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EDITORIAL INTRODUCTION

The fourth edition of the *Journal of Security and Criminal Sciences*, which is co-published by the University of Criminal Investigation and Police Studies in Belgrade and the Faculty of Security Studies, University of Banja Luka, is now available to a wider readership. This issue consists of four scientific articles and a book review. The articles concern various scientific fields: safety in emergency situations, special physical education, criminalistic tactics, methodology and operations, international relations.

In their article entitled *the Survey of Citizen Attitudes toward Preparedness for Disasters Caused by Wildfires: The Prijepolje Case Study*, Vladimir M. Cvetković and Bogdan Filipović address the topic of safety in emergency situations which is now increasingly entering the scientific and public discourse. The response by the authorities of the municipality of Prijepolje, as seen by its citizens, where forests cover one third of the territory is certainly an interesting topic. The results obtained in their research “indicate that people are insufficiently prepared to respond to wildfires.” Given that this study is supported by quality research and knowledgeable presentation of the results obtained, the article is worth reading.

Goran Žigić, Rasa Dimitrijević and Bojan Mitrović addressed the motor skills among students at University of Criminal Investigation and Police Studies. In their article entitled *Differences in Basic Motor Skills among Students at the University Criminal Investigation and Police Studies Regarding Special Physical Education 1*, they presented research aimed at determining “the differences between the levels of basic motor skills (BMS) at the entrance exam in relation to BMS in the semester exam in Special Physical Education 1 (SPE 1).” The research was conducted on a sample of 119 students (39 girls and 80 boys) at the University. The authors’ conclusion that “designed and systematically implemented physical activity during the entire study process would significantly contribute to the improvement of the educational and training process among the KPU students and represent a significant basis in training them for work within the Ministry of the Interior of the Republic of Serbia” is not surprising.

In his article *Key Institutional Actors of European Security – Current Sitate and Challenges*, Boris Tučić analyzes the “adaptability and ability of three institutional actors of European security– the EU, the NATO, and the OSCE – to properly respond to security challenges facing Europe.” In this context, the author points out that “in the EU it is possible to identify a wide range of security policies, different developments and efficiencies” and also points out that “the OSCE, like NATO, is a relic of the past.” According to Tučić, in addition to the classic security risks arising from the relationship between the great powers and their conflicting interests, “the European continent faces a number of security challenges which are more inherent in the modern, globalized international context” and in this sense the author points to terrorism, illegal migration and global environmental disturbances. Tučić points out that, in order to prevent

the mentioned security risks and threats and at the same time fulfill the role of the “global security actor, the EU must build an autonomous security identity”, which presently seems impossible, according to Tučić.

In the article entitled *Serbia's Strategic, Legal and Institutional Approach in the Fight against Terrorism*, Predrag Popović analyzes and reviews strategic documents, legislation and entities dealing with the fight against terrorism and reaches a conclusion that the Republic of Serbia in this sense has developed capabilities to counter terrorism.

It has become a tradition for the journal to end with a book review published by the Faculty of Security Studies. This time it is the book *Basic Integration and Cooperation Policies in the Area of Internal Affairs and Justice in the European Union: Legal and Institutional Framework of the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice* written by Boris Tučić. The book was reviewed by Srđan Perišić, Professor of International Relations at the Faculty of Philosophy, University of Istočno Sarajevo.

There is little doubt that the next issue of *Journal of Security and Criminal Sciences* is going to entice its growing readership.

Editor-in-Chief
Dr. Predrag Čeranić

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SCIENTIFIC ARTICLES

THE SURVEY OF CITIZEN ATTITUDES TOWARD PREPAREDNESS FOR DISASTERS CAUSED BY WILDFIRES: CASE STUDY: PRIJEPOLJE

Original Scientific Article

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Abstract: Starting with the severity of wildfires and the fact that about one third of the territory of Polimlje consists of forests and that wildfires are relatively common in Prijepolje, the aim of our research is to examine the influencing factors of certain independent variables (sex, marital status, age, education, etc.) on different dimensions of preparedness for a disaster caused by wildfires. By multi-stage random sampling, starting with the theory of planned behavior, a survey was conducted in 15 settlements within the municipality of Prijepolje on a sample of 197 respondents. The results of the survey indicate a low level of preparedness among the inhabitants of Prijepolje (citizens generally believe that they do not have the necessary knowledge to respond to disasters caused by wildfires and are generally not interested in attending training; they do not have plans or equipment for response and the majority of them think wildfires do not pose any danger to them). Also, the influence of certain factors on the attitudes toward preparedness was unequivocally determined. The scientific significance of the survey is reflected in the creation of preconditions for the improvement of empirical knowledge in the area of disaster risk management, while the practical significance is reflected in the creation of preconditions for improving the safety of citizens from wildfires.

Keywords: disasters, wildfire, preparedness, citizens, attitudes, Prijepolje.

INTRODUCTION

Wildfires are often the causes of forest destruction and lead to enormous environmental and economic damage, as well as the loss of human lives. There is a growing human influence on their occurrence, control and suppression. Scientists dealing with this problem have noticed that fires most often occur

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
in summer, when air temperatures are relatively high and when there is no precipitation. There are years when the increased activity of these disasters may also occur in early spring or late autumn. About 5% of fires are attributed to natural causes, while 95% of fires are caused by human activities such as carelessness, work on agricultural land and pyromania (Radovanović, 2008). The size of the burned area and the intensity of the fire depend on the type of vegetation that is endangered by fire. The dimensions of these natural disasters can often be of such proportions that they are visible from space (Ignjić, 2017). The behavior of wildfires depends on air temperature, wind, precipitation and relative humidity. After a long rainy period, there is an increase in moisture in burning materials.

Based on the analysis of wildfires in the period 2000-2009, it may be concluded that the largest areas affected by fire are located in Eastern and South-eastern Serbia and that it is noticeable that these areas have significantly higher average ten-year temperatures than the average for Central Serbia (Aleksic and Janičić, 2011). Regarding the situation in the municipality of Prijepolje, a large fire was recorded in a pine forest near the general hospital in 2017. The fire engulfed the forest in the settlement of Miljanovica; the village of Rasno and the settlement of Sretež were also endangered. Prior and Eriksen indicated that greater social cohesion among community members contributes to a greater level of preparedness for disasters caused by wildfires (Prior & Eriksen, 2013). Additionally, Monroe et al. conducted a research on the experiences of residents of 15 local communities who improved their disaster preparedness (Monroe et al., 2013). They came to a conclusion that good communication is the key to good natural risk management and that educational programs that foster interaction between community members and mutual work need to be designed (Agrawal & Monroe, 2006). Newman et al. (Newman et al., 2013) examined risk perception among the residents of local communities affected by wildfires and hurricanes and concluded that the residents are more aware of the dangers posed by hurricanes than by wildfires. Eriksen et al. addressed wildfire protection and rescue plans in Australia and indicated that such plans should include an explanation of the actions of all household members and recommendations for multiple unforeseen circumstances, given that proper decision making may be affected in these situations due to the impact of insecurity, fear and adrenaline on cognitive function (Eriksen et al., 2016). Fabac et al. (2015) pointed out the dissatisfaction of the citizens in Croatia with the organization of logistical support in the fight against wildfires. Given that fires are inevitable in many parts of Australia, numerous studies on the preparedness of residents for disasters caused by wildfires in this area have been conducted (McGee & Russell, 2003), including a number of studies related to preparedness for other disasters (Aleksandrina et al., 2019; Cvetkovic et al., 2020; Ocal et al., 2020; Cvetković & Martinović, 2020). the factors whose influence has been confirmed are knowledge of wildfires, the level of individual responsibility and self-confidence.

For this reason, this article seeks to examine the factors influencing the attitudes of citizens toward preparedness to respond to a disaster caused by wildfires. The aim of this article is to scientifically describe the levels and factors influencing the selected dimensions of response preparedness.

RESEARCH METHODS

This survey seeks to examine the impact of the factors of certain independent variables (sex, marital status, age, education, occupation, income, the number of children in the family, the number of household members, etc.) on different dimensions of preparedness for a disaster caused by wildfires. The disaster preparedness of citizens includes several different dimensions, with research focusing on having knowledge of how to respond to wildfires and protection plans. Specifically, this research seeks to determine the impact of sex, age, marital status, ethnicity, health status, the length of residence (demographic characteristics), education, occupation, the number of children in the family, the number of household members, apartment comfort, income level (socio-economic characteristics) on the preparedness among the citizens of the municipality of Prijepolje for the catastrophe caused by wildfires. The statistical method was used to analyze the impact of demographic and socio-economic characteristics of citizens on the level of their preparedness for emergency situations caused by wildfires.



*Figure 8. Conceptual model of the research objective.
Source: created by the authors.*

Sample

By multi-stage random sampling, a survey was conducted in 15 settlements in the municipality of Prijepolje on a sample of 197 respondents. The survey

was conducted in the following 15 settlements: Sretež, Miljanovica, Rasno, Bjelobabe, Kamena Gora, Koševina, Bostani, Šarampov, Vakuf, Jabuka, Milaković, Ratajska, Seljašnica, Kolovrat and Ivanje. In the selected settlements, the households to be surveyed were randomly selected. The method of random selection is reflected in the developed procedure of selecting every other household on the right side of the street, starting from the smallest to the largest number. Then, of the selected households, the respondents were selected in alphabetical order according to their names. The sample included a large number of female respondents, aged 31 to 50, married, with secondary education diploma, employed and with a monthly salary ranging from 26,000 to 50,000 dinars (Table 1).

Table 1. Review of the sample structure N=197.

Variable	Category	N	%
Sex	Male	74	37,6
	Female	123	62,4
Age	Under 30	46	23,4
	From 31 to 50	97	49,2
	Over 50	54	27,4
Marital status	Not in a relationship	31	15,7
	In a relationship	30	15,2
	Married	121	61,4
	Engaged	5	2,5
	Widow/widower	10	5,1
Education	Primary school	11	5,6
	High school	107	54,3
	Higher school	34	17,3
	University	45	22,8
Occupation	Unemployed	22	11,2
	Employed	153	77,7
	Retired	22	11,2
Monthly salary	Up to 25.000	77	39,1
	26.000 – 50.000	93	47,2
	51.000 – 75.000	12	6,1
	Over 76.000	15	7,6
Risk perception	Yes	106	53,8
	No	56	28,4
	Not sure	35	17,8
Previous experience	Yes	61	31,0
	No	136	69,0

Research instrument

Designing and designing the survey questionnaire involved several steps. First, all studies using scales to examine the level of preparedness of citizens for disasters caused by wildfires were identified (Fabac et al., 2015; Eriksen et al., 2016; McGee & Russell, 2003). Then, based on the research collected, all measures that mean disaster preparedness were identified and a survey questionnaire was created for the purpose of this research. The questionnaire consisted of two parts: questions about respondents' demographic and socio-economic characteristics (15 questions) and questions about citizen readiness to respond to emergencies caused by wildfires (20 questions). To ensure that the questions in the questionnaire would be clear and understandable to the respondents, a pilot survey was conducted and the internal compliance of the questionnaire was checked in the statistical data processing program.

Method of data analysis

The preparation of data for further processing and analysis was initiated after the survey had been conducted. The data collected were entered into the database and reviewed in order to identify possible errors. Further analysis of the data included the application of descriptive statistics, that is, the determination of the measures of central tendency (mean, median and mode), the measures of dispersion (variation interval, standard deviation and coefficient of variation) and variation form (symmetry and flatness). For the purposes of data analysis, descriptive static analyses and a chi square test were used.

RESULTS

The analysis of citizen preparedness for disasters included taking into consideration their self-assessment of their knowledge of responses to disasters caused by wildfires, their interest in attending additional trainings to enhance their preparedness, the possession of response plans and equipment, including the awareness of wildfire risk. 46.2% of the respondents answered "No" to the question "Do you think you have the necessary knowledge to respond to disasters caused by wildfires?", 34% answered "Yes", while 19.8% of the respondents were not sure how to self-assess their preparedness (Chart 1).




Chart 1. Percentage distribution of citizen attitudes regarding the self-assessment of their own knowledge of disaster response.

Thus, our results indicate that the majority of respondents do not believe they have adequate knowledge to respond to wildfires. We can assume that the reason for such a situation lies in the fact that the domestic public pays very little attention to examining and enhancing citizen preparedness to respond to disasters. Since there are no trainings organized for citizens, they do not have an opportunity to acquire necessary knowledge.




Chart 2. Percentage distribution of citizen interest in trainings on how to respond to disasters caused by wildfires.

The knowledge individuals possess is mainly acquired through education or experience. Of course, the task of the respondents was to assess their knowledge, so that we have their ideas, in other words, we cannot say with certainty that people who believe they possess the necessary knowledge, really possess that knowledge. In order to determine the actual level of the respondents' knowledge, it is necessary to conduct additional examinations and tests. 40.1% of the respondent answered "No" to the question "Are you interested in attending training for responding to disasters caused by forest fires in order to improve your preparedness?", 35.5% answered "Maybe", while 24.4% of the respondents answered "Yes" (Chart 1).

Only 24.4% of the respondents would be interested in attending wildfire response training courses. This result may be justified by the fact that people have insufficient awareness of the need to take appropriate protection measures and improve their own preparedness. If an appropriate image of the importance of training courses were created in the public, a larger number of people would likely show interest in them. In order to determine the number of those interested in training with certainty, it is necessary to specifically examine the respondents who may be interested. It is necessary to determine which factors affect their commitment, that is, in which situations they would be interested in attending training courses. 94.9% of the respondents answered "No" to the question "Do you have appropriate plans and appropriate equipment for responding to emergencies caused by forest fires?", while 5.1% answered "Yes". Only 5% of respondents have plans and equipment for disaster response. We would assume that those respondents who possess the appropriate knowledge of disaster response also possess the necessary equipment and plans. However, a small number of respondents who answered "Yes" to this question is worrying and may indicate that the level of citizen preparedness is much lower than they believe. In order to approach the analysis of the causes of this, it is necessary to determine whether the respondents know what is meant by wildfire response equipment. 29.9% of the respondents answered "Yes" to the question "Do you think you are in danger of forest fires?", while 70.1% answered "No".

Despite the fact that Prijepolje is a predominantly forested area and that wildfires are a relatively common occurrence, our results demonstrate that 70% of the respondents do not think wildfires pose a danger to them. This may suggest that people are careless about the environment and if they have not had any direct experience with wildfires, they do not believe they may find themselves in danger. Also, people probably have an unrealistic image of the dangers and consequences caused by wildfires. Few people are aware that it takes decades and huge sums of money to renew forest areas burned by fires. Even in cases of low-intensity wildfires, when trees are damaged, they must be cut down in order to prevent their gradual decay, disease and the spread of the disease. The following table shows the responses of the male and female respondents regarding their preparedness for disasters caused by wildfires. Only 10.57% of the female respondents believe that they have adequate knowledge

of disaster response, while as many as 35.13% of the male respondents believe so. Interestingly, a small number of the respondents of both sexes have plans and equipment for disaster response, only 2.44% of the females and 9.46% of the males.

Table 2. The result of cross tabulation of sex and disaster preparedness.

Sex		Knowledge			Training			Response plan and equipment		Danger	
		Yes	No	Not Sure	Yes	No	Maybe	Yes	No	Yes	No
Male	N	26	25	23	22	29	23	7	67	22	52
	%	35,1	33,7	31	29,7	39,1	31	9,46	90,5	29,7	70,2
Female	N	13	66	44	26	50	47	3	12 0	37	86
	%	10,5	53,6	35,7	21,1	40,6	38,2	2,44	97,5	30,0	69,9
Total	N	39	91	67	48	79	70	10	187	59	138
	%	19,8	46,1	34	24,3	40,1	35,5	5,07	94,9	29,9	70

Interestingly, as many as 60.87% of the respondents under the age of 30 believe that they do not have the appropriate knowledge to respon to disasters, 43.30% between the ages of 31 and 50, with 38.89% over the age of 51. the respondents over 51 are the least interested in attending training courses. As many as 57.40% of the respondents over 51 are not interested in training courses, including the respondents aged 31 to 50 (37.11%) and under 30 (26.07%). The respondents over 51, in a slightly higher percentage that the younger respondents, believe that they have the necessary knowledge to respond to wildfires. The reason for this may be the fact that they have probably already encountered forest fires during their lifetime, therefore they believe that they have improved their preparedness through experience. Also, this may indicate that people's self-confidence grows with age and they overcome any insecurity during their youth. The older respondents are the least interested in training courses, while the respondents under 30 show the greatest interest. They are more willing to learn and improve, while the older respondents are stiffer in their attitudes and find it harder to learn and remember. However, the respondents under 30, a significantly higher percentage than the older respondents, have wildfire response plan and equipment. The older respondents are likely to overestimate their knowledge and abilities, while the younger respondents are insecure about their knowledge.

The answers of the respondents of different marital status are presented below. Interestingly, about 60% of engaged respondents (3 respondents out of 5 respondents) express their interest in attending disaster response training courses, 40% of those in a relationship, 29.03% of those who are not in a relationship and 19.01% of those who are married. Also, 40% of engaged respondents (2 respondents), 40% of those who lost their partner (4 respondents), 38.71% of those who are not in a relationship, 28.10% of those who are married and 23.33% of those who are in a relationship believe that wildfires pose a dan-

ger to them. The largest percentage of their knowledge of wildfire response was positively assessed by widows/widowers, including engaged respondents. The most interested in the trainings are the loyal respondents, as well as the respondents who are in a relationship. The potential reason for these results probably lies in the fact that they are most often younger people who plan to live and have children together, so they want to take all measures so that they and their descendants can live in safe and secure conditions. The largest percentage of engaged respondents have plans and equipment for reacting in case of forest fires, which speaks in favor of the previous theory.

Regarding the impact of education, our survey has shown that those with higher education are the most confident in their knowledge of disaster response – 32.35% of them self-assessed their knowledge as being satisfactory. Also, 27.27% of those with primary education, 20% of those with higher education, and 14.95% of those with secondary education positively assessed their knowledge as being satisfactory. On the other hand, the least interested in attending additional training courses are those with primary education, only 9.09% are interested in training courses (1 respondent), followed by 20.56% of those with secondary education, 31.11% of those with university degrees and 32.35% of those with higher vocational education. The respondents with higher vocational education and university degrees believe that they are at risk of wildfires (35.29% and 33.33%) compared to the respondents with secondary and primary education (27.10% and 27.27%). People with primary and secondary education are most confident regarding their knowledge to respond in the cases of a wildfire, while the respondents with higher vocational education and university degrees are most interested in attending training courses. The respondents with primary education are the least interested. This can be explained by the excessive self-confidence of people with primary education and insufficiently developed awareness of the need to improve their own preparedness. In addition, the respondents with higher vocational education and university degrees, to a greater extent than those less educated, believe that wildfires pose a danger to them.

Our survey results demonstrated that about 31.82% of unemployed respondents believe that they have appropriate knowledge of disaster response, including the employed (17.65%) and retired (22.73%) respondents. The least interested in attending training courses are retired respondents, as many as 63.64% have a negative attitude toward training courses, including 50% of the respondents who are unemployed and 35.29% of those who are employed. A majority of respondents with a monthly salary not exceeding 25,000 dinars negatively assessed their knowledge of disaster response, as many as 58.44% of them believe they do not have adequate knowledge, including 44.09% of those with a salary ranging between 26,000 and 50,000, as well as 25% of those with a salary ranging between 51,000 and 75,000, and only 13.33% of those with a monthly salary exceeding 76,000. Those with a monthly salary exceeding 76,000 are the most interested in attending training courses – 46.67% of them

showed interest in it – 23.38% of those with a monthly salary not exceeding 25,000, 22.58% with a monthly salary ranging between 26,000 and 50,000 and only 16,67% of those with a monthly salary between 51,000 and 75,000. Interestingly, none of the respondents with a salary above 51,000 (including the group of respondents with a monthly salary exceeding 76,000) have disaster response plans or equipment, including 96.10% of those with a monthly salary less than 25,000 and 92.47% of those with a monthly salary between 26,000 and 50,000. Also, 60% of the respondents with a monthly salary above 76,000 believe they are at risk of wildfires, as well as those with a monthly salary ranging between 51,000 and 75,000 (41, 67%), those with a monthly salary not exceeding 25,000 (29.87%) and of those with a monthly salary ranging between 26,000 and 50,000 (23.66%). The respondents with a salary above 76,000 dinars assessed their knowledge negatively. Additionally, these respondents, to a much greater extent than other categories of respondents, showed interest in attending wildfire response training courses. We assume these people have a responsible and demanding job, which leaves them little room to do other things. Given their interest in training, they are obviously highly aware of wildfires and their consequences. None of them has a response plan or equipment for, and they, in a much higher percentage than the others, believe wildfires pose a danger to them. The largest percentage of respondents with a monthly salary ranging between 26,000 and 50,000 have a wildfire response plan and equipment, and most of them positively assessed their knowledge, so we can conclude that they are at a higher level of readiness compared to other categories of respondents.

The research indicated that those who are afraid of wildfires think they do not have adequate knowledge of how to respond to disasters, about 50% of the respondents answered negatively, including 39.29% of those who are not afraid of wildfires and 45.71 % of those who are not sure if they are afraid of them. Accordingly, the least interested in attending training courses are those who do not feel fear of forest fires, 60.71% of them answered negatively, as well as 35.85% of those who fear wildfires and 20% of those who are not sure whether they are afraid. None of the respondents who are not sure whether they fear wildfires have disaster response plans and equipment. 8.93% of the respondents who are not afraid of wildfires have disaster response plans and equipment, as well as 4.72% of the respondents who are afraid of wildfires. Only 14.29% of those who are not afraid of wildfires believe that wildfires pose a danger to them, including 37.74% of those who are afraid of wildfires and 31.43% of those who are not sure if they are afraid of them. The respondents who do not fear wildfires mainly think that they have satisfactory knowledge of disaster response. It may be concluded that these respondents are not afraid of wildfires because they believe in their knowledge. Of course, the respondents who are afraid of wildfires are most interested in attending trainings. Compared to other respondents, a significantly higher percentage of the respondents who are not afraid of wildfires have disaster response plans and equipment.

DISCUSSION

Our survey findings suggest that the male respondents, unlike female respondents, consider their disaster preparedness to be good. They are also more interested in attending training courses to improve their preparedness. Thus, according to the findings, we can conclude that there is a certain difference between men and women regarding response preparedness. Our findings are not in line with the findings of the survey conducted in Tehran in 2014, according to which, there is no difference in preparedness between male and female respondents (Najafi et al., 2015). On the other hand, the study conducted in Turkey demonstrates that women are more concerned about possible disasters and are more aware of the seriousness of their consequences (Karanci et al., 2005). The results of this study showed that marital status affects the readiness of the respondents, since the married respondents have a more pronounced perception of risks compared to the respondents who are single.

In relation to the established level of citizen preparedness to respond to disasters caused by wildfires, it may be said that the low level of citizen preparedness is the result of insufficient awareness of wildfires, their possible consequences and the need to improve knowledge to provide adequate disaster response. Given that the respondents were asked to self-assess their knowledge of how to respond in case of wildfires, these assessments do not have to present the respondents' actual knowledge. We have to take into account the fact that there are different types of people, so some of the respondents potentially overestimated or underestimated their knowledge and abilities. A small number of respondents having disaster response plans and equipment is worrying may indicate that a much smaller number of respondents know how to respond to wildfires, compared to the number of those who believe in it. Additionally, the majority of respondents do not believe that wildfires pose any danger to them. This is most likely due to the belief "it will not happen to us", which is stronger than the fact that wildfires frequently occur in Prijepolje, especially during the summer months.

In regard to the impact of education, people with college degrees do not believe they have the necessary knowledge to respond to disasters, although they believe they are at risk of wildfires. Our survey findings are not in line with the results of the research conducted in Thailand and the Philippines, which examined the impact of education on the preparedness of the population, with their demographic characteristics being controlled. The results showed that formal education increases the propensity for disaster preparedness activities, that is, education improves abstract thinking and anticipation skills, therefore people with college degrees take preventive measures without having to experience a harmful event and learn later (Hoffmann & Muttarak, 2017). We can assume that the inconsistent results are a consequence of a different socio-economic system in which people live, as well as insufficiently developed awareness among our people about the importance of undertaking preventive activities.

Interestingly, compared to the employed and retired respondents, the unemployed respondents believe they have satisfactory knowledge of how to respond to wildfires. The results obtained are not consistent with the research results where it was determined that employees to a greater extent took certain preventive measures in order to reduce the material consequences of floods (Perić & Cvetković, 2019; Rico, 2019).

The results indicate that the respondents who are afraid of wildfires are more interested in attending training courses to improve their response preparedness, given that they under assessed their knowledge to respond to wildfires. We may conclude that the results are somewhat consistent with a survey conducted in the United States, which aimed to determine the impact of risk perception on citizen preparedness. The results of this research indicated that risk perception does not have a significant direct impact on citizen preparedness and the impact of perception is largely conditioned by knowledge to respond, the perception of effectiveness of preventive activities and previous experience (Bourque et al., 2013). Our research confirms the influence of risk perception, but we must take into account that this influence is conditioned by both demographic and socio - economic characteristics of the respondents. Our results indicate that the respondents over the age of 51 have more self-confidence regarding their knowledge of disaster response. Our results are consistent with the results of the study conducted in the United States, where the respondents over the age of 55 showed a high level of preparedness, unlike the respondents aged 18 to 34 (Ablah, Konda & Kelley, 2009).

CONCLUSION

Our findings indicate that people are insufficiently prepared to respond to wildfires. Also, the need to develop awareness among citizens about the importance of preparedness and preventive measures in relation to such disasters is clearly emphasized. A much higher percentage of people believe they have some knowledge of how to respond to disasters, compared to the percentage of people who have the equipment and response plans, which may suggest that the level of citizen preparedness is much lower than they believe. The limitation of this research is reflected in the number of respondents, the results would be more reliable if a larger number of people were included in the research. The results indicated that men were more prepared than women, that is, older respondents than younger respondents. The impact of education and salary level on citizen preparedness has not been confirmed, and the unemployed respondents, unlike the employed ones, self-assessed their preparedness as good.

In addition to the mentioned characteristics, our research confirms the impact of previous experience and risk perception on the readiness of citizens to respond to wildfires. Obviously, our people are insufficiently aware of the risk of wildfires and preventive measures in relation to disasters. It is necessary

to continue the periodic examination of citizen preparedness, as well as to take certain measures for improvement. This would include organizing periodical training courses, seminars, conferences, and the like.

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DIFFERENCES IN BASIC MOTOR SKILLS AMONG STUDENTS AT THE UNIVERSITY OF CRIMINAL INVESTIGATION AND POLICE STUDIES REGARDING SPECIAL PHYSICAL EDUCATION 1

Original Scientific Article

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Abstract: The aim of this research was to determine the differences between the levels of basic motor skills (BMS) at the entrance exam in relation to BMS in the semester exam in Special Physical Education 1 (SPE 1). The sample consisted of 119 students (39 girls and 80 boys) enrolled at the University of Criminal Investigation and Police Studies. Student's t-test was used to determine the differences between the observed variables, while the eta square (η^2) was calculated to determine effect size. There was a statistically significant improvement for the maximum isometric force of the fingers of the dominant hand ($t = -4.296$; $p < 0.000$), the repetitive strength of the forearm extensors ($t = -4.218$; $p < 0.000$), the repetitive strength of the trunk flexors ($t = -4.191$; $p < 0.000$) and general aerobic endurance ($t = -2.473$; $p < 0.018$) in female students, as well as for the explosive strength of the leg extensors ($t = -2.246$; $p < 0.028$), the repetitive strength of the trunk flexors ($t = -5.152$; $p < 0.000$), general aerobic endurance ($t = -2.512$; $p < 0.021$) and maximum isometric force of the back ($t = -14.283$; $p < 0.000$) among the students. The results of η^2 demonstrated that the effect of SPE 1 classes on most observed motor skills in the students of both sexes was strong.

Keywords: motor skills, special physical education 1, students, police.

INTRODUCTION

In addition to other courses, students at the University of Criminal Investigation and Police Studies (Kriminalističko-policijski univerzitet KPU) (here-

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inafter: KPU) in Belgrade also attend classes in the subject of Special Physical Education (SPE). SPE is aimed at increasing the emotional resistance of future professionals to stressful and conflict situations and general resistance of the organism, including the psychosomatic professional training of future police officers through achieving and maintaining basic and special knowledge and skills (Blagojevic, Dopsaj, and Vuckovic, 2006; Milosevic & Milošević, 2014; Amanović, Baić, Nikač, & Ljubisavljević, 2015a; Amanovic, Masic, Kostovski, & Ljubisavljevic, 2015b). The course consists of two sub-units – the first unit deals with special and professional skills in the area of self-defense, while the second one deals with general physical preparation, that is, students' basic motor status (BMS) (Blagojević, Vucković, and Dopsaj, 2009). However, SPE has undergone transformations such as the reduction of the total number of hours and elimination of certain topics from the course.

Since the founding of the Police Academy in 1993 to 2000, SPE classes were taught in all four years – eight semesters. The basic part consisted of a total of 724 hours of classes in all four years, which were conducted in the form of morning exercises, such as swimming and skiing (4 lectures, 45 lectures having a training characteristic, and 675 practical classes). The special part consisted of lectures having training and exercise characteristics, which were conducted during eight semesters (16 lectures, 120 lectures having a training characteristic, and 225 practical classes). From 2000 to 2006, SPE teaching was conceived through two subjects: SPE 1, which was taught in the first and second years during four semesters through regular classes amounting to 180 hours (24 lectures and 156 practical classes) and through special forms of classes (70 hours of skiing and 58 hours of swimming) and aerobic conditioning (240 hours of exercise). SPE 2 classes were taught in the third and fourth year (four semesters) through 180 hours of regular classes (24 lectures and 156 practical classes) and aerobic conditioning (240 practical classes). With the establishment of the Academy of Criminalistics and Police Studies in 2006, the SPE course was divided into SPE 1 – general part, SPE 2 – special part, and SPE 3 – the use of coercive means, which is included in the undergraduate studies program, in the second, fourth and sixth semester, that is, in the first two years of vocational studies (Janković, 2009). SFO 1 classes are realized in the undergraduate studies program in the second semester and include 45 practical classes and 15 lectures (Blagojević, Vucković, and Dopsaj 2012).

In the selection procedure for admission to the KPU or for employment within the Ministry of the Interior of the Republic of Serbia, one of the basic criteria is the quantitative qualification of morphological characteristics and motor skills (Mudrić and Jovanović, 2000; Dopsaj, Milošević, Blagojević, and Vucković, 2002; Milošević, Mudrić, Jovanović, Amanović, and Dopsaj, 2005; Dopsaj, Vucković, and Blagojević, 2007; Amanović et al., 2015a). For enrollment in the KPU, candidates take an entrance exam and one of the selection criteria is the prescribed level of BMS. The selection of candidates according to the BMS criterion is important for achieving educational results in the area of

SPE and better performance of those police tasks that require extremely great physical effort (Sorensen, Smolander, Louhevaara, Korhonene, & Oja, 2000; Amanović, 2003; Dopsaj et al., 2007). The levels of BMS in candidates applying for admission to the KPU are tested by assessing the maximum isometric forces of the back muscles and lumbar muscles (male students), the maximum isometric forces of the flexor muscles of the dominant hand (female students), general aerobic endurance, the repetitive strength of the extensor muscles of the forearm and trunk, the explosive strength of leg extensor muscles and assessment of motor educability (Dopsaj, Milošević, Blagojević, and Vucković, 2002; Amanović, Milošević, and Mudrić, 2004; Milošević et al., 2005; Dopsaj et al., 2007; Milošević & Milošević, 2014).

However, after passing the entrance exam, students do not have organized or systematic physical activities for eight months. More precisely, since SPE 1 classes are organized in the second/spring semester, a decrease in the level of physical abilities occurs during the mentioned period (Mitrović et al., 2016). Due to all this, the importance of this research is reflected in the fact that the results obtained on the observed population may indicate the effectiveness of SPE teaching contents. The aim of the research was to determine the differences between the results achieved by students in the entrance exam in BMS and the results achieved by students in the semester exam in BMS, resulting from regular SPE 1 classes.

RESEARCH METHODS

Sample of respondents

The sample consisted of 119 students of both sexes, aged 19 to 21, who had passed the selection tests – passed the entrance exam and enrolled in the first year at the KPU as undergraduate students, as follows: 39 female students (body height TV = 169.34 ± 6.17 cm, body mass TM = 65.89 ± 10.18 kg, body mass index BMI = 22.98 ± 4.78 kg/m²) and 80 male students (body height TV = 181.81 ± 7.31 cm, body mass TM = 79.19 ± 8.09 kg, body mass index BMI = 23.96 ± 1.79 kg/m²).

Testing procedure

The motor variables that have been found in previous research to cover the area of importance for the specific structure that dominates in the professional work performed by the police were used in this research (Vuckovic, Dopsaj, & Blagojevic, 2001; Paspalj, 2013; Jankovic & Koropanovski, 2017), including the tests used in the methodology of testing the basic physical properties of athletes, which have also been used by law enforcement agencies (Dopsaj, Mi-

lošević, & Blagojević, 2000; Amanović et al., 2004). All measurements were performed in the research laboratory for SPE at the KPU by the subject teachers. The initial BMS measurement was performed at the entrance exam and the retest was performed after 45 hours of regular SPE 1 classes that students had 3 times during the week during the semester. Prior to testing, all tests were explained in detail and demonstrated to the subjects with the possibility of rehearsal, thus creating the necessary conditions for their application. The same meter measured the same variables on both the initial and final measurements.

The maximum isometric muscle force was assessed using a tensiometric probe aided with a hardware-software system for physical ability testing PAT 01 (Physical Ability Test 01), using standardized measurement procedures (Dopsaj et al., 2000; Janković, Dimitrijević, Koropanovski, Vucković, & Dopsaj, 2010a; Kolarević, Dimitrijević, Vucković, Koropanovski, & Dopsaj, 2014).

The maximum isometric force of the flexor muscles of the fingers of the dominant hand (F_{\max} HAND) in female students was assessed using the hand grip test – expressed in decanewtons (DaN), (Dopsaj & Vuckovic, 2006; Dopsaj et al., 2010; Dimitrijevic, Koropanovski, Dopsaj, Vuckovic, & Jankovic, 2014; Kolarevic et al., 2014).

The maximum isometric force of the low back extensor muscles (F_{\max} BACK) in students was assessed using the dead-pull test – expressed in DaN (Dopsaj et al., 2010; Janković et al., 2010a; Dimitrijević et al., 2014).

The explosive strength of the leg extensor muscles (female students – JUMP_Ž and male students – JUMP_M) was assessed using the standing long jump with arm swing test. The jump distance (the distance from the takeoff line to the mark made by the heels) was measured in centimeters (cm) and the accuracy of the measurement was 1 cm (Dopsaj et al., 2010; Dimitrijević et al., 2014).

The repetitive strength of the forearm extensor muscles (PUSH-UP) in female students was assessed by the “Push-ups” test from the front resistance in 10 seconds (s). The number of correctly performed push-ups in 10 s was evaluated (Dopsaj et al., 2010; Janković, Dimitrijević, Vucković, & Koropanovski, 2013; Kolarević et al., 2014).

The repetitive strength of the trunk flexors (TRUNK_F) in female students was assessed using the trunk lift test in 30 s. The number of correctly performed trunk lifts in 30 s was estimated (Dopsaj et al., 2007; Dopsaj et al., 2010; Kolarević et al., 2014).

The repetitive strength of the trunk flexors (TRUNK_M) in students was assessed using the trunk lift test with rotation to the left and right in 30 s. The number of correctly performed trunk lifts in 30 s was estimated (Blagojević, 2003; Dopsaj et al., 2010).

General aerobic endurance (female students – COOPER_F and male students – COOPER_M), was assessed using the Cooper 12-minute run test. The distance travelled was measured in meters (m), with an accuracy of 5 m (Dopsaj et al., 2010; Janković, Dimitrijević, & Koropanovski, 2010b; Dimitrijević et al., 2014).

Statistical methods

The results obtained were processed by descriptive and comparative statistical procedures using the application program SPSS 20.0. For each variable, the arithmetic mean (Mean), standard deviation (SD), minimum and maximum value of each variable observed (Min, Max), the coefficient of variation (sV%), the indicator of the level of asymmetry – the asymmetry coefficient (the coefficient of skewness) and the flatness level (the coefficient of kurtosis). In order to determine the significance of differences in the observed variables, the Student's t-test for dependent samples was used. Statistical significance was defined at the level of 95% confidence, that is, at the level of $p > 0.05$ (Hair, Anderson, Tatham, & Black, 1998). To determine effect size (ES) of educational treatment, the eta square (η^2) expressed in numerical value was calculated, where $\eta^2 \leq 0.01$ represents small effect, $\eta^2 = 0.06$ moderate effect, and $\eta^2 \geq 0.14$ large effect (Pallant, 2009).

RESULTS AND DISCUSSION

The obtained results, in line with the study objective which is related to determining the differences between the results which were achieved by the students in the entrance exam and the semester exam after 45 hours of regular SPE 1classes, are shown in Table 1 and Table 2.

Table 1. Results of descriptive statistics, t-test, and effect size for female students

	F _{max} HAND (DaN)		JUMP_F (cm)		PUSH-UP (s)		TRUNK_F (s)		COOPER_F (m)	
	I	II	I	II	I	II	I	II	I	II
Mean	34.90	37.40	179.90	182.20	6.40	8.20	21.80	23.80	2226.80	2288.20
SD	4.47	3.68	14.94	11.67	2.92	1.91	2.95	2.45	277.07	218.27
Min	25.80	31.40	146.00	166.00	0.00	5.00	16.00	20.00	1675.00	1970.00
Max	47.40	46.10	213.00	211.00	14.00	14.00	27.00	29.00	3075.00	3080.00
cV%	12.81	9.83	8.31	6.41	45.85	23.46	13.53	10.33	12.44	9.54
Skewness	0.22	0.65	-0.11	0.80	0.03	0.67	-0.18	0.17	0.54	1.38
Kurtosis	0.53	-0.29	-0.32	0.29	0.44	0.93	-0.53	-0.50	1.22	3.24
t		-4.30		-1.01		-4.22		-4.19		-2.47
P(T ≤ t)		0.00		0.32		0.00		0.00		0.02
η^2		0.33		0.03		0.32		0.32		0.14

Table 2. Results of descriptive statistics, t-test, and effect size for male students

	F _{max} BACK (DaN)		JUMP_M (cm)		TRUNK_M (s)		COOPER_M (m)	
	I	II	I	II	I	II	I	II
Mean	158.80	190.50	233.90	237.40	27.40	29.20	2747.80	2847.70
SD	21.44	21.00	18.75	15.56	3.29	2.63	237.03	185.77
Min	121.50	155.60	190.00	220.00	18.00	23.00	2235.00	2610.00
Max	216.20	250.10	280.00	283.00	34.00	34.00	3440.00	3250.00
cV%	13.50	11.02	8.02	6.56	12.00	9.01	8.63	6.52
Skewnes	0.47	0.58	0.42	1.13	-0.43	-0.15	0.49	0.62
Kurtosis	0.01	-0.22	-0.02	0.80	-0.15	-0.41	0.30	-0.77
t		-14.28		-2.22		-5.15		-2.51
P(T ≤ t)		0.00		0.03		0.00		0.02
η ²		0.72		0.06		0.25		0.07

The values obtained in all types of analyses indicate the high reliability of the research results obtained. Descriptive analysis indicated that the values of standard deviation are small for all monitored variables, that is, less than 15% of the average value, while the estimation error of the average value among the students is very low amounting to less than 5% of the average value in the sample, including the coefficient of variation which is relatively low. Our research results demonstrated that the students achieved statistically significantly better results in in F_{max} HAND, PUSH-UP, TRUNK_F and COOPER_F, while the JUMP_F test did not show statistical significance (Table 1).

For F_{max} HAND test, it was determined that the absolute difference amounts to 2.5 DaN, while the relative value of the final compared to the initial testing is higher by 7.2%. The value of η² = 0.33 shows that the effect of SPE 1 teaching on the maximum isometric force of the flexor muscles of the fingers of the dominant hand in female students is strong (Table 1). The results of the maximum isometric force of the flexor muscles of the fingers of the dominant hand are in accordance with the research conducted by Dopsaj et al. (2007), in which the subjects achieved an average score of 37.68 ± 5.09 DaN on the F_{max} HAND test. Additionally, Janković (2009) found an increase in F_{max} HAND by 2.79 DaN in the female students, which is slightly higher than the results obtained in this research.

In the PUSH-UP test, an increase in the absolute value by 1.8 was found, while the change in the relative value at the final compared to the initial measurement was 27.4%. The value of η² = 0.32 shows that the effect of SPE 1 classes on the repetitive strength of the extensor arm muscles in female students is large (Table 1). The results also showed that the female students, in relative terms, achieved a 32.2% better score on the final test compared to the similar population respondents in the research conducted by Dopsaj et al. (2010), whose average result was 6.20 ± 3.40 push-ups in 10 s.

The results demonstrated that, on the TRUNK_F test, female students on average improved their score by 2 in absolute values and by 9.0% in relative values, respectively. The value of $\eta^2 = 0.32$ for the repetitive strength of the trunk flexors shows a strong impact of SPE 1 on the female students (Table 1). Compared to the results in the study conducted by Dimitrijević (2016), in which the average value for the TRUNK test amounted to 20.89 ± 2.45 , the students in this study achieved a 14.4% better result in relative values in the final test.

In the COOPER_F test, female students achieved a statistically significantly better average result by 61.4 m in absolute values, that is, by 2.8% in relative values. The value of $\eta^2 = 0.14$ shows a strong impact of SPE 1 on general aerobic endurance in the female students (Table 1). The female students achieved a better result in the final test by 232.36 m in absolute or 11.3% in relative values compared to the respondents in the study conducted by Dimitrijević (2016).

The standing long jump with arm swing test performed by the female students was the only test whose statistical significance was not determined. However, the results of the JUMP_F test showed that the absolute value for the explosive power of the leg extensor muscles increased by 2.3 cm, while the relative value increased by 1.3%. The value of $\eta^2 = 0.03$ indicates that the impact of SPE 1 on this motor skill in the female students is minimal (Table 1). The reason for this result may be the fact that the movement in performing this test belongs to complex motor structures. More precisely, to achieve maximum results, the entire body musculature has to be synchronized perfectly, and it can be assumed that the students simply did not sufficiently master the correct jumping technique.

In the student population, the results showed that the respondents achieved statistically better results in the final testing compared to the initial testing in all tests. In the F_{max} BACK test, the absolute difference was found to be 31.70 DaN, while the relative change amounted to 19.9%. The value of $\eta^2 = 0.72$ indicates that the influence of SPE 1 on the maximum isometric force of lower back muscles in students is strong (Table 2). The result achieved on the final test for this motor skill amounts to 25.3 DaN, or 15.3% higher in relation to the average results achieved by the respondents in the study conducted by Dopsaj et al. (2010).

The results of the JUMP_M test indicated that the students achieved an absolute higher average value by 2.3 cm in the final test, while the relative value increased by 1.5%. However, despite the established statistical significance, the value of $\eta^2 = 0.06$ shows that the impact of SFO 1 on the explosive strength of the leg extensor muscles in students is moderate (Table 2). The obtained average values of long jump are in line with the results of Janković (2015), in whose study the students, in order to construct and validate the test as a measuring instrument for assessing the specific dexterity of police officers, achieved an average score of 235.78 ± 10.88 cm.

In the TRUNK_M test, the change in the final testing, compared to the initial testing, is 1.8 for absolute values, while the change in relative value is 6.5%.

The value of $\eta^2 = 0.25$ for the repetitive strength of the trunk flexor muscles indicates that the impact of SPE 1 on students is strong (Table 2). Similar results were found in the study conducted by Janković (2015), in which the repetitive strength of the trunk flexor muscles expressed in the number of trunk lifts with rotation to the left and right amounted to 28.55 ± 2.55 .

In the COOPER_M test, the students statistically significantly improved the average score by 99.9 m in absolute value, while the change in relative value was 3.6%. The value $\eta^2 = 0.07$ indicated that the impact of SPE 1 on the general aerobic endurance of students was moderate (Table 2). The average result achieved on the initial measurement is almost identical to the result determined by Dopsaj et al. (2010), where the average value achieved on the Cooper test was 2750.30 ± 209.42 m, while the result of the final test in this study is by 97.4 m or 3.5% in relative terms higher.

Based on the analysis of the results obtained, it can be assumed that the changes in the level of BMS in the observed population occurred as a result of SPE 1 teaching. However, it must be taken into account that the KPU students, along with teaching contents, participate in sport and recreational clubs and other independent physical activities. Therefore, it is necessary to conduct further research which would take into account the overall physical activities of students with the aim of improving the educational and training process.

CONCLUSION

In accordance with the objective of this study, differences in the levels of BMS among the KPU students were determined, as well as the extent of the impact of SPE 1 on the observed changes. The results demonstrated a statistically significant improvement in all observed motor skills, except for JUMP_F. Also, according to the Pallant's classification (Pallant, 2009), the effect of teaching on the level of the observed motor abilities was found to be strong in six cases, moderate in two and minimal in only one case. However, in order to avoid a decrease in the levels of motor skills in the forthcoming period, and especially in the period between the entrance exam and the beginning of the SPE 1 course, it is necessary to conduct mandatory extracurricular activities such as morning gymnastics, conditioning, and swimming. Additionally, to improve the effect of teaching on motor skills, it is necessary to propose an increase in the total number of practical classes, the introduction of the subject Special Physical Education in all eight semesters, the realization of additional and mandatory contents such as swimming, skiing, outdoor summer and winter classes, including fitness training (Milojkovic, Dopsaj, & Bachanac, 2003; Dopsaj, Jovic, Blagojevic, and Vuckovic, 2004; Vuckovic & Dopsaj, 2007; Vuckovic, Dopsaj, Radovanovic, & Jovanovic, 2008; Vuckovic, Dopsaj, 2009; Vuckovic, Dopsaj, 2011). Finally, it may be concluded that such a designed and systematically implemented physical activity during the entire study process would significantly contribute to the

improvement of the educational and training process among the KPU students and represent a significant basis in training them for work in the Ministry of the Interior of the Republic of Serbia.

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KEY INSTITUTIONAL ACTORS OF EUROPEAN SECURITY – CURRENT STATE AND CHALLENGES

Review Article

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Abstract: This paper addresses the adaptability and ability of three institutional actors of European security– the EU, the NATO, and the OSCE – to properly respond to security challenges facing Europe, especially those existing at the non-state level. The position, status, nature and functions, and the relations within and between the key institutional actors of European security are considered within the study of international relations. Weaknesses in their operation have been identified, which are of a structural nature, but also a consequence of the international environment. In the EU, it is possible to identify a wide range of security policies, different developments and efficiencies. As a “civil force”, the EU addresses security challenges using civil, political and economic instruments, focusing on the stability of its immediate environment. However, in order to play the role of a global security actor, the EU must build an autonomous security identity, which is, for now, an unsolvable problem. The NATO continues to be the personification of hard, military power in the face of security challenges, which does not sufficiently guarantee its security, and often means breaching the security of other countries. The OSCE, like NATO, is a relic of the past and its basic quality is diplomatic inclusiveness. It is an organization of “displaced” political power, without the necessary authority. The weaknesses of these three institutional actors, as well as the complexity of international relations, require a far higher level of political, functional and operational adaptability in order to understand and address the existing security challenges.

Keywords: security, defense, European Union, NATO, OSCE.

INTRODUCTION

The fall of the Berlin Wall and the end of the Cold War marked the beginning of a process of dynamic change in the system of international relations, including a strong modification of the hitherto ruling state - centrist security paradigm. Under the influence of various factors, especially the globalization

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process based on the liberal-democratic principles, the security context in the past thirty years has been further complicated in both the objective and subjective terms, and it could be said that today's challenges to national, regional and international security are as serious as those the world faced in the midst of mutual block setbacks. The tectonic (geo) political, institutional and structural changes that have taken place in the last few decades are especially visible in Europe, which is, generally speaking, united under a single value umbrella, whose institutional and political manifestation is primarily represented by the EU which, has gone through a thorny evolutionary path since the Maastricht Treaty.² Changes in the security paradigm and the introduction of the global security category, as well as the proliferation of security challenges that substantially exceed the capacity of national security instruments, inevitably impose the need to consider the institutional dimension of European security architecture and its adequacy in relation to the existing security environments which, in addition to the "traditional" security challenges that are manifested through the relations between the great powers and the category of hard power within them, include other no less significant challenges and risks related to terrorism, the migrant wave from the Middle East, the global epidemiological situation, energy (in)stability, climate change, pronounced economic and developmental discrepancies at the global level, cyberspace or, on the other hand, respect for human rights.

With the exception of various transitional and post-transitional regional and subregional initiatives and structures³ that also seek to strengthen security, that is, prevent, reduce and eliminate various security risks, European security, in the institutional sense, is based on three elements – the EU, as a civil force, NATO, as the personification of hard power, regardless of the attempts to reform and adapt it to the changed regional and global international circumstances and its transformation into an organism that would functionally be much more than a military alliance, and the OSCE, as a surviving offspring of some previous period, albeit without a real, recognized and sufficiently recognized political and security authority. The three mentioned institutional actors have different positions, nature, goals and tasks within the European security architecture, and their most important characteristics are briefly described in the following sections. A particular issue under consideration is the ability of key institutional actors to respond properly and effectively to contemporary security challenges, especially those manifested at the non-state level. Finally, the author's concluding remarks on all relevant issues analyzed are presented.

² The key moments in the development process of European integration, which are formally often manifested through amendments to the founding acts of the European organization, are colloquially marked by the city in which the amendments to the founding acts took place. In particular, the Maastricht Treaty, which, among other things, established the European Union, was signed on February 7, 1992 and entered into force on November 1, 1993.

³ For example, the Regional Cooperation Council (RCC), the South-East European Cooperation Process, the Black Sea Initiative, the Central European Initiative, the South-East European Law Enforcement Center, MARRI, etc.

EUROPEAN UNION

Stricto sensu, the EU's security function is reflected in two policy areas implemented at the European level – the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) with the Common Security and Defense Policy (CSDP) as one of the important components, including policies that are implemented within the former integration and cooperation in the area of home affairs and justice with a cross-border or transnational component, that is, current policies within the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice. In addition to these two policy areas, indirect security implications undoubtedly have other modalities of integration and cooperation, that is, common policies at the European level, aimed at preventing and eliminating potential causes or roots of certain security risks.

Policy of integration and cooperation in the area of home affairs and justice

Since the Treaty of Amsterdam,⁴ when it was ambitiously designed, that is, the Treaty of Lisbon,⁵ when it was additionally contractually emphasized, the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice has manifested itself as the most dynamic area of creating and implementing common policies which, simply put, aim at achieving and protecting fundamental values on which the European Union rests, including the realization and preservation of the highest possible level of security for the organization, its member states and their citizens in all three components that the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice includes. Although much has been done in the area of common policies in the past decades, a brief overview of each of the three components indicates a number of weaknesses that seriously jeopardize the full realization of the contractually designed goal. In doing so, some of the weaknesses that can be identified are of a structural or institutional nature, while others are more related to the axiological dimension as a key precondition for achieving the proclaimed common policies and their goals. In the domain of “freedom”, that is, the freedom of movement of people and the policies that are in its direct function, such as visa, asylum, migration, external border controls policies or policies related to the status and position of stateless and third-country nationals, it seems that all structural, institutional and, in particular, value weaknesses have come to the fore in dealing with the migrant crisis. Under the influence of the “global fight against terrorism”, as it was often referred to, after the events of September 11, 2001, and the conflicts of varying intensity and, consequently, a series of extremely negative economic and social implications in the Near East and Middle East, a large displacement of the population and the creation, of strong pressure, especially at certain intervals, on the external borders of the Union occurred, which the organization and its member states have failed to cope with properly. And not only that, since the very beginning there were differences between the member states on how to

4 The Treaty of Amsterdam amending the Treaty on European Union, the treaties establishing the European Communities and related acts, was signed on October 2, 1997 and entered into force on May 1, 1999.

5 The Treaty of Lisbon amending the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty establishing the European Community, was signed on December 13, 2007 and entered into force on December 1, 2009.

deal with the migrant challenge: on the one hand, there were several states led by FR Germany, which advocated the liberal concept of controlled opening of borders for migrants and their distribution based on the pre-determined quotas for each member state, while members of the Visegrad Group strongly opposed this concept, who believed that more effective control of the Union's external borders should be ensured and migrants prevented from entering the EU. As a result of the lack of solidarity between member states on this issue, although it is about one of the unavoidable functional and value principles on which the Union and its policies are based, decisions on migrant quotas were adopted by the Council by re-vote, involving the EU Court of Justice, and the expression of extremely individualistic action by member states in order to protect their own borders and security. The culmination of the Union's expressed weakness in addressing the security challenges posed by the migrant crisis was reflected in relying on, in many European capitals, a highly unpopular partner – Turkey, in protecting its external borders, in exchange for certain concessions from Brussels, such as financial support, the revitalization of the accession process or, as subsequently interpreted by official Ankara, support for its policies in Syria. Regarding “security”, which means police cooperation in the narrower sense aimed at preventing or combating crime with the cross-border component and its individual manifestations, although it covers almost all known instruments of international police-security cooperation, it is possible to identify structural and institutional weaknesses. One of the most pronounced is the position, status and powers of EUROPOL, as a key European coordinator of police activities carried out by the competent agencies of member states. Although amendments to the founding acts have continuously strengthened the position of EUROPOL since its establishment, the original German idea of the late 80's and early 90's to establish an authentic supranational police agency with operational powers has never been, nor will ever be, implemented, simply because it directly opposes the classical notion of state sovereignty, which is still prevalent. Therefore, EUROPOL continues to operate primarily at the coordination and communication level, with slightly modified role with regard to joint investigation teams, although it does not have any operational powers here either. Coordinated police action at the European level is aimed at a wide range of international crime; however, the security threats related to terrorism have posed a serious problem for the Union and its members in the last fifteen years are. Several European capitals, from Madrid, through London and Paris, to Brussels, have been the target of terrorist attacks, including various terrorist attacks and incidents in other, smaller European cities. The common denominator for most terrorist attacks on European soil represents political and religious fundamentalism, and the root of this security problem seems to be almost identical to that of the security risks associated with the migrant crisis, which can be identified in the foreign policy failures of leading European countries regarding the support and participation in the implementation of American policy in the Middle East. In this context, a special aggravating circumstance for the security of the Union and its members is reflected in the fact that, unlike the initial period when the

terrorist threat was usually “imported” from crisis areas, members of religious and political radicalism can often be identified among the citizens in member states within the second or third generation of descendants of former immigrants from today’s problematic areas. Therefore, as indicated by the EU’s key strategic documents, such as the EU Security Union Strategy 2020-2025 and the EU Strategic Agenda for 2019-2024 (Tučić 2020, 99), and one of the priorities is the prevention of radicalism “in its own yard”, that is, identification and elimination of the very roots of radicalism among the youth. Finally, the “justice” component means judicial cooperation in civil and criminal matters with elements of foreignness. While judicial cooperation in the area of civil law is evolutionarily “older” and by its nature and content represents support to the establishment and functioning of the internal market and the realization of “four great freedoms” within it, the cooperation and integration in criminal matters is primarily aimed at strengthening security within the European Union in the purpose of fighting the most serious forms of crime. Although it is still relatively new in relation to civil law, the application of different legal instruments and techniques has made it possible to ensure common, uniform criminal law standards regarding the nature and essence of the crime and the nature and character of the envisaged sanctions. For this reason, optimistic, but not entirely correct, theses on “European criminal law” or “European Union criminal law” can often be found in theory (Klipp, 2016; Mitsilegas, 2016; Ambos, 2018). However, it is a fact that, despite the progress made, there are still numerous problems in achieving criminal cooperation within the Union, which directly arise from the conflict between the prerogatives of national laws and European laws, which are manifested in almost all dimensions of criminal cooperation, from criminal offenses and corresponding sanctions to the concrete application of some key European instruments in this area, such as the European Arrest Warrant, the European Investigation Order or the European Victim Protection Order.

Common foreign and security policy

The slowest-growing area, including the EU’s most contested policy, is the EU’s Common Foreign and Security Policy, which, despite the relative improvements made by the Lisbon Treaty, remains firmly positioned on intergovernmental cooperation mechanisms which hamper any ambition to make the EU a more credible actor on the global stage. Of course, the insistence on intergovernmental mechanisms and unanimity in the decision-making process is a result of the unwillingness of member states to reduce their sovereignty regarding foreign policy, especially in times of their serious disagreement on numerous current foreign policy issues. Repeated weaknesses of the EU to properly address critical foreign policy issues, even in their own backyard, have given enough arguments to the proponents of the thesis of the European organization as an “economic giant, political dwarf and military ant”, but also a trigger

for various initiatives to overcome the existing situation and the creation of a framework in which, as has often been pointed out, the Union could fully fulfill all its foreign policy potentials. One of the latter refers to the French – German proposal for the establishment of the European Security Council, as a special body, which could make key strategic decisions faster and enable easier definition of common interests in the area of foreign policy and security. Although the need for institutional and procedural improvement in the foreign policy domain cannot be disputed, this initiative, including some previous initiative, opens more questions than it answers, and its perspective in that sense is more than questionable. As a legitimate component of the EU's Common Foreign and Security Policy, there is a Common Security and Defense Policy with the prospect of establishing a common defense, which, at first glance, might suggest that the European Union has taken a step toward building an autonomous security and defense identity, which is not the case, of course. Specifically, under Articles 42.2 and 42.7 of the Lisbon Treaty, any action undertaken by the Union, in this context, must take into account and be in accordance with the obligations of the member countries of the NATO and relevant policies of this organization. In other words, NATO is contractually recognized as Europe's primary defense umbrella and as a framework for the implementation of the collective security of European countries, and any EU's eventual action, that is, member states under its auspices, be it peacekeeping, conflict prevention or international security, is carried out with strong reliance on the North Atlantic Alliance. The attempt to mark the EU's relatively autonomous defense identity is also manifested through contractual solutions that regulate the obligation of member states to strengthen their military and defense capacities by provisions that provide for the establishment of the European Defense Agency, albeit as an auxiliary intergovernmental body for the strategic planning analysis, through the introduction of provisions in Article 42.7 of the Lisbon Treaty, which provide for specific elements of the collective security system, that is, define the obligation of member states to, adhering to the provisions of Article 51 of the UN Charter, protection and provide all necessary assistance to a member state subject to armed aggression. However, the first question to ask refers to the relation of the mentioned contractual solutions in relation to the built system of collective security and obligations of the member countries of NATO. Does this mean that such Lisbon solutions are primarily intended for the member states of the European Union that are not at the same time members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and what is their actual extent, given that the specified contractual obligation of member countries is strictly limited by their national defense and security policies? The reliance of the EU on NATO in conducting operations, as understandable as it is, hides, as it turned out, another danger which concerns open issues that some members of the Union have with Turkey, where the so-called Cyprus issue, that is, the status of the unrecognized Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus, which is why Turkey has on several occasions obstructed decision making in the NATO Council that would enable the EU to launch operations in an appropriate arrangement with NATO,

such as Operation Concordia in present-day Northern Macedonia or Operation Althea in BiH.

NATO

As has been already been mentioned, NATO continues to be the basic personification of hard military power in terms of defending the European continent. However, the end of the Cold War and the dissolution of the USSR, as the primary target of the Western Allies deterrence policy until that moment, raised the issue of the need for NATO's survival, especially on the grounds established by the 1949 Agreement. In other words, changes in international relations in the late 1980s and early 1990s, and especially the proliferation of unconventional and non-state security challenges, if there was a commitment to preserve NATO as a military-political organization, required the reform and modernization of NATO in order to be able to adequately adapt to the new, evolving security environment which, in its numerous characteristics, significantly differs from the one in which NATO was established and has existed for five decades. Indeed, if we look back at the last twenty years, we can see that NATO as an organization, with some illegal attempts to verify its security role by using bare military force even after the end of the Cold War, is in a continuous cycle of change and adaptation, greatly surpassing its original military – political and territorial identity. Particular focus is placed on, relatively speaking, new security challenges, including terrorism and cyberspace, both in the strategic-planning sense and the organizational-institutional sense.⁶ However, the general impression is that, no matter how functional NATO is in its deterrent role regarding conventional security challenges, its functionality in the context of security challenges posed and implied by non-state actors, such as terrorist groups and organizations, is not so striking. The reasons for that are multiple, and one of them refers to the fact that, despite the efforts made, NATO has not yet developed the capacities through which an efficient unconventional, that is, non-military response to new security challenges would be enabled. Thus, despite the fact that this would be a precondition for action in that direction, there are no established or developed security- information capacities within NATO, which are necessary in this context. In other words, NATO still “manages best” and operates more simply in the classic military-conventional matrix, which means the perception of one, conventional, state enemy and positioning in relation to it. After all, the events within NATO and its activities that followed the annexation of Crimea to the Russian Federation in 2014 clearly speak in favor of the presented thesis. Also, following the terrorist attack on the United States on September 11, 2001, Article 5 of the Washington Agreement as a key element of the collective security system nurtured by this organization was activated and disproportionate

⁶ For example, separate organizational units have been established within NATO to combat individual security challenges, most notably the unit for combating terrorism based in Ankara. (*Centers for Excellence against Terrorism*).

military force was used in a relatively wide area far exceeding the contractually established territorial North Atlantic identity of NATO.

Additionally, one of the current problems facing NATO is the lack of political unity among its members on a number of issues. One can cite the example of Turkey and its military-political “flirting” with the Russian Federation, including the purchase of some of the key weapons systems, in order to achieve Ankara’s set interests regarding the Syrian issue or the intensification of already strained relations between Turkey and Greece, this time due to the right to underwater oil and gas exploration in the eastern Mediterranean. The specific attitude of the current US administration toward European partners of NATO should be added to this, which insisted on “burden sharing” in common security and defense from the very beginning, that is, on consistent compliance with the obligation to allocate at least 2% of GDP for military purposes, of which at least 20% should be directed to the development of military capabilities. Although, according to data in 2018 (NATO, 2019), for example, European members of NATO allocated about 264 billion dollars for defense, which is one and a half times more than China or four times more than the Russian Federation, the US administration repeatedly pointed out that the attitude of European allies toward NATO, that is, the USA, is unacceptable, that the USA would not finance Europe’s security and defense interests, and emphasized radical changes in this sense, while some Western media, as unthinkable as it may seem, at times even talked about the possibility of leaving the Alliance (The Economist (July 6, 2019); Defense News (September 16, 2019); The New York Times (September 3, 2020)).

The relationship between NATO and the EU, which has already been partially discussed, is not one-dimensional, although 21 members of NATO are also members of the EU. Previously, official Washington did not fully approve of initiatives to strengthen the EU’s security and defense autonomy (The Hill (2019, November 15)), explaining that in that case there is a danger of unnecessary overlapping and duplication of NATO and European organizations and fearing, although these fears were rather unfounded, that there would be a derogation and relativization of the importance of NATO in the already deceptive and altered global circumstances. In this regard, the mentioned emphasis on NATO’s role in the Lisbon Treaty can be interpreted as a result of the need to amortize such fears and for EU’s stronger formal reliance on the Alliance’s incomparably more developed capacity. In revitalizing the perception of the Russian Federation as a primary security threat in the conventional sense, NATO has acted cyclically in the direction of moving east, both by admitting Central and Eastern European countries, that is, the former Warsaw Pact members, and by strengthening its capacities and presence in the areas which the Russian Federation strategically views as its area of interest. Generally, it could be said that eastern countries are closer to the Russian Federation, especially the countries with accumulated negative historical experiences related to the Soviet period or the period of Russian Empire, such as the Baltic countries or Poland, are

more willing to follow the US policy within NATO in this regard, unlike Western European countries which are not characterized by such historical experiences and, some would say, occasional irrationality. The action of the United States and the Russian Federation are also important regarding the collapsing arrangements that have been the basis of European security for decades⁷ and creating space for the revitalization of the arms race which, at times, resembles the one during the most radical phases of the Cold War. On the other hand, the prevailing perception of China by the United States and its European partners is that it does not currently pose a military threat, but, as noted by the EU institutions, China is increasingly manifesting itself as a very serious competitor in political, economic and technical-technological terms. meaning, which requires defining an appropriate strategic approach in facing this type of challenge, as evidenced by the conflicts between the US and European partners, on the one hand, and China, on the other, in the area of modern information technology and supporting infrastructure (Altmeyer, 2020).

A serious blow to the security of Europe was certainly the withdrawal of the UK from the EU on several grounds. In the context of the topic dealt with, the role of Great Britain as a “Euro-Atlantic security bridge” is especially important, that is, as an actor which, although its participation in EU security policies was rather limited, represented a significant link between the US’s foreign-policy and security Atlanticism on the one hand, and the interests and policies that partners from the continental part of European have been trying to implement on the other hand. Currently, the final modality of future relations between the European organization and the UK in various areas is still the subject of negotiation. However, it can be said with certainty that intensive security cooperation is not only in the interest of both parties, but also something that no one questions. The only thing left is to determine the structural and institutional form of that cooperation, both at the multilateral level and through more concrete bilateral agreements that Britain would conclude with the most important European countries.

ORGANIZATION FOR SECURITY AND COOPERATION IN EUROPE (OSCE)

Since the 1975 Helsinki Final Act, including the 1990 Paris Charter for a New Europe and the 1999 Charter for European Security, the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) has played a certain role in European and global political and security processes, primarily as an international forum that brings together members from “Vancouver to Vladivostok”, within which various issues directly and indirectly related to regional and global security are discussed, such as the fight against terrorism, the prevention of and

⁷ For example, the 1987 Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty (INF), which entered into force in 1988.

fight against illegal arms trade and human trafficking, conflict prevention and resolution, human rights protection with an emphasis on the status and rights of minority groups as well as the strengthening of democratic institutions and the electoral process. In other words, although there are certain established institutionalized forms of cooperation between the Russian Federation and the European Union, that is, Russia and NATO, the OSCE is the only, relatively speaking, European organization that brings together the most relevant individual, regional and subregional security actors. In this way, the OSCE, at least in principle, manifests itself as a key diplomatic forum for discussing a variety of security issues at various political-representative levels, from heads of states and governments, to technical and working groups. However, the main weakness of the OSCE lies in its institutional structure, operational modalities, and the nature of the instruments it applies. Specifically, the OSCE, as a form of deliberative or typical international organization, rests on the intergovernmental mechanisms of cooperation which, among other things, include consensual decision-making of its 56 members.⁸ The number of members and frequent opposition of the views and interests of the member states are more than an aggravating factor in its operation. If we add to this the weaknesses related to the international legal nature of the instruments applied within it, it is not surprising that this organization is frequently “eliminated” from some key real political events in Europe and beyond, including the absence of necessary political and institutional authority. Seen from the perspective of today, it seems that the OSCE, conceived in the form of a Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe during the period of *détente*, the period of improved relations between the two major powers of Cold War, has never succeeded in overcoming the functional framework of Central and Eastern Europe and impose itself as a more serious strategic or operational actor on the European political and security agenda.

The OSCE has been a broad diplomatic forum through which efforts are being made to ameliorate tensions between key political and security actors and take a common position on some of the most relevant issues in recent years. It is possible to give an example of the so-called Corfu Process initiated in 2008 with the aim of opening up a broader debate on Euro-Atlantic and Eurasian key security issues in the conditions of strong dissatisfaction with the European security architecture by the Russian Federation or the 2010 Summit in Astana which managed to bring together the highest representatives of member states and open up a number of important issues on European security in rather difficult circumstances, including the position and role of the OSCE itself in this context (Perišić, 2015: 238–240). However, at the same time, the Summit in Astana, which was held exactly ten years ago, was the last summit of heads of states and governments convened by the OSCE, which still means “relocating”

⁸ However, there are exceptions, such as when applying the so-called Moscow Mechanism established in 1991 and amended in 1993, which provides an opportunity of sending expert missions at the initiative of 1 + 8 other members to a member states to investigate human rights and freedoms violations.

political authority to other forums and modalities of (un)institutionalized diplomatic communication.

A wide range of issues to which the OSCE is committed, the number of field missions in various transition and post-conflict areas and participatory inclusion that no other regional organization has given the OSCE the right to position itself as one of the three key institutional actors of European security, regardless of its numerous weaknesses, some of them are related to its internal solutions, while others, again, represent a manifestation of specific but dynamic turmoil in the system of international relations we are currently witnessing.

CONCLUSION

The numerous security risks facing the European continent at the dawn of the third decade of the 21st century can generally be divided into two groups. On the one hand, there are still “inherited” or, more precisely, traditional security risks related to the relationship between the great powers and their often conflicting interests and goals, although the category of “great power” itself, under dynamic changes in the system of international relations and power relations between its key actors and the proliferation of entities whose actions seriously affect the international political and security context, can be presently interpreted differently. On the other hand, the European continent also faces a number of security challenges which are more inherent in the modern, globalized international context and primarily manifested at the level of non-state actors in international relations. Some of them, such as terrorism, illegal migration or global environmental disturbances are definitely not new or unknown, but the valence of danger posed to the security of European countries and their citizens came to the fore in the conditions created by the globalized society we live in.

In such circumstances, each of the three key institutional actors of European security – the EU, NATO and the OSCE, has its place, role and function. At the same time, the EU, for example, despite the periodic manifestation of immature ambition to develop its capacities in some other direction, acts as a civil force, so the instruments of its security action are of civil nature, which are directed toward broad prevention action and dealing with potential causes or the roots of security challenges a “united Europe” is faced with. Numerous weaknesses or the lack of the EU’s potential to deal effectively with security challenges have already been discussed. However, what deserves special attention is the fact that the security of Europe pays the highest price for often blindly following the US foreign policy interests and goals, regardless of whether it is the perception of the Russian Federation and China or American interests in other parts of the world, as evidenced by the two, in addition to the epidemiological situation, the biggest challenges currently facing the EU and its member

states are the migrant crisis and terrorism, which were strongly initiated by a joint action of the United States and European partners in the Middle East.

The aspiration of the EU to become a global actor in international political and security processes can be realized only under the condition of building its full political autonomy and redefining its current position in relation to some of the key issues of modern international relations. As contradictory as it may seem, the withdrawal of the UK from the European Union can provide a certain space for action in that direction. NATO, on the other hand, have managed to survive the question of the purposefulness of its further existence following the Cold War and preserve its position as a military security umbrella of the Euro-Atlantic area. However, the key problem is reflected in the fact that, despite the multidimensional reform processes it has gone through or continues to go through, the Alliance does not have the capacity to respond to contemporary, non-state security challenges. Using military means and hard power to face more sophisticated security challenges inherent in modern history is often neither sufficient nor fully effective, which can produce catastrophic consequences that, as a boomerang, return to those who opt for this type of action. Despite its undoubted historical significance, the OSCE exists today primarily as a diplomatic forum of limited extent and certainly, as already mentioned, does not have the authority and capacity to play a more prominent role in international political and security processes. The greatest value of this organization is reflected in its inclusiveness, that is, the potential to bring together the most relevant actors of European security, excluding China. However, without adequate operational instruments and faced with the political disunity of its members and often failing to ensure a balance between some key principles it seeks to protect and advocate, such as the principle of preserving territorial integrity, the right of peoples to self-determination; unfortunately, the OSCE's role ends somewhere here.

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SERBIA'S STRATEGIC, LEGAL AND INSTITUTIONAL APPROACH IN THE FIGHT AGAINST TERRORISM

Review Article

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Abstract: Terrorist activities as a negative social phenomenon have been present to a large extent lately, and for that reason, every country strives to develop the best approach in terms of its prevention and suppression. This is understandable, especially given the growing presence of violent extremism and radicalization leading to terrorism. This paper addresses the ways and capacities Serbia uses to fight terrorism. A detailed analysis and review of existing resources, primarily strategic documents, legislation and entities involved in the fight against terrorism, clearly shows that Serbia has significant capacities in this context.

Keywords: terrorism, extremism, radicalization, strategy, law.

INTRODUCTION

Terrorism as a negative social phenomenon attracts a lot of public attention with its current relevance, harmfulness and the consequences it produces with its way of expression. Thus, it is a multi-layered phenomenon that must be viewed multidisciplinary (Trifunović, 2007: 4). In this regard, states have an obligation to provide protection against terrorist acts, and this requires a special emphasis on the prevention of terrorism, which is reflected in their international legal and political obligations (OSCE, 2014: 36).

In the Republic of Serbia, the popularization of radical groups and movements in areas where there are religious minorities has been noticed. Special emphasis is placed on the spread of radicalism among young people. Some of the radical groups are associated with like-minded people in other countries. In addition to popularizing radicalism, some of these groups may be involved in various types of terrorist activity: training, activity planning, arms smuggling, and networking, which favors the development of international terrorism (Seci Center Bucharest, 2011: 130).

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Specifically, Islamist centers show great interest in the region of Raška and Polimlje (Sanjak of Novi Pazar) by performing various activities aimed at achieving well-known goals in this region. Specifically, for this region, the goal of the Islamists is to establish a radical Islamic ideology among the local Muslim population, and then the territorial separation of the so-called Sandžak from the Republic of Serbia and its independence. In addition to certain Islamic countries such as Iran and Saudi Arabia which are the most important financiers of Muslim extremism in this area, political entities, as the bearers of religious extremism in that area, play an important role in the realization of this intention. The most radical among them are Islamist movements and organizations that operate publicly and covertly on the territory of the Raška-Polim region. This primarily refers to the influence of the Wahhabi movement, which publicly advocates conflicts and carries out terrorist acts in the leading countries of Christian civilization. In this regard, they are used to systematically disrupt the security of the cities within the Raška region in order to transfer the hotspot from Kosovo and Metohija to this region and thus distract the attention of the Serbian authorities from the Kosovo problem (Trifunović, Stojaković and Vračar, 2011: 242-243).

In this regard, the Republic of Serbia has adopted a significant number of strategic documents and legal acts and has significant institutions in terms of combating terrorist activities. Therefore, this is also the aim of this paper which seeks to show the specified capacities of the Republic of Serbia in terms of countering terrorism.

As the review of the literature has revealed, there exist a number of articles addressing strategic, legal and institutional fight against terrorism (Alexander, 2005; Picco, 2004; Picco, 2005; Kydd & Walter, 2006; Pietrasanta, 2015; El Difraoui & Uhlmann, 2015; Özbey, 2018; Antoliš, 2009; Pavlović, 2016; Popović, 2019).

The paper presents a strategic approach in the fight against terrorism, the legal framework for the fight against terrorism and the institutional approach to the fight against terrorism in the Republic of Serbia.

STRATEGIC APPROACH IN THE FIGHT AGAINST TERRORISM

At this point, it is important to mention the *National Strategy for the Prevention and Countering of Terrorism for 2017-2021*, which provides guidelines for the improvement of the existing methods and development of new methods, measures and instruments for the prevention and countering of terrorism, with the aim of establishing a proportion between the extent of resource engagement and threat level. This strategy aims to protect the Republic of Serbia from the terrorist threat posed to its citizens, values and interests, while supporting international efforts in the fight against terrorism. This purpose will be achieved, among other things, through the implementation of targeted and designed

measures at the doctrinal level, through the development and enhancement of security culture in society and promotion of certain values at the normative and institutional levels, the improvement of capacities for preventing and countering terrorism, particularly capacities for countering violent extremism and radicalization leading to terrorism, as an increasingly pronounced phenomenon. Strategic objectives regarding prevention should be achieved through measures for the prevention of causes and mitigation of the factors that promote radicalization leading to terrorism, including measures for early identification of radicalization and prevention measures starting with the implementation of a terrorist act planned or prepared. Early prevention measures will be complemented by the measures for the prevention of the spread of radicalization and violent extremism and efforts to deradicalize and reintegrate radicalized persons. The purpose of this strategy will be implemented in four areas defined by the *Action Plan of the National Strategy for the Prevention and Countering of Terrorism*. The strategy defines strategic objectives that protect core values and classifies them into four priority areas: the prevention of terrorism, violent extremism and radicalization leading to terrorism; protection by detecting and eliminating terrorist threats and weaknesses in the protection system; prosecuting terrorists, while respecting human rights, the rule of law and democracy, and the system's response to a terrorist attack. Therefore, the mentioned strategy relies on the *Action Plan* that was adopted for its detailed elaboration and efficient implementation. In the same action plan, the first priority area includes several objectives: developing the security culture of citizens; early identification of the causes and factors conducive to the spread of radicalism and violent extremism leading to terrorism; an environment discouraging the recruitment of young people to participate in terrorist activities; high-tech communication systems and digital networks resistant to the spread of radicalization and violent extremism; strategic communication skills. The second priority area includes the following strategic objectives: full understanding of the terrorism threat in the Republic of Serbia through early identification of target groups and radical methods; improved coordination and cooperation between state intelligence agencies; enhanced level of operational capabilities of police and intelligence-security capacities; an improved system for combating terrorist financing; the deradicalization and reintegration of radicalized persons; the enhanced level of critical infrastructure protection; improved efficiency of the integrated border management mechanism; the raised level of security in the field of transport, trade and exchange of goods and services. Furthermore, the third priority area consists of three objectives: harmonized national regulations with the relevant United Nations Security Council resolutions, EU acquis and other international standards; the improved system of detection, identification and prosecution of perpetrators of terrorism and terrorism-related crimes with respect for human rights; effective trial for terrorism-related offenses. Finally, the fourth priority area consists of two objectives: improved system of managing reducing the consequences the consequences of a terrorist attack and mitigating the consequences of a terrorist attack (Nacionalna strategija za pre-

venciju i borbu protiv terorizma za period od 2017-2021. godine, *Službeni glasnik broj 94/2017*).

The *National Strategy against Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing*, which was adopted in 2008 and represents a very important document of the Republic of Serbia in the fight against terrorism, should also be mentioned. This is the first strategy of the Republic of Serbia in this area. The 2008 National Strategy had an extremely important goal, which was to effectively establish a complex and comprehensive system for combating money laundering and terrorist financing. The overall goal and purpose of this strategy is to fully protect the country's financial system and economy from the dangers posed by money laundering and terrorist financing and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, thus strengthening the integrity of the financial sector and contributing to security and safety. This strategy elaborates this general goal through four strategic topics: reducing the risk of money laundering and terrorist financing through strategic planning, coordination and cooperation of all participants in the system; preventing the entry of property suspected of having been acquired by a criminal offense into the financial system and other sectors, that is, detecting and reporting property already entered; detecting and eliminating threats posed by money laundering and terrorist financing, punishing perpetrators of criminal offenses and confiscating illegally acquired property; qualified staff trained for effective participation in all segments of the system for combating money laundering and terrorist financing and public understanding of the role and plans of the competent bodies. This general strategic goal shall be achieved through the Action Plan (Nacionalna strategija za borbu protiv pranja novca i finansiranja terorizma, *Službeni glasnik broj 89/08*).

LEGAL FRAMEWORK OF THE FIGHT AGAINST TERRORISM

Further, the legal basis for anti-terrorist response lies in the national criminal legislation (Criminal Code of the Republic of Serbia) and adopted international conventions, bilateral and multilateral agreements. The Criminal Code of the Republic of Serbia provides for the following criminal offenses: terrorism (Article 391); public incitement to commit terrorist acts (Article 391a); recruitment and training for terrorist acts (Article 391b); the use of a lethal device (Article 391c); the destruction of, and damage to, a nuclear facility (Article 391g); endangering persons under international protection (Article 392); terrorist financing (Article 393), and terrorist association (Article 393a) (Krivični zakonik Republike Srbije, *Službeni glasnik broj 85/2005, 88/2005; 107/2005; 72/2009; 111/2009; 121/2012; 104/2013; 108/2014 i 94/2016*; Zakon o izmjenama i dopunama Krivičnog zakonika Republike Srbije, *Službeni glasnik broj 35/2019* Law on Amendments to the Criminal Code of the Republic of Serbia, Official Gazette No. 35/2019). Regarding criminalization related to recruitment and training for committing terrorist acts, the amendments to the Criminal

curity Council consists of the President of the Republic of Serbia, who is also the chairman, Prime Minister, Minister of Defense, Minister of the Interior, Minister of Justice, Chief of the General Staff of the Serbian Army, Director of the Security Information Agency, Head of the Military Security Service within the Ministry of Defense, and Secretary of the Council and this function is exercised by the Chief of Staff of the President of the Republic of Serbia (Law on Fundamentals of Security Services of the Republic of Serbia, Article 6, Official Gazette of the Republic of Serbia, No. 116/2007).

The Council is not just a consultative body, given that its decisions are binding. It has its own operational powers – the Coordination Bureau which operationally coordinates the work of security services and implements the conclusions of the National Security Council. The Coordination Bureau consists of the directors of the Military Intelligence Agency, the Military Security Agency, the Security Information Agency and the Secretary of the National Security Council. If the need arises, representatives of specific government bodies may be invited to participate in the Coordination Bureau: representatives of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the police, and heads of police administrations, Republican Public Prosecutor, the Director of Customs and other heads of government bodies, organizations and institutions. Additionally, the Serbian Government established the Commission for the adjustment of operations and further improvement of cooperation in the field of Justice and internal affairs on issues of general interest, especially in the fight against corruption, organized crime, terrorism, drugs, human trafficking, confiscation, money laundering, and so on. The Commission has adopted an Action Plan to implement its activities in order to coordinate operations and further improve cooperation between the said bodies. Of course, the fight against terrorism is only one of the issues that the Council and the Commission deal with. There is no such an institution in the Republic of Serbia that solely deals with combating terrorism (Seci center Bucharest, 2011: 131-132).

The following organizational units within the Ministry of the Interior of the Republic of Serbia participate in the fight against terrorism:

- The Criminal Police Directorate, within which there is a Service for Combating Terrorism and Extremism, is responsible for the prevention, detection and clarification of terrorism and extremism-related criminal offenses and detection and apprehension of perpetrators of these criminal offenses. The service was established in December 2013, with its Department for the Monitoring and Investigation of Terrorism which was established in 2007. The Service for Combating Terrorism and Extremism continuously monitors all phenomena and events relevant to security in the Republic of Serbia and gathers operational intelligence regarding persons, groups, organizations and movements whose activities are related or may be related to terrorism and/or extremism in order to prevent the commission of criminal terrorism and extremism-related offenses in the Republic of Serbia or to use the territory of the Republic

of Serbia for the preparation or commission of such actions in other countries, as well as to prevent activities advocating terrorism and extremism, recruitment, raising or storing funds for these activities. The service consists of the Department for Countering Terrorism and the Department for Countering Extremism and four field departments (departments in Belgrade, Novi Sad, Nis and Novi Pazar) (Ministry of the Interior of the Republic of Serbia, 2018).

- The special anti-terrorist unit is an organizational unit within the Police Directorate, the Ministry of the Interior. It is intended for the execution of the following high-risk tasks in accordance with legal regulations and authorities: the planning and execution of the most complex security tasks in the fight against terrorism; interventions in hostage situations; interventions in aircraft hijacking and other crisis situations; interventions in cases of barricading and resistance to firearms; the apprehension of members of organized criminal groups in cooperation with other organizational units within the Ministry of the Interior; the security of persons and facilities whose security, according to the assessment of the relevant government bodies, is threatened (Ministry of the Interior of the Republic of Serbia, 2018).
- The Gendarmerie is a special police unit at the headquarters of the Police Directorate whose task is to collect and process operational intelligence, detect terrorist offenses and ensure evidence, apprehend perpetrators of criminal offenses, intervene in the internal defense of the country in order to break up organized terrorist groups, including preventive anti-terrorist activities (Ministry of the Interior of the Republic of Serbia, 2018).

In addition to the police, the Operations Department within the Military Security Services is responsible for combating terrorism (Law on the Military Security Agency and the Military Intelligence Agency, Article 6, Official Gazette of the Republic of Serbia No. 88/2009, 55/2012, 17/2013). Also, the Analytics Department within the Military Intelligence Agency is in charge of combating terrorism (Law on the Military Security Agency and the Military Intelligence Agency, Article 24, Official Gazette of the Republic of Serbia No. 88/2009, 55/2012, 17/2013).

The Security Information Agency (*Bezbednosno-informativna agencija – BIA*) performs significant activity in the fight against terrorism. The Agency consists of the Directorate for Countering Terrorism and International Organized Crime. An important segment of the work of the Security Information Agency is the investigation, detection and documentation of links between individuals, groups and organizations involved in international organized crime and terrorism (BIA, 2018).

The Republic Public Prosecutor’s Office also plays a statutory role in the fight against terrorism through its criminal department, that is, the Special

Prosecutor's Office for Organized Crime (Republican Public Prosecutor's Office of the Republic of Serbia, 2018), including High Courts which are also competent for crimes contained in Chapter 34. (crimes against humanity and other values protected under international law), where there are also incriminations related to terrorism (Higher Courts of the Republic of Serbia, 2018). The organization and jurisdiction of government bodies responsible for combating terrorism is regulated under a special law (Zakon o organizaciji i nadležnosti državnih organa u suzbijanju organizovanog kriminala, terorizma i korupcije, *Službeni glasnik Republike Srbije, broj 94/2016 i 87/2018*).

CONCLUSION

Due to the popularization of radical groups and movements in areas where there are religious minorities, Serbia has developed capabilities to combat terrorism. These capacities are reflected in the existence of strategic documents, legal acts and various institutions which are, in addition to their regular duties and tasks, responsible for the suppression of terrorism as well.

Regarding the strategic documents, it is important to mention the *National Strategy for the Prevention and Countering of Terrorism for 2017-2021* and the *National Strategy against Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing*. The *National Strategy for the Prevention and Countering of Terrorism for 2017-2021*, in addition to its importance related to the protection of the Republic of Serbia from terrorist threats posed to its citizens, values and interests and support of international efforts in the fight against terrorism, the implementation of targeted and designed measures at the doctrinal level through the development of security culture and promotion of certain values at the normative and institutional levels through the improvement of capacities for the prevention and countering of terrorism, is also important because it has measures for the prevention of the spread of radicalization and violent extremism, efforts to deradicalize and reintegrate radicalized persons. Also, it is important to note here that the goals of this strategy are achieved through its Action Plan. In addition to this strategy, the importance of the National Strategy against Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing should be mentioned, which established a complex and comprehensive system for the fight against money laundering and terrorist financing. It seeks to protect the country's financial system and economy from the dangers posed by money laundering and terrorist financing and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, thus strengthening the integrity of the financial sector and contributing to security and safety. These activities are implemented through its Action Plan. Here rises the need for the implementation of the previously mentioned strategic documents, as well as precise compliance with the deadlines envisaged under the action plans. Therefore, we believe that these strategic documents should not remain on paper.

Further, in addition to the strategic documents, legal regulations are also important, more precisely, the *Criminal Code*, the *Law on the Prevention of Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing* and the *Criminal Procedure Code of the Republic of Serbia*. The *Criminal Code* criminalizes various terrorist activities, while the *Law on the Prevention of Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing* prescribes actions and measures to be undertaken to prevent and detect money laundering and terrorist financing and regulates the jurisdiction of government bodies to implement these provisions. On the other hand, the *Criminal Procedure Code* enables the proper application of substantive law by government bodies. If the above-mentioned legal regulations are applied in an appropriate way, we can certainly expect important results in the fight against terrorism.

In addition to the above, it is clear that the Republic of Serbia has significant institutions that, within their competence, can produce good results in the fight against terrorism. Thus, there are specific capacities that can produce results both in the preventive and repressive sense. In our view, Serbia's institutions should pay special attention to preventive work, primarily the fight against the process of radicalization.

Based on the above, it may be concluded that the Republic of Serbia has significant capacities to combat terrorism. In addition to the strategic documents, legislation and its own institutions, Serbia has the opportunity to cooperate with other countries and international institutions in the fight against terrorism.

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- Закон о измјенама и допунама Кривичног законика Републике Србије, *Службени тласник број 35/2019*.
- Законик о кривичном поступку Републике Србије, *Службени тласник број 72/2011, 101/2011, 121/2012, 32/2013, 45/2013, 55/2014 и 35/2019*.

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BOOK REVIEWS

Review of the book entitled *Basic integration and cooperation policies in the area of internal affairs and justice in the European Union: Legal and institutional framework of the area of freedom, security and justice* by Boris Tučić

A SERIOUS APPROACH TO UNDERSTANDING THE EUROPEAN UNION

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Research on European Union in Republika Srpska, Serbia, and Bosnia and Herzegovina has so far been apologetic in nature – without a critical or scientific approach. Unfortunately for science and professional discourse in the countries of this region, most of the published books are either hymns about this international organization or conference proceedings and guides that uncritically present the EU as a fantastic emerging state or an alleged equal community of European countries. These guides set out requirements for specific areas which countries need to meet to become EU members or how a member state should behave to meet the bureaucratic requirements of the supranational EU

However, with a dose of political and legal analysis, Tučić writes about one segment of the development of the supranational organization of the EU. Tučić views the European Union in a research and quality manner and presents it theoretically.

In his book, Tučić explores the political and legal context of integration and cooperation in the area of internal affairs and justice of the European Union. Tučić looks at the most significant problems that this form of EU action is facing. The author focuses on the legal, institutional and regulatory framework of the so-called area of freedom, security and justice as one of the goals of integration and cooperation in the EU. In this regard, the author considers extensive legal documents and laws regulating this area. These are very complex processes which take place at the national and supranational level, which is burdened with various challenges. The author himself is skeptical about the direction in which this EU's goal will develop, bearing in mind that it is an area of cooperation, but also resistance to the supranational regulation of this area, which is expressed by the national policies of the EU member states.

The monograph consists of preface, seven chapters, concluding remarks, bibliography and the author's biography.

Following the preface, the issues related to the characteristics of the European Union as a legal, regulatory and institutional matrix in which the project entitled *Area of Freedom, Security and Justice* is set are discussed in the first chapter. The second chapter addresses the first initiatives and the beginning of cooperation in the area of internal affairs and justice. The third chapter deals with the development of the idea of supranational regulation of internal security through amendments to the contractual and strategic framework for the creation and implementation of policies in this area. The fourth chapter provides an overview of the most important mechanisms and instruments of each policy implemented within the *Area of Freedom, Security and Justice*, including institutional structure monitoring, its development and mode of operation. These are freedom of movement, asylum, visas, migration, police and security issues related to the prevention and fight against crime, judicial cooperation in civil and criminal matters. Chapters five, six and seven discuss the European Union's activities in the area of internal affairs and justice, with a special emphasis on the criminal law cooperation achieved at the European level, both in material and procedural part, as the most challenging segment within the *Area of Freedom, Security and Justice*. The author also provides a review of the activities of the Court of Justice of the European Union.

Boris Tučić wrote his book when the European Union was faced with various crises, which raise the question of the future of that supranational organization. The migrant crisis is particularly noteworthy. In this regard, Tučić emphasizes sharp differences between EU countries, not only in terms of migrant quotas, but also in terms of appropriate modalities for dealing with this security risk. The German-led bloc of states managed to impose its proposals and the institutions in Brussels, including the Court of Justice itself, sided with them. Tučić concludes that resolutions regarding these issues, which can be adopted by re-voting, cannot bring anything good to the EU countries. He believes that the opposite is happening and that the actions of member states in facing the challenges of the migrant crisis clearly indicate that the lack of solidarity on key issues only leads to further deepening of the negative situation in which the EU has found itself.

Tučić's book, which is an academic work but can also be used as a textbook at colleges, has been lacking in the literature on the European Union and is of great importance because such a textbook has not been published in Republika Srpska so far.



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- ✓ Each reference cited in text must appear in the reference list.
- ✓ Uncited sources should not be included in the reference list.
- ✓ When citing several works by the same author, they should be ordered by year of publication, the earliest first.
- ✓ When an article has two authors, co-authored articles are listed after single author articles.
- ✓ If a work has no author, use the title of the work or the name of institution in place of an author's name.
- ✓ When writing a work, it is necessary to properly use the intellectual property of other authors. Plagiarism, taking people's original ideas, words or other creative expression without acknowledging the source by citing a reference, represents a serious violation of scientific ethics. Plagiarism is a violation of the author's rights, which is punishable by law.



FACULTY OF SECURITY STUDIES
UNIVERSITY OF BANJA LUKA



UNIVERSITY OF CRIMINAL INVESTIGATION
AND POLICE STUDIES

JOURNAL OF SECURITY AND CRIMINAL SCIENCES

JOURNAL OF THE FACULTY OF SECURITY STUDIES,
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AND

UNIVERSITY OF CRIMINAL INVESTIGATION
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- GUIDELINES FOR REVIEWERS -

The Journal of Security and Criminal Sciences publishes innovative scholarly articles that address topics ranging from security studies, criminalistics and forensics, protection and rescue, the organization of policing and police activities, to special physical education. Additionally, the journal publishes articles in other scientific fields that are closely related to the profile of the journal.

The journal publishes original research articles, review articles, short communications, article critique or response papers, conference reports, book reviews, and research projects reports that have not previously been published or submitted to another journal for consideration in any form.

Article 53 of the Rulebook on Publishing Academic Work ("Official Gazette of Republika Srpska" No. 77/17) provides for the quality of a review as one of the criteria for the categorization of journals.

- Pursuant to Article 35(5) of the Rulebook, the review must contain the following:
 1. Evaluation of the relevance and originality of the article and its contribution to the relevant field;
 2. Evaluation of the novelty and originality of research;
 3. Evaluation of the methods used;

4. Recommendation for assorting the manuscript into the relevant category or article type;
 5. Evaluation of the literature used;
 6. Recommendation to publish the article.
- Article 23 of the Rulebook provides for the following article types:
 1. **Original research article** is, in principle, organized according to the IMRAD scheme for experimental research or in a descriptive way for descriptive scientific fields, in which the text about the research results of the author's own study obtained using scientific methods, which are textually described and allow for the research to be replicated and the facts to be verified, is published for the first time.
 2. **Review article** presents an overview of recent articles regarding a specific topic with the aim of summarizing, analyzing, evaluating, or synthesizing the main ideas arguments and findings, with new syntheses that must encompass the results of the author's own research.
 3. **Short communication** is a short article or a preliminary study which does not have to include all the IMRAD elements. It summarizes the findings of the author's completed original research or article still in progress.
 4. **Article critique or response paper** is a discussion of a certain scientific topic, based exclusively on scientific argumentation, in which the author expresses his/her opinion which must be supported with evidence, that is, confirms or disproves the findings of other authors.
 5. **Informative review** such as editorials or commentaries.
 6. **Review** is an evaluation of a book, instrument, computer program, case, or a scientific event. It evaluates the correctness/incorrectness of a scientific paper, criteria, or starting points, with a particular emphasis on the quality of the work evaluated.
 - When reviewing the article, the reviewers should consider the following:
 1. Does the article fit the scope of the Journal of Security and Criminal Sciences?
 2. Does the title clearly describe the article?
 3. Does the article adhere to the journal's standards?
 4. Does the article in the relevant category have all the necessary elements (for example: original research article – introduction, methods, results, discussion, conclusion)?
 5. Are tables and figures easy to interpret and understand?
 6. Are the sources cited in accordance with the Instruction for authors?

- Other notes (Article 35, items 2, 4 and 6)
 1. Articles are evaluated descriptively.
 2. Reviewing form must be signed if it is in printed form and sent to the editorial office via email for each article reviewed.
 3. Reviewers are required to point out possible violations of ethical standards in the work.
 4. Reviewers should provide a full reference to a representative single author/co-authored articles from the narrower scientific field, such as the work they have reviewed.

