KEY INSTITUTIONAL ACTORS OF EUROPEAN SECURITY – CURRENT STATE AND CHALLENGES

Boris Tučic[1]
Faculty of Security Studies, University of Banja Luka

Abstract: This paper addresses the adaptability and ability of three institutional actors of European security– the EU, the NATO, and the OSCE – to properly respond to security challenges facing Europe, especially those existing at the non-state level. The position, status, nature and functions, and the relations within and between the key institutional actors of European security are considered within the study of international relations. Weaknesses in their operation have been identified, which are of a structural nature, but also a consequence of the international environment. In the EU, it is possible to identify a wide range of security policies, different developments and efficiencies. As a "civil force", the EU addresses security challenges using civil, political and economic instruments, focusing on the stability of its immediate environment. However, in order to play the role of a global security actor, the EU must build an autonomous security identity, which is, for now, an unsolvable problem. The NATO continues to be the personification of hard, military power in the face of security challenges, which does not sufficiently guarantee its security, and often means breaching the security of other countries. The OSCE, like NATO, is a relic of the past and its basic quality is diplomatic inclusiveness. It is an organization of "displaced" political power, without the necessary authority. The weaknesses of these three institutional actors, as well as the complexity of international relations, require a far higher level of political, functional and operational adaptability in order to understand and address the existing security challenges.

Keywords: security, defense, European Union, NATO, OSCE.

INTRODUCTION

The fall of the Berlin Wall and the end of the Cold War marked the beginning of a process of dynamic change in the system of international relations, including a strong modification of the hitherto ruling state - centrist security paradigm. Under the influence of various factors, especially the globalization

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1 Corresponding author: dr. Boris Tučić, Assistant Professor at the Faculty of Security Studies, University of Banja Luka. E-mail: boris.tucic@fbn.unibl.org.

process based on the liberal-democratic principles, the security context in the past thirty years has been further complicated in both the objective and subjective terms, and it could be said that today's challenges to national, regional and international security are as serious as those the world faced in the midst of mutual block setbacks. The tectonic (geo) political, institutional and structural changes that have taken place in the last few decades are especially visible in Europe, which is, generally speaking, united under a single value umbrella, whose institutional and political manifestation is primarily represented by the EU which, has gone through a thorny evolutionary path since the Maastricht Treaty.[2] Changes in the security paradigm and the introduction of the global security category, as well as the proliferation of security challenges that substantially exceed the capacity of national security instruments, inevitably impose the need to consider the institutional dimension of European security architecture and its adequacy in relation to the existing security environments which, in addition to the "traditional" security challenges that are manifested through the relations between the great powers and the category of hard power within them, include other no less significant challenges and risks related to terrorism, the migrant wave from the Middle East, the global epidemiological situation, energy (in)stability, climate change, pronounced economic and developmental discrepancies at the global level, cyberspace or, on the other hand, respect for human rights.

With the exception of various transitional and post-transitional regional and subregional initiatives and structures[3] that also seek to strengthen security, that is, prevent, reduce and eliminate various security risks, European security, in the institutional sense, is based on three elements – the EU, as a civil force, NATO, as the personification of hard power, regardless of the attempts to reform and adapt it to the changed regional and global international circumstances and its transformation into an organism that would functionally be much more than a military alliance, and the OSCE, as a surviving offspring of some previous period, albeit without a real, recognized and sufficiently recognized political and security authority. The three mentioned institutional actors have different positions, nature, goals and tasks within the European security architecture, and their most important characteristics are briefly described in the following sections. A particular issue under consideration is the ability of key institutional actors to respond properly and effectively to contemporary security challenges, especially those manifested at the non-state level. Finally, the author's concluding remarks on all relevant issues analyzed are presented.

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2 The key moments in the development process of European integration, which are formally often manifested through amendments to the founding acts of the European organization, are colloquially marked by the city in which the amendments to the founding acts took place. In particular, the Maastricht Treaty, which, among other things, established the European Union, was signed on February 7, 1992 and entered into force on November 1, 1993.

3 For example, the Regional Cooperation Council (RCC), the South-East European Cooperation Process, the Black Sea Initiative, the Central European Initiative, the South-East European Law Enforcement Center, MARRI, etc.

EUROPEAN UNION

Stricto sensu, the EU's security function is reflected in two policy areas implemented at the European level – the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) with the Common Security and Defense Policy (CSDP) as one of the important components, including policies that are implemented within the former integration and cooperation in the area of home affairs and justice with a cross-border or transnational component, that is, current policies within the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice. In addition to these two policy areas, indirect security implications undoubtedly have other modalities of integration and cooperation, that is, common policies at the European level, aimed at preventing and eliminating potential causes or roots of certain security risks.

Policy of integration and cooperation in the area of home affairs and justice

Since the Treaty of Amsterdam,[4] when it was ambitiously designed, that is, the Treaty of Lisbon,[5] when it was additionally contractually emphasized, the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice has manifested itself as the most dynamic area of creating and implementing common policies which, simply put, aim at achieving and protecting fundamental values on which the European Union rests, including the realization and preservation of the highest possible level of security for the organization, its member states and their citizens in all three components that the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice includes. Although much has been done in the area of common policies in the past decades, a brief overview of each of the three components indicates a number of weaknesses that seriously jeopardize the full realization of the contractually designed goal. In doing so, some of the weaknesses that can be identified are of a structural or institutional nature, while others are more related to the axiological dimension as a key precondition for achieving the proclaimed common policies and their goals. In the domain of "freedom", that is, the freedom of movement of people and the policies that are in its direct function, such as visa, asylum, migration, external border controls policies or policies related to the status and position of stateless and third-country nationals, it seems that all structural, institutional and, in particular, value weaknesses have come to the fore in dealing with the migrant crisis. Under the influence of the "global fight against terrorism", as it was often referred to, after the events of September 11, 2001, and the conflicts of varying intensity and, consequently, a series of extremely negative economic and social implications in the Near East and Middle East, a large displacement of the population and the creation, of strong pressure, especially at certain intervals, on the external borders of the Union occurred, which the organization and its member states have failed to cope with properly. And not only that, since the very beginning there were differences between the member states on how to

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4 The Treaty of Amsterdam amending the Treaty on European Union, the treaties establishing the European Communities and related acts, was signed on October 2, 1997 and entered into force on May 1, 1999.

5 The Treaty of Lisbon amending the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty establishing the European Community, was signed on December 13, 2007 and entered into force on December 1, 2009.

deal with the migrant challenge: on the one hand, there were several states led by FR Germany, which advocated the liberal concept of controlled opening of borders for migrants and their distribution based on the pre-determined quotas for each member state, while members of the Visegrad Group strongly opposed this concept, who believed that more effective control of the Union's external borders should be ensured and migrants prevented from entering the EU. As a result of the lack of solidarity between member states on this issue, although it is about one of the unavoidable functional and value principles on which the Union and its policies are based, decisions on migrant quotas were adopted by the Council by re-vote, involving the EU Court of Justice, and the expression of extremely individualistic action by member states in order to protect their own borders and security. The culmination of the Union's expressed weakness in addressing the security challenges posed by the migrant crisis was reflected in relying on, in many European capitals, a highly unpopular partner – Turkey, in protecting its external borders, in exchange for certain concessions from Brussels, such as financial support, the revitalization of the accession process or, as subsequently interpreted by official Ankara, support for its policies in Syria. Regarding "security", which means police cooperation in the narrower sense aimed at preventing or combating crime with the cross-border component and its individual manifestations, although it covers almost all known instruments of international police-security cooperation, it is possible to identify structural and institutional weaknesses. One of the most pronounced is the position, status and powers of EUROPOL, as a key European coordinator of police activities carried out by the competent agencies of member states. Although amendments to the founding acts have continuously strengthened the position of EUROPOL since its establishment, the original German idea of the late 80's and early 90's to establish an authentic supranational police agency with operational powers has never been, nor will ever e, implemented, simply because it directly opposes the classical notion of state sovereignty, which is still prevalent. Therefore, EUROPOL continues to operate primarily at the coordination and communication level, with slightly modified role with regard to joint investigation teams, although it does not have any operational powers here either. Coordinated police action at the European level is aimed at a wide range of international crime; however, the security threats related to terrorism have posed a serious problem for the Union and its members in the last fifteen years are. Several European capitals, from Madrid, through London and Paris, to Brussels, have been the target of terrorist attacks, including various terrorist attacks and incidents in other, smaller European cities. The common denominator for most terrorist attacks on European soil represents political and religious fundamentalism, and the root of this security problem seems to be almost identical to that of the security risks associated with the migrant crisis, which can be identified in the foreign policy failures of leading European countries regarding the support and participation in the implementation of American policy in the Middle East. In this context, a special aggravating circumstance for the security of the Union and its members is reflected in the fact that, unlike the initial period when the

terrorist threat was usually "imported" from crisis areas, members of religious and political radicalism can often be identified among the citizens in member states within the second or third generation of descendants of former immigrants from today's problematic areas. Therefore, as indicated by the EU's key strategic documents, such as the EU Security Union Strategy 2020-2025 and the EU Strategic Agenda for 2019-2024 (Tučić 2020, 99), and one of the priorities is the prevention of radicalism "in its own yard", that is, identification and elimination of the very roots of radicalism among the youth. Finally, the "justice" component means judicial cooperation in civil and criminal matters with elements of foreignness. While judicial cooperation in the area of civil law is evolutionarily "older" and by its nature and content represents support to the establishment and functioning of the internal market and the realization of "four great freedoms" within it, the cooperation and integration in criminal matters is primarily aimed at strengthening security within the European Union in the purpose of fighting the most serious forms of crime. Although it is still relatively new in relation to civil law, the application of different legal instruments and techniques has made it possible to ensure common, uniform criminal law standards regarding the nature and essence of the crime and the nature and character of the envisaged sanctions. For this reason, optimistic, but not entirely correct, theses on "European criminal law" or "European Union criminal law" can often be found in theory (Klipp, 2016; Mitsilegas, 2016; Ambos, 2018). However, it is a fact that, despite the progress made, there are still numerous problems in achieving criminal cooperation within the Union, which directly arise from the conflict between the prerogatives of national laws and European laws, which are manifested in almost all dimensions of criminal cooperation, from criminal offenses and corresponding sanctions to the concrete application of some key European instruments in this area, such as the European Arrest Warrant, the European Investigation Order or the European Victim Protection Order.

Common foreign and security policy

The slowest-growing area, including the EU's most contested policy, is the EU's Common Foreign and Security Policy, which, despite the relative improvements made by the Lisbon Treaty, remains firmly positioned on intergovernmental cooperation mechanisms which hamper any ambition to make the EU a more credible actor on the global stage. Of course, the insistence on intergovernmental mechanisms and unanimity in the decision-making process is a result of the unwillingness of member states to reduce their sovereignty regarding foreign policy, especially in times of their serious disagreement on numerous current foreign policy issues. Repeated weaknesses of the EU to properly address critical foreign policy issues, even in their own backyard, have given enough arguments to the proponents of the thesis of the European organization as an "economic giant, political dwarf and military ant", but also a trigger

for various initiatives to overcome the existing situation and the creation of a framework in which, as has often been pointed out, the Union could fully fulfill all its foreign policy potentials. One of the latter refers to the French – German proposal for the establishment of the European Security Council, as a special body, which could make key strategic decisions faster and enable easier definition of common interests in the area of foreign policy and security. Although the need for institutional and procedural improvement in the foreign policy domain cannot be disputed, this initiative, including some previous initiative, opens more questions than it answers, and its perspective in that sense is more than questionable. As a legitimate component of the EU's Common Foreign and Security Policy, there is a Common Security and Defense Policy with the prospect of establishing a common defense, which, at first glance, might suggest that the European Union has taken a step toward building an autonomous security and defense identity, which is not the case, of course. Specifically, under Articles 42.2 and 42.7 of the Lisbon Treaty, any action undertaken by the Union, in this context, must take into account and be in accordance with the obligations of the member countries of the NATO and relevant policies of this organization. In other words, NATO is contractually recognized as Europe's primary defense umbrella and as a framework for the implementation of the collective security of European countries, and any EU's eventual action, that is, member states under its auspices, be it peacekeeping, conflict prevention or international security, is carried out with strong reliance on the North Atlantic Alliance. The attempt to mark the EU's relatively autonomous defense identity is also manifested through contractual solutions that regulate the obligation of member states to strengthen their military and defense capacities by provisions that provide for the establishment of the European Defense Agency, albeit as an auxiliary intergovernmental body for the strategic planning analysis, through the introduction of provisions in Article 42.7 of the Lisbon Treaty, which provide for specific elements of the collective security system, that is, define the obligation of member states to, adhering to the provisions of Article 51 of the UN Charter, protection and provide all necessary assistance to a member state subject to armed aggression. However, the first question to ask refers to the relation of the mentioned contractual solutions in relation to the built system of collective security and obligations of the member countries of NATO. Does this mean that such Lisbon solutions are primarily intended for the member states of the European Union that are not at the same time members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and what is their actual extent, given that the specified contractual obligation of member countries is strictly limited by their national defense and security policies? The reliance of the EU on NATO in conducting operations, as understandable as it is, hides, as it turned out, another danger which concerns open issues that some members of the Union have with Turkey, where the so-called Cyprus issue, that is, the status of the unrecognized Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus, which is why Turkey has on several occasions obstructed decision making in the NATO Council that would enable the EU to launch operations in an appropriate arrangement with NATO,

such as Operation Concordia in present-day Northern Macedonia or Operation Althea in BiH.

NATO

As has been already been mentioned, NATO continues to be the basic personification of hard military power in terms of defending the European continent. However, the end of the Cold War and the dissolution of the USSR, as the primary target of the Western Allies deterrence policy until that moment, raised the issue of the need for NATO's survival, especially on the grounds established by the 1949 Agreement. In other words, changes in international relations in the late 1980s and early 1990s, and especially the proliferation of unconventional and non-state security challenges, if there was a commitment to preserve NATO as a military-political organization, required the reform and modernization of NATO in order to be able to adequately adapt to the new, evolving security environment which, in its numerous characteristics, significantly differs from the one in which NATO was established and has existed for five decades. Indeed, if we look back at the last twenty years, we can see that NATO as an organization, with some illegal attempts to verify its security role by using bare military force even after the end of the Cold War, is in a continuous cycle of change and adaptation, greatly surpassing its original military – political and territorial identity. Particular focus is placed on, relatively speaking, new security challenges, including terrorism and cyberspace, both in the strategic-planning sense and the organizational-institutional sense.[6] However, the general impression is that, no matter how functional NATO is in its deterrent role regarding conventional security challenges, its functionality in the context of security challenges posed and implied by non-state actors, such as terrorist groups and organizations, is not so striking. The reasons for that are multiple, and one of them refers to the fact that, despite the efforts made, NATO has not yet developed the capacities through which an efficient unconventional, that is, non-military response to new security challenges would be enabled. Thus, despite the fact that this would be a precondition for action in that direction, there are no established or developed security- information capacities within NATO, which are necessary in this context. In other words, NATO still "manages best" and operates more simply in the classic military-conventional matrix, which means the perception of one, conventional, state enemy and positioning in relation to it. After all, the events within NATO and its activities that followed the annexation of Crimea to the Russian Federation in 2014 clearly speak in favor of the presented thesis. Also, following the terrorist attack on the United States on September 11, 2001, Article 5 of the Washington Agreement as a key element of the collective security system nurtured by this organization was activated and disproportionate

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6 For example, separate organizational units have been established within NATO to combat individual security challenges, most notably the unit for combating terrorism based in Ankara. (*Centers for Excellence against Terrorism*).

military force was used in a relatively wide area far exceeding the contractually established territorial North Atlantic identity of NATO.

Additionally, one of the current problems facing NATO is the lack of political unity among its members on a number of issues. One can cite the example of Turkey and its military-political "flirting" with the Russian Federation, including the purchase of some of the key weapons systems, in order to achieve Ankara's set interests regarding the Syrian issue or the intensification of already strained relations between Turkey and Greece, this time due to the right to underwater oil and gas exploration in the eastern Mediterranean. The specific attitude of the current US administration toward European partners of NATO should be added to this, which insisted on "burden sharing" in common security and defense from the very beginning, that is, on consistent compliance with the obligation to allocate at least 2% of GDP for military purposes, of which at least 20% should be directed to the development of military capabilities. Although, according to data in 2018 (NATO, 2019), for example, European members of NATO allocated about 264 billion dollars for defense, which is one and a half times more than China or four times more than the Russian Federation, the US administration repeatedly pointed out that the attitude of European allies toward NATO, that is, the USA, is unacceptable, that the USA would not finance Europe's security and defense interests, and emphasized radical changes in this sense, while some Western media, as unthinkable as it may seem, at times even talked about the possibility of leaving the Alliance (The Economist (July 6, 2019); Defense News (September 16, 2019); The New York Times (September 3, 2020).

The relationship between NATO and the EU, which has already been partially discussed, is not one-dimensional, although 21 members of NATO are also members of the EU. Previously, official Washington did not fully approve of initiatives to strengthen the EU's security and defense autonomy (The Hill (2019, November 15)), explaining that in that case there is a danger of unnecessary overlapping and duplication of NATO and European organizations and fearing, although these fears were rather unfounded, that there would be a derogation and relativization of the importance of NATO in the already deceptive and altered global circumstances. In this regard, the mentioned emphasis on NATO's role in the Lisbon Treaty can be interpreted as a result of the need to amortize such fears and for EU's stronger formal reliance on the Alliance's incomparably more developed capacity. In revitalizing the perception of the Russian Federation as a primary security threat in the conventional sense, NATO has acted cyclically in the direction of moving east, both by admitting Central and Eastern European countries, that is, the former Warsaw Pact members, and by strengthening its capacities and presence in the areas which the Russian Federation strategically views as its area of interest. Generally, it could be said that eastern countries are closer to the Russian Federation, especially the countries with accumulated negative historical experiences related to the Soviet period or the period of Russian Empire, such as the Baltic countries or Poland, are

more willing to follow the US policy within NATO in this regard, unlike Western European countries which are not characterized by such historical experiences and, some would say, occasional irrationality. The action of the United States and the Russian Federation are also important regarding the collapsing arrangements that have been the basis of European security for decades[7] and creating space for the revitalization of the arms race which, at times, resembles the one during the most radical phases of the Cold War. On the other hand, the prevailing perception of China by the United States and its European partners is that it does not currently pose a military threat, but, as noted by the EU institutions, China is increasingly manifesting itself as a very serious competitor in political, economic and technical-technological terms. meaning, which requires defining an appropriate strategic approach in facing this type of challenge, as evidenced by the conflicts between the US and European partners, on the one hand, and China, on the other, in the area of modern information technology and supporting infrastructure (Altmeyer, 2020).

A serious blow to the security of Europe was certainly the withdrawal of the UK from the EU on several grounds. In the context of the topic dealt with, the role of Great Britain as a "Euro-Atlantic security bridge" is especially important, that is, as an actor which, although its participation in EU security policies was rather limited, represented a significant link between the US's foreign-policy and security Atlanticism on the one hand, and the interests and policies that partners from the continental part of European have been trying to implement on the other hand. Currently, the final modality of future relations between the European organization and the UK in various areas is still the subject of negotiation. However, it can be said with certainty that intensive security cooperation is not only in the interest of both parties, but also something that no one questions. The only thing left is to determine the structural and institutional form of that cooperation, both at the multilateral level and through more concrete bilateral agreements that Britain would conclude with the most important European countries.

ORGANIZATION FOR SECURITY AND COOPERATION IN EUROPE (OSCE)

Since the 1975 Helsinki Final Act, including the 1990 Paris Charter for a New Europe and the 1999 Charter for European Security, the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) has played a certain role in European and global political and security processes, primarily as an international forum that brings together members from "Vancouver to Vladivostok", within which various issues directly and indirectly related to regional and global security are discussed, such as the fight against terrorism, the prevention of and

7 For example, the 1987 Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty (INF), which entered into force in 1988.

fight against illegal arms trade and human trafficking, conflict prevention and resolution, human rights protection with an emphasis on the status and rights of minority groups as well as the strengthening of democratic institutions and the electoral process. In other words, although there are certain established institutionalized forms of cooperation between the Russian Federation and the European Union, that is, Russia and NATO, the OSCE is the only, relatively speaking, European organization that brings together the most relevant individual, regional and subregional security actors. In this way, the OSCE, at least in principle, manifests itself as a key diplomatic forum for discussing a variety of security issues at various political-representative levels, from heads of states and governments, to technical and working groups. However, the main weakness of the OSCE lies in its institutional structure, operational modalities, and the nature of the instruments it applies. Specifically, the OSCE, as a form of deliberative or typical international organization, rests on the intergovernmental mechanisms of cooperation which, among other things, include consensual decision-making of its 56 members.[8] The number of members and frequent opposition of the views and interests of the member states are more than an aggravating factor in its operation. If we add to this the weaknesses related to the international legal nature of the instruments applied within it, it is not surprising that this organization is frequently "eliminated" from some key real political events in Europe and beyond, including the absence of necessary political and institutional authority. Seen from the perspective of today, it seems that the OSCE, conceived in the form of a Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe during the period of *détente*, the period of improved relations between the two major powers of Cold War, has never succeeded in overcoming the functional framework of Central and Eastern Europe and impose itself as a more serious strategic or operational actor onthe European political and security agenda.

The OSCE has been a broad diplomatic forum through which efforts are being made to ameliorate tensions between key political and security actors and take a common position on some of the most relevant issues in recent years. It is possible to give an example of the so-called Corfu Process initiated in 2008 with the aim of opening up a broader debate on Euro-Atlantic and Eurasian key security issues in the conditions of strong dissatisfaction with the European security architecture by the Russian Federation or the 2010 Summit in Astana which managed to bring together the highest representatives of member states and open up a number of important issues on European security in rather difficult circumstances, including the position and role of the OSCE itself in this context (Perišić, 2015: 238–240). However, at the same time, the Summit in Astana, which was held exactly ten years ago, was the last summit of heads of states and governments convened by the OSCE, which still means "relocating"

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8 However, there are exceptions, such as when applying the so-called Moscow Mechanism established in 1991 and amended in 1993, which provides an opportunity of sending expert missions at the initiative of 1 + 8 other members to a member states to investigate human rights and freedoms violations.

political authority to other forums and modalities of (un)institutionalized diplomatic communication.

A wide range of issues to which the OSCE is committed, the number of field missions in various transition and post-conflict areas and participatory inclusion that no other regional organization has given the OSCE the right to position itself as one of the three key institutional actors of European security, regardless of its numerous weaknesses, some of them are related to its internal solutions, while others, again, represent a manifestation of specific but dynamic turmoil in the system of international relations we are currently witnessing.

CONCLUSION

The numerous security risks facing the European continent at the dawn of the third decade of the 21st century can generally be divided into two groups. On the one hand, there are still "inherited" or, more precisely, traditional security risks related to the relationship between the great powers and their often conflicting interests and goals, although the category of "great power" itself, under dynamic changes in the system of international relations and power relations between its key actors and the proliferation of entities whose actions seriously affect the international political and security context, can be presently interpreted differently. On the other hand, the European continent also faces a number of security challenges which are more inherent in the modern, globalized international context and primarily manifested at the level of non-state actors in international relations. Some of them, such as terrorism, illegal migration or global environmental disturbances are definitely not new or unknown, but the valence of danger posed to the security of European countries and their citizens came to the fore in the conditions created by the globalized society we live in.

In such circumstances, each of the three key institutional actors of European security – the EU, NATO and the OSCE, has its place, role and function. At the same time, the EU, for example, despite the periodic manifestation of immature ambition to develop its capacities in some other direction, acts as a civil force, so the instruments of its security action are of civil nature, which are directed toward broad prevention action and dealing with potential causes or the roots of security challenges a "united Europe" is faced with. Numerous weaknesses or the lack of the EU's potential to deal effectively with security challenges have already been discussed. However, what deserves special attention is the fact that the security of Europe pays the highest price for often blindly following the US foreign policy interests and goals, regardless of whether it is the perception of the Russian Federation and China or American interests in other parts of the world, as evidenced by the two, in addition to the epidemiological situation, the biggest challenges currently facing the EU and its member

states are the migrant crisis and terrorism, which were strongly initiated by a joint action of the United States and European partners in the Middle East.

The aspiration of the EU to become a global actor in international political and security processes can be realized only under the condition of building its full political autonomy and redefining its current position in relation to some of the key issues of modern international relations. As contradictory as it may seem, the withdrawal of the UK from the European Union can provide a certain space for action in that direction. NATO, on the other hand, have managed to survive the question of the purposefulness of its further existence following the Cold War and preserve its position as a military security umbrella of the Euro-Atlantic area. However, the key problem is reflected in the fact that, despite the multidimensional reform processes it has gone through or continues to go through, the Alliance does not have the capacity to respond to contemporary, non-state security challenges. Using military means and hard power to face more sophisticated security challenges inherent in modern history is often neither sufficient nor fully effective, which can produce catastrophic consequences that, as a boomerang, return to those who opt for this type of action. Despite its undoubted historical significance, the OSCE exists today primarily as a diplomatic forum of limited extent and certainly, as already mentioned, does not have the authority and capacity to play a more prominent role in international political and security processes. The greatest value of this organization is reflected in its inclusiveness, that is, the potential to bring together the most relevant actors of European security, excluding China. However, without adequate operational instruments and faced with the political disunity of its members and often failing to ensure a balance between some key principles it seeks to protect and advocate, such as the principle of preserving territorial integrity, the right of peoples to self-determination; unfortunately, the OSCE's role ends somewhere here.

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