of this mega-project are likely to accrue only to a select few and foreign investors. The UNHCR reports around 120,000 refugees and asylum seekers outside Ethiopia, with the central government forcibly displacing thousands more within the country through its 'settlement' program. Approximately 30,000 Ethiopians have been forced to flee to Sudan, 52,000 to Yemen, and thousands more to Israel, the United States, South Africa, and several thousand since 2012 to Mozambique (United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, 2013).

The Arab Spring: A Catalyst for New Waves of Migration

The Arab Spring triggered numerous security implications, leading to a surge in migration. The resulting instability led to a halt in foreign investments, disruptions in trade, a decline in economic growth, and an increase in food prices. Migrants, who often worked in the informal economy, lost their sources of income. During periods of acute unrest, with UNHCR and international NGOs reducing their operations, refugees who were dependent on financial aid and with little or no savings had to bridge financial gaps, often resulting in food shortages. Female refugees frequently lost their jobs as domestic workers for international staff of foreign companies. In Tunisia and Egypt, where the Ministry of the Interior was heavily targeted, police presence in refugee settlements diminished following the revolution, further jeopardizing refugee safety. Fearing arrest during demonstrations or riots and being labeled as foreign agents, migrants often preferred to stay at home rather than seek employment. As se-

curity agencies weakened, systematic surveillance of political refugees temporarily decreased, but as the Mukhabarat regrouped, old forms of surveillance were soon reinstated. The security vacuum allowed the intelligence services of the countries of origin to pursue refugees, as numerous African and other refugees have claimed.

The Arab Spring led to an increase in organized human trafficking as law enforcement agencies ceased to effectively deter traffickers, who began to pursue refugees even within urban areas. Reports of illegal organ extraction from migrants also surged. As media attention shifted to the refugee crisis stemming from the Arab Spring, UN member states allocated additional funds to UNHCR, which were primarily directed towards managing activities at the Libyan borders and later towards accommodating Syrian refugees. African and other long-term refugees have expressed concerns that the crises in Libya and Syria have overshadowed their own plight. This issue is also reflected in the EU-funded START program, which has been implemented by the International Organization for Migration (IOM) since 2012. The program aims to assist “vulnerable communities” in Egypt, Libya, and Tunisia but has largely concentrated on the immediate Libyan migration crisis, with insufficient emphasis on long-term security and migration perspectives (International Organization for Migration, 2012).

In Jordan, Iraqi refugees have been largely overlooked as the budget has been redirected to better accommodate Syrian refugees. Although Jordanian King Abdullah received significant financial support from the EU (Jordan Times, 2013), the refugee situation in Jordan remains tense. As a Jordanian refugee worker recently observed, “In short, it’s chaos; Jordanians are increasingly angry and frustrated with the refugees, there are many problems, and the government lacks planning skills.” This situation is similarly reflective of the refugee crises in Egypt and Libya, which have contributed to the wave of migration to the European Union.

Syria and the Arab Spring

The Arab Spring and subsequent developments in international security have transformed several migrant-receiving and transit countries along North Africa into refugee-producing nations, particularly Syria and Libya. The rise of nationalism and declining economic productivity in countries like Tunisia and Egypt have further complicated and often endangered the lives of long-term refugees from conflict zones located further south or east. This led to short- to medium-term surges in migration across the Mediterranean, as seen in the case of Libya, which by the summer of 2011 had generated hundreds of thousands of migrants

Millions of Syrians have so far sought refuge across the Jordanian and Turkish borders, with both countries recently experiencing an increasing influx of refugees at their borders. Initially intended as temporary, the refugee ar-

rangements and camps have recently begun to take on more permanent structures (Economist, 2013b). Despite the ongoing unstable situations in South Sudan and Iraq, some economic migrants and refugees have started returning to their countries of origin, as their host countries along the Mediterranean no longer appear safer than the states they left, and migration to Europe or Israel has become too dangerous.

SOCIETAL SECURITY CHALLENGES IN THE EUROPEAN UNION

Migration poses a significant security challenge to the European Union, not only due to the heightened risk of terrorism but also because of the potential for regional conflicts. One of the greatest anomalies is that the poorest countries in Europe, due to their relative economic underdevelopment and high unemployment rates, have no economic or other incentive to retain a certain number of migrants on their soil or to bear the costs of migration transit, yet they would fundamentally bear the greatest burden of migration.

The unresolved status and difficult conditions of refugees and displaced persons from Syria, Afghanistan, Iraq, Eritrea, Pakistan, Nigeria, Somalia, Sudan, Gambia, and Mali could lead to the following security threats: organized crime, robberies, unrest and expressions of dissatisfaction towards government authorities, individual incidents, human trafficking, illegal migration and border violations, disputes with neighboring countries, the importation of terrorism, illegal arms trade and smuggling, a rise in right-wing extremism, and challenges to economic development and economic threats.

Considering that a portion of migrants has directly participated in military conflicts and is trained to conduct combat operations in both rural and urban environments, there is a real possibility of individual terrorist actions targeting high-value objects and targets with the aim of instilling fear and panic among the population. If such actions were to occur, the impact on security would be significant (Jevtić & Miljković, 2021: 67). From the perspective of assessing the terrorist threat, a major challenge is the lack of adequate information about migrants. Many migrants have partial or no identifying information, including their identity, origin, potential criminal or terrorist background, and health or psychological condition. Given that their identification is rarely based on personal documents, with most migrants being identified based on their own statements, the structure of the migrant population remains largely unknown. In assessing the terrorist threat, one must not overlook the influence of radical Islamist ideology on extremist groups in the region and their connection with extremist and terrorist organizations in regional countries (Jevtić & Miljković, 2021: 68).

The situation is further complicated by the fact that a significant number of radical Islamists from regional countries have participated in the activities

of “Islamic State.” Their return from conflict zones to their countries of origin creates a potential nucleus of individuals capable of carrying out terrorist activities and connecting with like-minded individuals among the migrant population. Considering that some migrants have directly participated in combat and are trained for conducting military actions in both rural and urban environments, there is a real possibility of isolated terrorist actions targeting critical infrastructure and high-value targets. Such actions could occur in response to dissatisfaction with their status, prolonged detention at EU borders, forced returns to their countries of origin, or upon orders from radical terrorist organizations. The implications of disrupted social security at the national, regional, and global levels have significantly influenced migration as a factor contributing to terrorism (Jevtić & Miljković, 2021: 68).

Social and Economic Implications of Migration for the European Union

The recent surge in asylum seekers entering Europe has undoubtedly raised significant interest and concern regarding migration, prompting questions about the EU’s capacity to swiftly integrate migrants into its economy and society. Forced and economic migration flows are expected to continue, driven by conflicts in neighboring regions, particularly Ukraine, and by the increasing frequency and scale of natural disasters resulting from climate change and rising global poverty (International Monetary Fund, 2016).

Migration impacts many different aspects of society, both in countries of origin and destination. Migrants often come from regions with lower labor productivity and tend to achieve higher productivity levels in their new environments. As such, migration generates economic gains and can be a decisive factor in helping Europe address its challenges, including an aging population, prosperity, and security (Ilo, 2015). From an economic perspective, migrants represent a valuable workforce that can support EU countries in recovering their economies in the long term. In the short term, however, the reception and support of asylum seekers—through the provision of services such as housing, food, healthcare, and education—require additional public investments and expenditures. This effect is particularly concentrated in the primary destination countries, such as Austria, Germany, and Sweden (Perco, 2004).

The fiscal impact of refugees is particularly significant for countries facing budgetary constraints. The impact of migrants in the medium to long term depends on how quickly and effectively they are integrated into the labor market, “to what extent the skills of newcomers complement or substitute the skills of the domestic workforce, and their impact on resource allocation, product mix, and production technology.” Labor market integration is crucial to reducing the net fiscal costs associated with the current influx of migrants. The sooner they find employment, the more they will contribute to public finances through income taxes and social security contributions. Their successful integration into the labor market will also help counteract some of the negative fiscal effects of

an aging population. Conversely, slow integration processes reflect the presence of factors and barriers that hinder migrants from finding jobs: lack of language skills and qualifications, legal restrictions on working during the asylum application period, and labor market rigidity.

The Rise of Xenophobia in the European Union

The sudden influx of refugees and migrants in 2015 overwhelmed many EU member states' capacity to accommodate newcomers and threatened to create divisions within the European Union. Member states struggled to reach an agreement and implement effective, long-term measures to properly receive and host the people arriving in Europe. For instance, a relocation plan was adopted to transfer around 160,000 asylum seekers from Italy and Greece to other European countries. However, only a third of this number was actually relocated.

As the EU struggles to reform its common asylum system, tensions against refugees and migrants are flaring across the continent. In Italy, Minister of the Interior Matteo Salvini, the leader of the far-right party "Lega," has ramped up his rhetoric against migrants. Salvini's xenophobic rhetoric and policies have resonated in other countries as well. For example, Croatia has been accused of collective expulsion of migrants and asylum seekers and of using police brutality. Hungary has enacted a law to sanction NGOs that assist migrants and asylum seekers, while Denmark announced in December that it plans to send rejected asylum seekers and criminal refugees to an isolated island starting in 2024.

Some of these policies may even risk undermining the fundamental rights and values of the European Union. This danger was highlighted by the EU's Fundamental Rights Agency in a report on the violation of basic rights of migrants and refugees, which was published last February. These risks were also acknowledged by the European Commission, which has initiated infringement proceedings against Bulgaria and Hungary for violating EU asylum rules.

In addition to these changes in legislation and policy, there has also been a rise in anti-migrant activities and demonstrations. Violent protests in Germany were organized in August 2023 by the Pegida movement and the AfD, a rising far-right party, leading to verbal and physical attacks on foreigners. Recently, an openly xenophobic man drove his car into a crowd of Syrians and Afghans on New Year's Eve, injuring several of them.

In Belgium, several thousand people protested last December in the "March against Marrakesh" against the Global Compact for Migration signed in Marrakesh the same month. This was accompanied by rhetoric and slogans such as "Our people first" and "We've had enough, close the borders." Xenophobia is on the rise, and the inability of member states to agree on asylum and immigration

policy or to reform the Common European Asylum System (CEAS) casts a dark shadow over the Union's common policy.

The European Commission has launched a major reform of the CEAS. However, negotiations have been difficult and progress has been slow. This is particularly true for the planned revision of the Dublin Regulation, which continues to divide European states. One of the main aspects of this reform is the creation of a "distribution mechanism" for asylum seekers across the Union to reduce the pressure on countries along the southern border. However, the Visegrad Group (Hungary, Slovakia, Czech Republic, and Poland) has categorically rejected any redistribution and opposes the views of the Mediterranean states (Italy, Greece, Malta, Spain, and Cyprus), which are calling for a mechanism that can help share the responsibility for migrants.

CONCLUSION

In many EU countries, the political landscape has been dominated by growing anti-migrant sentiments that view migration as a threat to cultural identities and welfare systems.

Migrants face a higher risk of social exclusion compared to the native population, particularly in terms of access to employment, education, healthcare, and social services. Within the migrant population, some groups are especially vulnerable and therefore require tailored integration measures. This is particularly true for third-country nationals, refugees, and beneficiaries of international protection, low-skilled migrants, women, unaccompanied minors, migrants with disabilities, and irregular migrants.

In this highly complex context, nonprofit social service providers and civil society organizations are engaged in providing both short-term and long-term solutions to build cohesive societies and foster the integration of migrants and refugees into host countries. They also work on the integration of other disadvantaged groups within their own countries, such as the homeless and other socially vulnerable categories. There are four potential barriers to migrant integration in the European Union: discrimination against migrants, difficulties in finding employment, limited interactions between migrants and citizens, and negative media portrayals of migrants.

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Paper received on: 15/4/2024

Paper accepted for publishing on: 2/9/2024

CRIME PREVENTION THROUGH ENVIRONMENTAL DESIGN: THE PATH TO STANDARDIZATION

Review Article

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| DOI: 10.5937/zurbezkrim2402055S | COBISS.RS-ID 141413889 | UDK 343.91:343.85 |
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Abstract: Contemporary cities face numerous challenges, ranging from environmental to security issues. One of the most significant security challenges is the rise of urban crime and how to prevent it. Numerous examples have shown that the design of the environment can influence criminal behavior. Globally, the model known as Crime prevention through environmental design (CPTED) is recognized. To enhance urban safety, it is essential to implement crime prevention measures, and this model is particularly effective. Therefore, the aim of this paper is to highlight the importance of CPTED for improving urban safety by shaping public urban spaces to be safe and attractive for citizens. Given that this model is still new in Republika Srpska, the goal is to present the development path and significance of CPTED standardization, as well as its application on a global level. This will form a theoretical research base and lay the foundations for initial research at institutes and universities, aiming for a comprehensive approach to urban safety analysis.

Keywords: urban safety, crime prevention, CPTED, Republika Srpska

INTRODUCTION

We are witnessing rapid changes and unpredictable challenges faced by cities and their inhabitants, ranging from environmental and natural challenges and disasters to security issues. The concept of 'security' is a very complex and multifaceted social phenomenon. Etymologically, it originates from the Latin word *securitas-atis*, which means safety, the absence of danger, confidence, protection, etc. (Маслеша, 2007). The human security agenda focuses on protecting and enhancing the security of people and communities, making crime

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prevention one of the greatest security challenges in urban places. To improve urban safety, it is essential to implement crime prevention measures.

Alongside measures implemented by criminologists, crime prevention can also be influenced through the design and arrangement of public spaces, that is, urban design. Appropriate design and effective use of space can reduce the fear of crime, decrease crime rates, and improve the quality of life for people (Cozens, Saville, & Hillier, 2005). This approach allows for the planning, designing, and construction of safe communities (Crowe & Zahm, 1994). Various crime prevention models exist, but this paper focuses on Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design (CPTED).² CPTED posits that there is a connection between the design of specific urban zones and crime rates, suggesting that the appearance and organization of an urban space influence the commission of criminal acts. The goal of CPTED is to make every location unsuitable for criminal activities while simultaneously ensuring it is safe for citizens.

CPTED is not a new model globally, but it is relatively new and insufficiently researched in Republika Srpska. Therefore, the subsequent sections of this paper outline its developmental path and application, aiming to demonstrate its significance and lay the groundwork for initial research at institutes and universities. This will help define guidelines for the preparation of planning and project documentation. It is essential to incorporate the standards, strategies, and principles of CPTED into the legislative and political framework, national policy guidelines, and city regulations for urban design and planning.

DEVELOPMENT OF CRIME PREVENTION THROUGH ENVIRONMENTAL DESIGN

In the 1960s and 1970s, journalist, urban theorist, and activist Jane Jacobs, along with urban writer Elizabeth Wood and architect Oscar Newman, established principles and postulates of secure architecture that later became the core principles and strategies of the CPTED. Jacobs advocated for a safe city adapted to people, combining attractiveness and accessibility with a system of openness through participation and the right to open access to urban space. In her book *The Death and Life of Great American Cities*, she argued that crime in residential blocks could be reduced by orienting buildings toward the street, clearly distinguishing between public and private spaces. Open spaces, according to her, connect the community and increase the number of ‘eyes on the street.’ She also believed that urban design, to reduce crime opportunities, should promote a diversity of space usage (mixed-use) rather than mono-functional blocks and should enhance the free flow of people to increase ‘natural surveillance’ (Jacobs, 1961). The CPTED strategy of *natural surveillance* for crime prevention directly emerged from these early ideas. Elizabeth Wood (Wood, 1960; Wood,

² For more information, see: <http://www.cpted.net/>

1961) also contributed significantly to the early development of CPTED with her works *A New Look at The Balanced Neighborhood* and *Housing Design: A Social Theory*. The CPTED formulations for territorial and social control, particularly the presence of people, were directly derived from her work. In his book *Defensible Space: Crime Prevention Through Urban Design*, Oscar Newman developed an approach based on the defensible space theory, offering very pragmatic solutions to crime problems. However, it was relatively narrow as it focused on residential structures and communities through *territoriality* (creating perceived zones of territorial influence), *natural surveillance* (opportunities for residents and their agents to observe), and *image and milieu*—now referred to as *image and maintenance* (perception of the project’s uniqueness, isolation, and reputation). These concepts later became the main strategies of the first generation of CPTED. The design of defensible space provides people with the opportunity to take control over the space and activities outside their homes, offering them an environment for comfortable living and the chance to improve their space so that their identity with it is strengthened (Newman, 1972). This concept suggests that all space in a human environment can be defended if residents consider the space their own and protect it from criminal use. During the same period when Newman was developing his concept of defensible space, academic solutions for crime control were proposed by the founder of CPTED, criminologist Clarence Ray Jeffery, in his book *Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design*. Jeffery argued that the criminal justice system (police, courts, prisons) was not functional as crime remained a fundamental social problem. He believed that crime and the fear of crime could be reduced by reshaping built spaces (the external physical environment), which mediate in the brain processes of individuals, acting as environmental stimuli and influencing changes in their behavior (Jeffery, 1971). “Behavior is a product of the brain, rather than environment. For behavior to occur, the environment, including social class, education, and age as social roles, must enter the brain and be processed” (Jeffery, 1990: 309). He proposed a broad, system-based approach between crime and the environment. His conceptualization included the internal environment (the brain), the external environment (the living environment), and the social environment, and the interaction of these different levels has the power to predict and prevent crime (Jeffery, 1971).

Twenty years later, criminologist and crime prevention consultant Timothy D. Crowe published a book with the same title *Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design*. The concepts presented in this book explain the relationship between urban design and human behavior. Understanding this relationship can enable planners to use natural environmental factors to reduce crime. Crowe worked as the director of the National Crime Prevention Institute at the University of Louisville and created his own CPTED training program, which serves as an important resource for anyone involved in urban design, planning, and space management (Crowe, 1991).

Henry Cisneros, former U.S. Secretary of Housing and Urban Development, published the monograph *Defensible Space: Deterring Crime and Building Community* in 1995. It was significant that a high-ranking federal leader acknowledged the impact of CPTED on crime reduction, and his book gained widespread recognition (Cisneros, 1995). A year later, Oscar Newman reasserted his concepts of defensible space in his book *Creating Defensible Space* (Newman, 1996). Five years later, the American Planning Association published *SafeScapes: Creating Safer, More Livable Communities Through Planning and Design* (Zelinka & Brennan, 2001), solidifying CPTED as an integral part of the planning process in many American cities.

Additionally, the U.S. National Institute of Justice developed studies demonstrating that appropriate (re)design and effective management of the physical environment can control and/or prevent crime (Fleissner & Heizelmann, 1996). The physical environment significantly impacts crime, the fear of crime and quality of life. CPTED works by reducing the ability of criminals to commit crimes and increasing the likelihood that citizens will witness crimes.

Today, CPTED is a holistic approach that holds a significant place within criminology and urbanism. In the early 21st century, CPTED strategies and principles³ gained global acceptance by police forces, architects, urban planners, spatial planners, and city authorities, becoming integral parts of various city regulations for planning, design, construction, and maintenance. The topic remains relevant in academic circles even after half a century. In 2020, professors Rachel Armitage and Paul Ekblom published the book *Rebuilding Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design: Strengthening the Links with Crime Science*. The authors define CPTED as a practice-oriented approach aimed at reducing crime risk by modifying the built environment (Armitage & Ekblom, 2020).

CPTED, as it is known and practiced today, is a closer adaptation of Newman's defensible space concept than Jeffery's original idea, although it combines elements of both approaches. It has evolved beyond its physical focus from '1st generation CPTED' into more mature approaches of 2nd and 2rd generations CPTED and continues to merge with other place-based crime prevention strategies such as situational crime prevention and crime geography, as well as space syntax, new urbanism, gated communities, and the 'responsibility' of spaces and objects (Kitchen & Schneider, 2007). The gradual expansion of the CPTED theory has grown from a small micro-scale at the architectural level, the focus of 1st generation CPTED, to a medium meso-scale with its focus on social conditions in neighborhoods - second-generation CPTED. 2nd generation CPTED was introduced by Cleveland and Saville (1997) during the second

3 The CPTED strategies are as follows: 1st-generation CPTED: natural surveillance, access control, territoriality, and image and milieu (image and maintenance); for 2nd-generation CPTED: social cohesion, community culture, connectivity, and capacity threshold; for 3rd-generation CPTED: environmental sustainability, social sustainability, economic sustainability, and public health sustainability.

annual conference of the International CPTED Association (ICA). According to this association, crime prevention through environmental design is defined as a “multidisciplinary approach to crime prevention that utilizes urban and architectural design and the management of built and natural environments.” CPTED surpasses traditional security methods by naturally integrating security measures into the community. The goal of all CPTED applications is to: “Enhance quality of life! Reduce fear of crime! Reduce crime!”⁴ With the expansion of 2nd generation CPTED in the 2000s, a new era of CPTED theorization began, focusing on activity generators, crime displacement, and movement predictors. Emerging from the urban planning roots of CPTED is the Smart Growth movement, which offers a new perspective on urban planning by analyzing urban sprawl, housing, transportation, environmental sustainability, and their impacts on community life and safety (Goetz, 2005). The desire to integrate planning, crime prevention, and neighborhood life into the new expectations and requirements of contemporary living environments is clearly emphasized. Through 1st generation CPTED, opportunities for crime were reduced, while 2nd generation CPTED focused on decreasing the motivation for criminal behavior. However, no consideration is given to the internal psychological and biological environment related to the external environment of the places where we live. This is the foundation from which ideas for 3rd generation CPTED began to emerge. Saville & Mihinjac (2022) introduced 3rd generation CPTED by emphasizing the importance of developing neighborhoods that meet the highest levels of needs in Abraham Maslow’s hierarchy of human needs (Maslow, 1943). As an integrated approach, 3rd generation CPTED offers a method to maintain both crime prevention and various aspects of neighborhood livability, as presented by the authors in their book *Third-Generation CPTED: Integrating Crime Prevention and Neighbourhood Liveability*. Additionally, the United Nations’ 2030 Agenda (also known as Habitat III) stipulates that sustainable cities and communities must also be made safe, with one of the proposed specific goals being to ensure equal access to safe, inclusive, and accessible green and public spaces by 2030 (UN-SDSN, 2012). General principles and frameworks for the process of crime prevention through environmental design were established in 2022 within the document *Prevention of Crime – Urban Planning and Building Design - CEN 14383*, which represents the first European standard aimed at reducing crime and fear of crime through urban planning. CEN standards from the 14383 series, particularly the overarching standard *Urban Planning (ENV 14383-2:2003 replaced by TR 14383-2:2007 and TS 14383-2:2022)*, are based on the ideas of Jane Jacobs and Oscar Newman regarding crime prevention and the fear of crime. Work on this standard began in 1995, and approximately 25 years later, the result is not only a complete series of European standards CEN 14383 but also the *SafePolis manual (2008)* and the global ISO standard on CPTED (*ISO 22341:2021*). The *SafePolis manual* was created as a practical explanation of

4 The International CPTED Association (ICA) is the world’s first professional non-profit CPTED organization, established in 1996 in Calgary, Canada. For more information, see: <https://www.cpted.net/>

the guidelines in the TR 14383-2 standard. This standard provides guidelines and strategies for CPTED, offering a 'step-by-step' process involving all relevant actors in urban planning and crime reduction. The standard and manual offer practical knowledge on how to prevent crime, reduce the fear of crime, and antisocial behavior through urban design and planning. The TR 14383-2 standard is said to be "the only standard for crime prevention in Europe since the Roman Empire" (COST Action TU1203, 2014: 50), and the same applies to the revision of TS 14383-2:2022 (van Soomeren, 2022). The global ISO standard on CPTED, ISO 22341:2021, aims to promote a shared understanding of crime prevention through environmental design (in the realm of security, law enforcement, and related risks and their preventive measures) and through the design and management of the environment. This document addresses the understanding of crime in the context of the physical environment and security risk factors, the fundamentals of CPTED through its historical background, considerations of CPTED strategies, the implementation process of CPTED, and general principles for the CPTED process (balanced conceptual approach, cost-effectiveness, sustainability and resilience, ecological approach, adaptive application, and evidence-based approach). The global ISO standard on CPTED provides guidelines for establishing the fundamental elements, strategies, and processes for preventing crime and the fear of crime in new or existing built environments. It includes examples of strategy implementation and best practices, but the applications of CPTED are not limited to these examples (ISO, 2021).⁵

The significance of this developmental path of CPTED towards standardization is considerable, highlighting the importance of integrating CPTED standards, strategies, and principles into urban regulations for planning, design, and management, as well as into national policy guidelines and the legislative framework of the state.

APPLICATION OF CRIME PREVENTION THROUGH ENVIRONMENTAL DESIGN

A significant part of CPTED's developmental path arises from the gradual incorporation of its strategies into local building and development codes in the United States and national policy guidelines in the United Kingdom. CPTED has been most extensively applied in English-speaking regions and Northern European countries, but it is also increasingly developing in nations such as Italy and France, as well as in Eastern Europe, Turkey, and the Middle East (Ekblom, 2011). In the UK, modern CPTED is endorsed by the national government and has been declared as local authority policy within the context of the Secured by Design (SBD) program (Kitchen & Schneider, 2007). Although it involves other government agencies, SBD is essentially a police-led initiative aimed at applying place-based crime prevention principles to the built envi-

⁵ For more information, see: <https://www.iso.org/obp/ui/#iso:std:iso:22341:ed-1:v1:en>

ronment. In the mid-1980s, the British Standardisation Institute (BSI) became the first standardization institute in Europe to publish standards for crime prevention for residential housing, street layout (emphasizing cul-de-sacs), as well as for shops and offices. In contrast, the United States⁶ and Asia⁷ do not have national CPTED guidelines, leaving states to develop their own planning and design guidelines. However, the national governments of Australia⁸ and New Zealand⁹ have developed legislative and policy frameworks for using CPTED, ensuring that all federal states have CPTED codes or guidelines (Балгач, 2013).

Urban security is a fundamental component of modern democracies within the European Union. Therefore, it is urgent that European local urban authorities begin to embrace their role in creating and implementing security policies. In Europe, the European Urban Charter endorsed the right of urban space residents to a safe and secure city in 1992 (CE, 1992). In 2008, the European Council adopted the European Urban Charter II – Manifesto for New Urbanity, where crime prevention is imperative as a condition for city security (CE, 2008). In 2017, the European Commission issued the Action Plan to support the protection of public spaces, which includes crime prevention through environmental design (EC, 2017). The Urban Agenda on Security in Public Spaces was published in 2019.

The mentioned European Union documents are highly significant, but unfortunately, they have not been adopted in Republika Srpska or Bosnia and Herzegovina. The Republic of Serbia has adopted the aforementioned Action

6 For example, in 2000, the CPTED Committee in Virginia Beach issued a guide for designers and planners titled Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design - General Guidelines for Designing Safer Communities. This guide outlines CPTED strategies and provides specific guidelines for implementing these techniques in various spaces. For more information, see: <https://www.biblioteca-deseguranca.com.br/wp-content/uploads/2023/04/crime-prevention-through-environmental-design.pdf>

7 In Asia, the Singapore National Crime Prevention Council issued the “Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design Guidebook” in 2003. For more information, see: <https://appdev.ifdemo.com/ncpcorgsg/images/media/CPTED.pdf>

8 For instance, in 2005, the Government of the Australian state of Victoria, through its Department of Sustainability and Environment, published the Safer Design Guidelines for Victoria. This document emphasizes the importance of the built environment in reducing crime and the fear of crime, highlighting how good investment in the design and appearance of the environment brings numerous social and community benefits. For more information, see: https://www.planning.vic.gov.au/__data/assets/pdf_file/0014/4631/Safer_Design_Guidelines.pdf. Additionally, in 2007, the government of the Australian state of Queensland issued the Crime Prevention through Environmental Design - Guidelines for Queensland, which provides specific guidelines for the implementation of the CPTED principles. For more information, see: <https://www.police.qld.gov.au/sites/default/files/2021-07/Crime%20Prevention%20Through%20Environmental%20Design%20-%20Guidelines%20for%20Queensland%202021%20v1.pdf>

9 In 2011, the Auckland Police Department in New Zealand released a manual titled Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design (CPTED) - Security Handbook. This manual presents a comprehensive range of the CPTED principles categorized according to components such as territoriality, surveillance, maintenance, and access control, along with guidelines for their effective implementation. For more information, see: <https://www.rockridgencpc.com/documents/fliers/CPTED%20Security%20Handbook-rev%20simlin.pdf>

Plan to support the protection of public spaces. However, provisions related to CPTED are absent in the current Law on Planning and Construction of the Republic of Serbia,¹⁰ so architects and urban planners are not required to analyze or incorporate them into their work. In contrast, field research in Serbian cities shows that urban security is important to citizens and influences how they use certain open spaces in their environment (Антонић, Ђукић, Ваништа Лазаревић, & Марић, 2022). In 2007, the Urban Planning Institute of Belgrade published the manual *Safer Places: A Planning System and Crime Prevention*. The manual describes seven CPTED attributes of urban security (УЗБ, 2007).

Urban security and CPTED are not included in the current Spatial Planning Act of the Republic of Croatia.¹¹ The Spatial Development Strategy of the Republic of Croatia states that any intervention and transformation of space directly impacts health, security, climate, and overall living conditions.¹² Juričić (2016) suggests that the implementation of CPTED in Croatia could easily be achieved through existing programs or strategies, such as the Community Policing model, which is compatible with the defensible space model and is fundamentally very similar to CPTED. CPTED and the Community Policing strategy are comprehensive crime prevention strategies and involve close cooperation between police and neighborhood residents in preventing crime and the fear of crime.

The policing system in Bosnia and Herzegovina is complex due to its division into state and entity levels (Federation of BiH and Republika Srpska), with the Brčko District of BiH also having its own autonomous police structure. This complex organization highlights the challenges in applying certain crime prevention models at the national level. Urban security and CPTED principles are not currently included in the Law on Spatial Planning and Construction¹³ or the Law on Strategic Planning and Development Management in Republika Srpska.¹⁴ This indicates that professionals are not required to address urban security, despite the need for public urban spaces to be safe. It is crucial to integrate CPTED strategies and principles into spatial planning processes and to include security issues in planning documents to effectively prevent crime and the fear of crime.

10 Закон о планирању и изградњи Републике Србије [Law on Planning and Construction of the Republic of Serbia], Службени гласник РС, бр. 72/09.

11 Закон о просторном уређењу Републике Хрватске [Spatial Planning Act of the Republic of Croatia], Народне новине РХ, бр. 153/13.

12 Стратегија просторног развоја Републике Хрватске [Spatial Development Strategy of the Republic of Croatia], Народне новине РХ, бр. 106/17.

13 Закон о уређењу простора и грађењу Републике Српске [Law on Spatial Planning and Construction], Службени гласник РС, бр. 40/13.

14 Закон о стратешком планирању и управљању развојем у Републици Српској [Law on Strategic Planning and Development Management in Republika Srpska], Службени гласник РС, бр. 63/21.

CONCLUSION

Crime and the fear of crime are significant issues in modern society, negatively impacting the quality of life for citizens. Therefore, it is essential to devise effective crime prevention strategies. The built environment should be designed to enhance the lifestyle and quality of life by meeting people's physical, social, and economic needs, as well as providing a safe place to live. This can be achieved through crime prevention through environmental design (CPTED).

Crime prevention through environmental design represents a significant link between security theories and urban design and planning, offering numerous solutions for enhancing the safety of open public spaces through various strategies, principles, and guidelines. The primary obstacle to the broader application of CPTED is a lack of knowledge and insufficient understanding of this concept, despite its successful use over many years and substantial research confirming its effectiveness. Therefore, it is necessary to actively work on educating engineers, criminologists, sociologists, psychologists, and other professionals and citizens who can assist in developing strategies, principles, and guidelines for crime prevention. Existing legal and technical regulations should incorporate current CPTED standards, strategies, and principles, considering the importance of CPTED standardization at the European and global levels. Examples of their successful implementation can be useful for developing planning and project documentation, particularly in Republika Srpska, where this field is still relatively unknown.

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Review of Exercises Supported by Computer Simulations in the Training of Protection and Rescue Forces by Dragiša Jurišić and Goran Maksimović

The book *Exercises Supported by Computer Simulations in the Training of Protection and Rescue Forces* is the first book in this region that addresses the use of modern technologies in the training of protection and rescue forces.

This book address a topic that deserves special attention in Bosnia and Herzegovina and the surrounding countries. The training of protection and rescue forces for responding to various emergency situations is crucial for their effective and efficient response. The authors point out that the current level of training for protection and rescue forces is not adequate in Republika Srpska, the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, and the Brčko District of BiH, to ensure an efficient and effective response in emergency situations. Naturally, the authors also highlight the reasons behind this state of affairs within the protection and rescue forces, emphasizing the need for a new and modern approach to training.

The development of computers, software, and hardware has enabled unprecedented capabilities, including the use of modern technology in training. The use of computer simulations represents just one aspect of this wide range of modern possibilities. In line with this, the goal of this book is to highlight new approaches to training of protection and rescue forces, particularly emergency management staff, both at the local level and in Republika Srpska, and beyond. New technologies offer opportunities that should be utilized, as costs and finances are not limiting factors in this case. The core idea is to present exercises supported by computer simulations and to provide the fundamental elements for their planning, organization, execution, and evaluation. In this context, the book consists of nine chapters, including an introduction and conclusion.

The first chapter focuses on the training of protection and rescue forces in Republika Srpska, the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, and institutions at the state level, and discusses the impact of Bosnia and Herzegovina's accession to the EU Civil Protection Mechanism on the training of protection and rescue forces in the two entities and the Brčko District.

The second chapter explains simulations and simulation systems, providing a conceptual framework, historical development, areas of application, and the advantages and disadvantages of using computer-supported exercises compared to field or other types of exercises.

The third chapter is primarily focused on the concept and typology of exercises, offering descriptions of the basic types of exercises used in the training of protection and rescue forces in Republika Srpska, as well as those that could be used in the future, including exercises supported by computer simulations.

The fundamentals of exercise management for protection and rescue forces are presented in the fourth chapter, which also serves as an introduction to the planning of computer-supported exercises, which is covered in the fifth chapter. This chapter outlines all phases of planning and organizing computer-supported exercises, with a detailed description of planning teams, all relevant conferences, and the technical preparations that must be completed before the exercise itself.

The sixth chapter provides a detailed explanation of how computer-supported exercises are conducted, with particular emphasis on the control and evaluation of these exercises. The seventh chapter presents the basics of reporting on the implementation of computer-supported exercises, both during and after their execution.

The eighth chapter describes simulation systems currently in use worldwide and available both in Bosnia and Herzegovina and neighboring countries, along with their main characteristics and applications.

Finally, the book concludes with an overview of simulation centers located in Bosnia and Herzegovina and neighboring countries, which could potentially be used or are already being used, to some extent, for the training of protection and rescue system forces.

The book *Exercises Supported by Computer Simulations in the Training of Protection and Rescue Forces* by Dragiša Jurišić and Goran Maksimović spans 198 pages and contains 36 images, 11 diagrams, and six tables. These visual aids help the reader gain a clearer understanding of the content and the relationships between various elements involved in the planning, organization, and execution of computer-supported simulation exercises.

The approach taken by the authors in addressing the subject and issues covered in this book adheres to fundamental methodological principles. With over a hundred references, including works by domestic and international authors, as well as various online sources, and a significant amount of literature in English and Russian, the book ensures a comprehensive and thorough exploration of the training of protection and rescue forces in an era of modern technologies and new technological capabilities. Examples from international practice, along with presentations of the potential use of computer systems for training protection and rescue forces in global and neighboring countries, further highlight the importance of this book.

This book can serve as a supplementary textbook and practical guide for the subject *Safety in Emergency Situations*, as well as a manual for the planning, organization, execution, and evaluation of computer-based exercises for

protection and rescue forces in the protection and rescue institutions of both Republika Srpska and Serbia, and beyond.

The book is highly engaging and provides clear guidelines for readers on how to prepare, organize, and implement computer-supported exercises for protection and rescue forces. The authors, in a detailed and knowledgeable manner, describe various types of simulation systems currently used worldwide, as well as those existing in Bosnia and Herzegovina and neighboring countries, which are being used to varying degrees of success for training protection and rescue forces.

Jurišić and Maksimović emphasize a new method of training that is virtually absent from current literature. There is no comparable book addressing this approach concerning the training of protection and rescue forces. This innovative training method, along with its presentation and detailed explanations of the process of preparation, planning, implementation, and evaluation, represents a significant novelty in the field of protection and rescue.



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Viktimološkog društva Srbije-Žrtve kriminaliteta i žrtve rata: međunarodni i domaći kontekst, knjiga apstrakta (p. 13). Beograd: Viktimološko društvo Srbije & Prometej.

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